Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential web shell installation via WordPress administrative panels. The rule identifies a WordPress administrator session executing a theme installation request triggered by an external (off-site) referer, followed shortly thereafter by the creation of new PHP files within the WordPress themes directory. This pattern is often indicative of an attacker leveraging a compromised admin session to upload a backdoor.
Detects potential web shell installation via WordPress administrative panels. The rule identifies a WordPress administrator session executing a theme installation request triggered by an external (off-site) referer, followed shortly thereafter by the creation of new PHP files within the WordPress themes directory. This pattern is often indicative of an attacker leveraging a compromised admin session to upload a backdoor.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms where a suspicious batch file (.bat) is placed within the Windows Startup folder and subsequently executed using command-line arguments that include specific file extensions like .exe and .ini. This behavior is indicative of malware, such as remote access trojans (RATs), attempting to maintain persistence upon system reboot.
Detects PHP web shells dropped into wp-content/uploads or plugin directories following WordPress plugin exploitation, characterized by host detail reporting and a browser-based file upload form
Detects the creation of multiple or specific file locks that deviate from standard naming conventions, often associated with wiper malware attempting to overwrite files or fill disks by creating locking files as part of their destructive payload.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities involving files placed in 'ProgramData\Firefox'. It identifies the creation or modification of a non-standard executable within this folder, followed by its execution by a trusted process (or itself), and the subsequent creation of a Registry run key for persistence. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence mechanism implementation using masqueraded file names.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a file named 'ClipBoard.txt' within the directory 'AppData\Roaming\ConfigsEx\', as well as the creation of the 'ConfigsEx' directory using command-line tools. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging sensitive information, such as harvested clipboard data, for potential exfiltration.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects a potential destructive activity pattern involving the staging of a payload in a non-standard directory (utilizing a directory name with a trailing space) followed by a burst of file deletions on the same device. This behavior is indicative of a secondary destructive payload execution, often associated with disk-wiping malware.
Detects files written to a non-standard path containing a deliberate trailing space after 'Windows' (e.g., 'C:\Windows \SysWOW64') combined with the creation of a registry run key for persistence. This pattern is associated with the CHOSEN BRICK threat activity to hide and maintain persistence for secondary payloads.
Detects specific malicious processes (smdqservice.exe, winappx.exe) or suspicious paths associated with the CHOSEN BRICK malware suite writing image files (png, jpg, jpeg, bmp) to sensitive system directories. This activity typically precedes the exfiltration of sensitive desktop capture data to C2 infrastructure.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a suspected persistence binary (identified by name or path) performs system discovery using native tools (tasklist, systeminfo, wmic) followed by the creation of potential data exfiltration artifacts (screenshots or audio recordings) on the same device within a two-hour window.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for known indicators of compromise associated with the Casbaneiro/Ousaban banking trojan. It identifies activity across network connections (IPs and domain patterns), DNS queries for specific C2 domains, and the presence or execution of known malicious file hashes (e.g., PDF lures, HTA, AutoIt scripts, and payload binaries).
Detects shell/install scripts that deploy an XMRig-based Monero cryptominer, consistent with the install script planted on the LeakySensey git repository server
Detects a process loading known malicious DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll) used by the FamousSparrow threat actor, followed by the creation or modification of a .dat file in the same process context. This pattern is indicative of the reflective loading of a backdoor payload without leaving the secondary binary on disk.
Detects a process loading known malicious DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll) used by the FamousSparrow threat actor, followed by the creation or modification of a .dat file in the same process context. This pattern is indicative of the reflective loading of a backdoor payload without leaving the secondary binary on disk.
Detects a process loading known malicious DLLs (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll) used by the FamousSparrow threat actor, followed by the creation or modification of a .dat file in the same process context. This pattern is indicative of the reflective loading of a backdoor payload without leaving the secondary binary on disk.
Detects the presence of known artifacts associated with the SparroWocky loader and backdoor, specifically identifying the file names 'winfsp-x64.dll' and 'DukeQt.dll', or files matching known SHA1 hashes of SparroWocky samples. The presence of these files on a host is a strong indicator of compromise.
Detects file artifacts referencing OtterCandy malware, which combines OtterCookie and RATatouille RAT capabilities, associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
Detects file artifacts referencing OtterCandy malware, which combines OtterCookie and RATatouille RAT capabilities, associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
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