Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows camera or microphone consent store registry keys by either a suspected Kothamine agent masquerading as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe' or an injected 'explorer.exe'. The rule correlates these registry access events with the presence of specific Kothamine-related file artifacts (MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll and tailcat.exe) on the same host within a 24-hour window to minimize noise.
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
Detects the deployment of the CARBONATO botnet's Hermes Agent within containerized environments. The rule identifies specific artifacts such as the 'SOUL.md' persona configuration, 'netd-svc' container references, and indicators of AI-focused credential theft (e.g., searching for OpenAI or Anthropic API keys) orchestrated by the GH0ST AI agent.
Detects the deployment and operational artifacts associated with the Hermes Agent framework using the CARBONATO GH0ST persona on Linux systems. This detection focuses on identifying specific file-system indicators, including persona configuration files (SOUL.md), loot staging directories, and deployment entry scripts (entry.sh or CARBONATO_API_KEY artifacts) that indicate malicious activity and potential AI-driven Telegram command and control (C2) staging.
Detects extension code implementing Caesar-shift-over-base64 decoding of a remote proxy server list fetched from dead-drop hosts, feeding a PAC-based proxy configuration
Detects the ChainScript RAT agent (executing as node.exe from specific masquerading directory paths) scanning for and enumerating cryptocurrency wallet files, browser-stored wallet extensions, and related sensitive configuration data.
IOC hunt across DNS, network, and file-hash telemetry for the Ledger Google Ads phishing campaign. Vercel redirect domains are matched by exact hostname (DNS query name / parsed URL host) rather than substring, eliminating false positives from unrelated strings that merely contain a look-alike domain fragment. GCS bucket and Google Sites path IOCs remain substring-matched since the bucket IDs and page slugs are already highly specific.
Detects non-browser processes (e.g., non-chrome.exe/msedge.exe) modifying critical browser configuration files such as 'Secure Preferences' followed by near-simultaneous writes to extension-related directories like 'Extension State' or 'Extensions'. This pattern is indicative of a malicious attempt to bypass browser security integrity checks to silently install or load unauthorized extensions.
Detects non-browser processes (e.g., non-chrome.exe/msedge.exe) modifying critical browser configuration files such as 'Secure Preferences' followed by near-simultaneous writes to extension-related directories like 'Extension State' or 'Extensions'. This pattern is indicative of a malicious attempt to bypass browser security integrity checks to silently install or load unauthorized extensions.
Detects the behavior of LunexStealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets. The rule monitors for the enumeration of known crypto wallet files and browser-stored extension data, followed closely by the creation of a 'wallet.zip' archive by the same process, which is indicative of staged data collection for exfiltration.
Detects the behavior of LunexStealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets. The rule monitors for the enumeration of known crypto wallet files and browser-stored extension data, followed closely by the creation of a 'wallet.zip' archive by the same process, which is indicative of staged data collection for exfiltration.
This rule monitors for network communication with known malicious infrastructure (IPs/domains) and the execution of specific suspicious file names. It correlates device network events, file system activity, and process execution, specifically flagging attempts to execute MSI installers or other binaries associated with the identified threat indicators.
Detects the execution or presence of AnyDesk.exe within directories containing 'UBP-Asset' that are outside of known, legitimate installation paths. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to use remote access software for persistent access or command and control, commonly disguised within unconventional directories.
Detects the WAV-based loader staging technique: a RIFF/WAVE file carrying a high-entropy appended blob, or a companion DLL chain (rdCore.dll/WMPCL.dll/WPFLocalizeExtension.dll) referencing the hidden audio payload and the encrypted monitor.raw container used to unpack the final RAT
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
Hunts telemetry for published NeedyMantis indicators: three known SHA-256 hashes (WinSparkle.dll first-stage loader and its encrypted archive, plus the older libcurl archive), the C2 domain corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the C2 URL path /library/zip/ on that domain. Domain/URL matching parses the actual host out of RemoteUrl and requires an EXACT match (not substring 'has/contains'), so a different domain that merely contains 'corp.tripswithengine.com' as a suffix of a longer label (e.g. 'notcorp.tripswithengine.com') or as a prefix of an unrelated domain (e.g. 'corp.tripswithengine.com.evil.net') cannot match. No malicious IP address has been published for this campaign, so IP-based matching is intentionally not included.
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