Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
752 detections
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Detects cleanup of captured frames, QR images, overlay resources, or decrypted modules after a banking fraud session, specifically targeting files with names containing 'screen', 'frame', 'overlay', 'qr', 'module', or 'stage' and extensions like '.png', '.jpg', '.bmp', '.dll', '.dat', '.bin' within common temporary or application data directories. The activity is attributed to processes with 'banana', 'client', 'update', or 'service' in their base file name.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with critical Linux log files such as /var/log/auth.log, /var/log/syslog, and /var/log/audit/audit.log. It specifically looks for file deletion or modification events, or process creation events that involve commands like 'rm', 'shred', 'truncate', 'unlink', or 'dd' targeting these log files. Legitimate processes like 'logrotate', 'rsyslog', 'syslog-ng', 'auditd', 'systemd', and 'journald' are excluded to reduce false positives.
Detects Pony malware dropping a self-deletion batch script into %TEMP% via ShellExecuteA, then executing it with cmd.exe. The batch loops using 'if exist %1 goto' until the loader file lock is released, deletes the loader, then deletes itself with 'del %0'. Correlates .bat file creation in TEMP with subsequent cmd.exe execution of that same file on the same device.
Detects suspicious command-line activity involving 'cmd.exe' executing 'ping' to localhost (127.0.0.1) combined with a file deletion command ('del', 'delete', or 'erase') using the '&' operator. This pattern can indicate an attempt to test network connectivity before or after performing a destructive action, often seen in malware or adversary scripts.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, powershell, wbadmin) to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to prevent system recovery.
Detects evidence of post-exploitation activity on Cisco SD-WAN components (vManage, vSmart, vBond). The rule triggers on common forensic evasion techniques including the deletion of logs via 'rm' or 'find', modification of file permissions on sensitive logs, use of validation scripts to verify account removal (e.g., 'troot'), and cleanup of staging files or tenant lists.
Detects evidence of post-exploitation activity on Cisco SD-WAN components (vManage, vSmart, vBond). The rule triggers on common forensic evasion techniques including the deletion of logs via 'rm' or 'find', modification of file permissions on sensitive logs, use of validation scripts to verify account removal (e.g., 'troot'), and cleanup of staging files or tenant lists.
Detects evidence of post-exploitation anti-forensic activity on Cisco SD-WAN components (vManage, vSmart, vBond). This rule monitors for unauthorized removal of logs and exploitation artifacts, the clearing of shell command history, and suspicious modification of file and directory permissions on critical system paths.
This rule detects when a non-Outlook process running as SYSTEM accesses or creates PST or OST mailbox data files. The logic specifically excludes legitimate Outlook, searchindexer, or searchprotocolhost activity to focus on suspicious mailbox collection sequences.
This rule detects two suspicious behaviors associated with the TinyRCT malware family: the execution of common installer or archiver utilities in the Downloads folder that terminate within two seconds, and the use of 'choice.exe' for self-deletion of an executing process within a short timeframe.
Detects the creation and subsequent deletion or modification of 'wipefile.tmp' or similarly named temporary wipe artifacts, which are used by the Gentlemen ransomware during its cleanup phase. This rule specifically looks for file events (creation, deletion, modification) related to this filename.
Detects the modification of Azure Storage account management policies where the 'daysAfterModificationGreaterThan' condition is set to 7 days or less, specifically including a 'delete' action. This could indicate an attempt by an adversary to shorten the lifecycle of data for rapid, automated, and potentially malicious data destruction within Azure Blob Storage.
Detects the execution of JSE files by wscript.exe or cscript.exe followed by the immediate self-deletion of the file from the Downloads folder, a behavior commonly observed in Kimsuky dropper activity.
Detects execution of the Prinz Eugen Go-based ransomware binary (servertool.exe) with the --delete flag, which instructs the encryptor to remove original plaintext files after encryption. The binary is known to execute from user-writable paths such as Music and OneDrive directories.
Detects a sequence of events where an actor deletes a Google Cloud Storage bucket and then immediately recreates it, a pattern consistent with bucket hijacking intended to manipulate resource access or bypass security controls on data streams.
This rule detects potential file staging or persistence activities by identifying executable, library, or script files that are created in temporary folders and subsequently deleted within a short timeframe (300 seconds). This behavioral pattern is characteristic of attackers moving tools, staging payloads, or cleaning up tracks after executing malicious scripts or binaries within common directory structures like '\Temp\', '\AppData\', or '\Windows\Temp\'.
Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) using 'vssadmin' or 'wmic' commands, especially when these commands are executed by unusual parent processes. This activity is a common tactic used by ransomware, such as Qilin, to prevent system recovery.
Detects the execution of 'cmd.exe' with a command line that includes both a 'timeout' command and a 'del /f /q' command. This combination can be indicative of an adversary attempting to delay execution before forcefully deleting files, often seen in destructive malware or during incident response to remove evidence.
Detects StealC's characteristic self-deletion pattern where cmd.exe executes a timeout delay followed by a forced quiet file deletion (/f /q) of the malware binary. This occurs as StealC's final operation after data exfiltration when the self_delete flag is set in the C2 configuration.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities on network devices by monitoring Syslog messages for account creation with high privileges, privilege abuse, configuration wiping, and anomalous SSH logins from unauthorized source IP addresses. The rule aggregates these events to identify multi-stage exploitation patterns on network infrastructure.
This rule correlates multiple suspicious activities indicative of ransomware or destructive attacks. It detects a combination of volume shadow copy deletion, bulk file modifications, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, and network connections occurring during periods of high file write activity. The rule triggers when multiple signals are observed or when specific high-fidelity destructive indicators are present.
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