Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or renaming of .rbf (Rollback File) files within the C:\Config.Msi directory where the previous filename was 'marker.txt'. This behavior is associated with the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) and can be leveraged by adversaries to perform file operations or execute arbitrary code during installation processes.
Detects cloning and building xmrig-proxy from source (git clone + cmake/make), used by JadeProx operators to relay cryptomining traffic from compromised hosts behind a single mining pool connection. Build commands must specifically reference the xmrig-proxy repository or directory to reduce false positives from generic development builds.
Detects creation or modification of a shell profile (.bashrc/.zshrc/etc.) containing the exact 'tensorflow hardware compatibility check' marker used by the mrmustard stealer to disguise its persistence hook.
Detects curl.exe retrieving an .msi file from a URL that specifies a raw IP address (rather than a domain) and writing/staging it under ProgramData. This behavioral pattern was observed in Chaos ransomware group initial-access activity staging a fake Windows-update MSI from IP 172.86.126.18; that IP is a high-confidence indicator but the detection logic is structured around the broader raw-IP + .msi + ProgramData pattern since staging infrastructure rotates across campaigns.
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts on disk associated with Stealth Falcon's WebDAV-based delivery and staging infrastructure. The rule looks for filenames characteristic of their simulated 'clickfix' and application update social engineering themes.
Detects the creation of a PHP file with a specific malicious naming convention ('disable-batch-api-for-unauth.php') commonly associated with wp2shell post-exploitation activity in WordPress plugin or upload directories.
Detects the creation of a specific wallpaper file ('image_danger.jpg') associated with the GigaWiper malware family, which is indicative of a system defacement attempt during the destructive phase of an attack.
Detects the full TTF Trap JScript dropper chain executed by wscript.exe or cscript.exe. The obfuscated JScript dropper uses ActiveXObject instances (Scripting.FileSystemObject, ADODB.Stream, Microsoft.XMLDOM) combined with heavy string split/join obfuscation to decode and write both a Lua script disguised with a .ttf extension and a LuaJIT or AutoIt interpreter executable into C:\Users\Public\Libraries\. The dropper then invokes WScript.Shell to launch the dropped interpreter executable, passing the .ttf-disguised Lua script as a command-line argument to execute the next stage.
Detects the full TTF Trap JScript dropper chain executed by wscript.exe or cscript.exe. The obfuscated JScript dropper uses ActiveXObject instances (Scripting.FileSystemObject, ADODB.Stream, Microsoft.XMLDOM) combined with heavy string split/join obfuscation to decode and write both a Lua script disguised with a .ttf extension and a LuaJIT or AutoIt interpreter executable into C:\Users\Public\Libraries\. The dropper then invokes WScript.Shell to launch the dropped interpreter executable, passing the .ttf-disguised Lua script as a command-line argument to execute the next stage.
Detects indicators of the Miasma worm compromise on Windows and macOS systems. This includes the execution of malicious Spectral CLI payloads from npm npx cache directories, the staging and execution of sync.js payloads, the creation of Miasma-specific lock files and Cryptnet cache artifacts, and persistence established via Windows Registry Run keys.
This rule monitors for file-level artifacts related to the ModHeader browser extension, specifically targeting folder paths and file names that match the extension's unique ID. This is typically used to identify the installation or download of this extension, which has been associated with malicious activity.
This rule detects the creation of the 'C:\Config.Msi' folder or files within it that have weak security descriptors (SDDL). This folder is frequently used by the Windows Installer service, and if insecure permissions are applied, an attacker can perform privilege escalation or perform DLL hijacking by placing malicious files within this directory.
Detects file creation, modification, or renaming operations involving .rbs or .rbf files within the 'C:\Config.Msi' directory when the process performing the action is not 'msiexec.exe'. Adversaries may attempt to manipulate MSI rollback or installation files to achieve persistence or execute arbitrary code during the installation process.
This rule detects file-level activity associated with the known malicious version of the ModHeader browser extension (Extension ID: idgpnmonknjnojddfkpgkljpfnnfcklj). It flags the presence of specific indexedDB LevelDB files and temporary directories that are characteristic of the malicious update, which was used for unauthorized data access and browser-based persistence.
Detects creation of the lg.txt debug/failure log written by ChonkyChicken's filename-gating anti-sandbox check.
Detects the creation of a file named 'logAzure.txt' that contains sensitive Microsoft Graph or cloud configuration credentials, such as TenantId, ClientId, ClientSecret, or UserEmail. This activity is indicative of credential staging or exfiltration by malicious actors.
This rule identifies instances where files with specific extensions (.dll, .py) or the python executable are created on a system shortly after (or exactly at) the observed creation timestamp of notepad.exe. This logic aims to detect potential masquerading or side-loading techniques where attackers may attempt to hide their activities or establish persistence by mimicking or piggybacking on standard utility usage.
Detects creation of the mmcompat.pth file in Python site-packages, the mrmustard stealer's persistence mechanism designed to survive package uninstall.
Detects the installation of the srt64.sys kernel driver, associated with the Daxin rootkit. The detection monitors for the creation of this specific file within the System32\drivers directory and the creation of services referencing the driver file.
Detects the creation of a Windows Shortcut (.lnk) file in the Startup folder using WScript.Shell, often used by the Starland RAT or similar malware to establish persistence. The rule monitors command lines for the combination of WScript.Shell invocation, the CreateShortcut method, and targeting of pythonw.exe or LICENSE.txt files.
Detects the creation of a 'C:\user.png' file, which is known to be used as a marker file by NoEscape ransomware/wiper malware at the root of the system drive.
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