Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume (more than 10) of file creation or renaming events within a short timeframe (30 minutes) initiated by a process named 'htspnew.exe'. It excludes common system and temporary directories to reduce noise, focusing on suspicious file modifications that might indicate bulk encryption or mass file manipulation.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume (more than 10) of file creation or renaming events within a short timeframe (30 minutes) initiated by a process named 'htspnew.exe'. It excludes common system and temporary directories to reduce noise, focusing on suspicious file modifications that might indicate bulk encryption or mass file manipulation.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume (more than 10) of file creation or renaming events within a short timeframe (30 minutes) initiated by a process named 'htspnew.exe'. It excludes common system and temporary directories to reduce noise, focusing on suspicious file modifications that might indicate bulk encryption or mass file manipulation.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume (more than 10) of file creation or renaming events within a short timeframe (30 minutes) initiated by a process named 'htspnew.exe'. It excludes common system and temporary directories to reduce noise, focusing on suspicious file modifications that might indicate bulk encryption or mass file manipulation.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
This rule detects the creation of cron jobs in /etc/cron.d/ that are associated with known miner file names (e.g., redis-miner, xminer). It explicitly looks for instances where the initiating process or its parent process is associated with Redis, suggesting a compromise or exploitation of a Redis service to establish persistence for a crypto miner.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects the BlueMoon exploit kit's post-exploitation activity, specifically identifying when a Chromium-based browser process (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) initiates command-line tools such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or curl.exe to download and execute a secondary payload named 'msgbox.exe' within the user's temporary directory.
Detects the installation or modification of a browser extension (manifest.json file creation) followed by network activity from the browser to trusted AI assistant domains within a five-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious browser extensions or content scripts being introduced to intercept or manipulate user interaction with AI services.
Detects instances where browser processes (chrome.exe or comet.exe) create multiple screenshot-related files in quick succession without apparent user interaction, a behavior pattern observed in the BragJack attack chain associated with hijacked browser AI agents.
Detects instances where browser processes (chrome.exe or comet.exe) create multiple screenshot-related files in quick succession without apparent user interaction, a behavior pattern observed in the BragJack attack chain associated with hijacked browser AI agents.
Detects unauthorized usage of Android Debug Bridge (ADB) commands for self-pairing or remote connection, along with behavioral indicators linked to the RatHat Go agent, including manual power management exemption settings, silent package installation with permission granting, and persistence via accessibility service enablement.
Detects artifacts associated with the CRUDEEXCLUDE Delphi-based loader, which is used to deploy the HEAVYGRAM backdoor. The rule identifies a combination of Delphi indicators, anti-analysis sandbox connectivity checks, decoy message boxes, and attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions for specific paths associated with the malware's activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from code editors (VS Code, Electron-based applications) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or the creation of a specific suspicious file 'EXTINSTALL_PWNED.txt' in the 'Users\Public' directory.
This rule detects file creation or modification events occurring within the 'ProgramData\ZlibDate' directory. This specific path and the associated file extensions (.Dat and .zip) are frequently associated with data staging activities or unauthorized file management by malicious software attempting to persist or exfiltrate data under the guise of legitimate application data.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
This rule detects a multi-stage malicious behavior chain: the execution of a suspected loader (identified by hash or specific mutex), followed by network communication to a known C2 domain or IP, and concluded by the placement of a file in the Windows Telemetry folder (typically mimicking msedge.exe). The events are correlated within a short time window (2 hours between each stage) on the same device.
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