Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of executable or script files within non-system directories that were initiated by the OneDrive sync process. This activity may indicate a user downloading malicious files via a compromised OneDrive account or a malicious payload being synced to the local system.
Detects the creation of a git branch with a name consisting of exactly 40 hexadecimal characters. This naming convention is a known technique used to bypass security controls such as commit-pin verification in AI coding agent plugins and other CI/CD integrations (often associated with Plugin4Shell research).
Detects the loading or presence of the vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys), which is frequently exploited in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to gain kernel-level access and disable security products. The rule monitors for file artifacts and service creation/execution commands associated with this driver.
Detects the creation of files with specific extensions (.locked, .locked_wip) or filenames (RESTORE_FILES.txt) commonly associated with ransomware operations and ransom notes.
Detects the creation or modification of specific system driver files (nvfsflt64.sys, Alinubx.sys) combined with the installation or initiation of a Windows service associated with NVIDIA filter names. This behavior is often indicative of persistence mechanisms, potential rootkit activity, or the deployment of vulnerable drivers (BYOVD).
Detects post-exploitation persistence artifacts on Windows endpoints managed by N-able N-central consistent with abuse of CVE-2026-18577, including a new Windows service named Cloudflared, registry Services key creation for Cloudflared, a file named svchost.exe written under a user's Documents folder, or process execution of cloudflared.exe or a Documents-located svchost.exe.
Detects execution and file artifacts associated with the 'fscan' network scanning tool, which is commonly used for internal network discovery and vulnerability scanning. The rule monitors for the presence of the fscan binary or evidence of its output files, specifically 'result.txt', often in combination with scanning parameters like port strings or target service references.
Detects execution and file artifacts associated with the 'fscan' network scanning tool, which is commonly used for internal network discovery and vulnerability scanning. The rule monitors for the presence of the fscan binary or evidence of its output files, specifically 'result.txt', often in combination with scanning parameters like port strings or target service references.
Detects the creation of files in the /tmp/ directory by common command-line tools (curl, wget, sh, bash), followed shortly by a successful external network connection by the same process from the same device, excluding known benign domains.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct indicators: deletion of Volume Shadow Copies (using native Windows utilities), mass file modifications (>100 files in 15 minutes), and the creation or modification of files typically associated with ransom notes. The rule uses an inner join to ensure these events happen within a 30-minute window of each other on the same device.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct indicators: deletion of Volume Shadow Copies (using native Windows utilities), mass file modifications (>100 files in 15 minutes), and the creation or modification of files typically associated with ransom notes. The rule uses an inner join to ensure these events happen within a 30-minute window of each other on the same device.
Detects the creation or modification of crontab files, as well as the execution of crontab commands, that involve suspicious paths (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, hidden files) or command obfuscation techniques such as base64 encoding. This behavior is often associated with the establishment of persistence by adversaries.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events involving the execution of 'setup.sh', the subsequent creation of a hidden file in temporary directories, and the deletion of specific architecture-named files (redtail.*). This behavior is indicative of a malware loader or droppers attempting to install and then remove traces of its components.
Detects anomalous SSH sessions originating from potentially suspicious IP addresses that utilize an 'SSH-2.0-Go' banner and immediately perform file creation operations associated with the RedTail botnet (e.g., shell scripts or architecture-specific binaries).
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
Detects instances where 'TieringEngineService.exe' or 'MsMpEng.exe' (Windows Defender) create, modify, or rename executable, library, or system files within the 'C:\Windows\System32\' directory. This behavior is highly irregular as these processes should not be authoring binaries in protected system folders, and may indicate process masquerading, unauthorized persistence, or defense evasion.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
This rule detects either the execution of a specific SSH daemon binary known to be trojanized or the creation/modification of files within the /var/lib/sshd/ directory, which is a common indicator of backdoor persistence or credential theft targeting SSH sessions.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the /tmp directory that follow a specific naming convention (t[number]_w.pipe) by an HAProxy process. This pattern is often associated with inter-process communication or potential post-exploitation activity where HAProxy is leveraged to handle named pipes for malicious command execution or data redirection.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
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