Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the deletion or clearing of critical Cisco SD-WAN log files. This is a common post-exploitation technique used by attackers to cover their tracks after compromising a device, for instance, after exploiting CVE-2026-20127. The rule identifies direct file deletions and commands used to clear or truncate log file content.
Identifies processes that first communicate with AI services and then perform a low-volume burst of file creation or deletion events. This behavioral pattern may indicate an AI-driven ransomware or wiper attack that is surgically targeting key data to evade traditional volume-based detection methods, as theorized by Check Point Research.
Detects the modification or deletion of specific JavaScript or Python files shortly after a Node.js or Python interpreter starts. This behavior is characteristic of the 'self-patching' and 'evidence removal' techniques used by the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo malware.
This detection monitors for the creation or deletion of files within the TokenBroker and AAD Broker Plugin cache folders. These folders store authentication tokens that, if accessed or manipulated by an unauthorized process, could indicate credential theft activity.
This rule detects a specific sequence of commands often used by ransomware, particularly the '01flip' variant, to self-delete after execution. The sequence involves 'ping.exe' for a delay, 'fsutil.exe' to zero out file data, and 'cmd.exe' to delete files. The rule correlates these events within a short timeframe, initiated by the same process on a given device.
Detects the specific command-line sequence used by the 01flip ransomware on Linux to erase itself from the disk after encrypting files. This involves using 'sleep' for a delay, 'dd' to overwrite the file with random data, and 'rm' to delete it.
Detects the deletion of the ':Zone.Identifier' Alternate Data Stream (ADS) from a file. This is a technique used by malware like Phorpiex to remove the Mark-of-the-Web and bypass security warnings on downloaded files.
Detects a sequence of commands used by 01flip ransomware to delete itself from a Windows host after encryption. This involves using fsutil to zero out the file, and using the del command to delete it.
This rule detects 3 types of suspicious activities: first, the presence of files matching a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes associated with Sha1-Hulud; second, suspicious process behavior involving file deletion commands and third traffic towards potential C2.
Detects process execution patterns associated with the "Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming" NPM supply chain attack. This includes the silent installation of the 'bun' runtime during an 'npm install' and a destructive file shredding command. The rule filters out legitimate manual installations by developers by checking the initiating parent process.
Delete Windows shadow copies before it begins encrypting the data on the victim host. This tactic is typically carried out with powershell, vssadmin or wmic.
Detects the compilation of an executable in a temporary directory, followed by its execution and subsequent deletion. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to compile and run tools on a target system while minimizing forensic artifacts.
Detects a process exhibiting multiple behaviors associated with Warlock ransomware. This rule correlates the termination of critical services, deletion of volume shadow copies within a short time window.
Detects specific commands commonly used to remove or empty the syslog, a technique often used by attackers to hide their tracks. This rule identifies the use of utilities like 'rm', 'unlink', 'mv', 'truncate', 'ln', 'cp', 'shred', and 'journalctl' when their command lines target '/var/log/syslog' or perform actions that would clear syslog content.
Detects an unexpected file deletion by the dns.exe process. This activity could indicate remote code execution or other forms of exploitation, potentially related to vulnerabilities like CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed), where an attacker might manipulate DNS server files.
The following analytic detects the deletion of SSH keys or configuration files on a Linux machine. It leverages filesystem event logs to identify when files within "/etc/ssh/*" or "~/.ssh/*" are deleted. This activity is significant because attackers may delete or modify SSH keys to evade security measures or as part of a destructive payload, similar to the AcidRain malware. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to impaired security features, hindered forensic investigations, or further unauthorized access, necessitating immediate investigation to identify the responsible process and user.
The analytic identifies a high frequency of file deletions by monitoring Sysmon EventCodes 23 and 26 for specific file extensions. This detection leverages Sysmon logs to track deleted target filenames, process names, and process IDs. Such activity is significant as it often indicates ransomware behavior, where files are encrypted and the originals are deleted. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to extensive data loss and operational disruption, as ransomware can render critical files inaccessible, demanding a ransom for their recovery.
This analytic detects the deletion of the USN Journal using the fsutil.exe utility. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because the USN Journal maintains a log of all changes made to files on the disk, and its deletion can be an indicator of an attempt to cover tracks or hinder forensic investigations. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to obscure their activities, making it difficult to trace file modifications and potentially compromising incident response efforts.
The following analytic detects the execution of the 'rmdir' command with '/s' and '/q' options to delete files and directory trees. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant as it may indicate malware attempting to remove traces or components during cleanup operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to eliminate forensic evidence, hinder incident response efforts, and maintain persistence by removing indicators of compromise.
The analytic detects the execution of a batch command designed to recursively delete files or directories, a technique often used by ransomware like Reddot to delete files in the recycle bin and prevent recovery. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific flags for recursive and quiet deletions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential ransomware behavior aimed at data destruction. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to significant data loss and hinder recovery efforts, severely impacting business operations.
Detects an unexpected file being deleted by dns.exe which my indicate activity related to remote code execution or other forms of exploitation as seen in CVE-2020-1350 (SigRed)
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