Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
Detects Node.js processes executing command lines containing known malicious indicators or accessing specific suspicious JavaScript files (e.g., sharedLoad.min.js) associated with malicious loaders or hardcoded cryptographic keys.
This rule detects the use of specific tools associated with credential dumping and memory forensics, including Dokan driver installations for file system mounting, the use of DumpIt for creating memory dumps, and the subsequent analysis of these dumps using MemProcFS to access sensitive process memory information such as LSASS minidumps.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known FeralWolf threat actor malware, including MQTTDoor, MatrixDoor, RDPSocksProxy, GenieLocker ransomware, fscan, and tools leveraging CVE-2026-31431.
Detects a suspicious sequence where the 'chrome_cleanup.exe' binary is written to disk, its Mark of the Web (MOTW) identifier is removed, and it is subsequently launched by an unusual process (e.g., explorer, svchost, dllhost, or rundll32) without command-line arguments. This behavior is indicative of a COM-based shell launch, a technique often used by post-exploitation tools to bypass security controls and execute binaries stealthily.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects the presence or execution of a specific file hash associated with a known malicious campaign (KREMLIN/REF9334) that leverages a signed SentinelOne binary. This indicates potential abuse of trusted code-signing to bypass security controls.
Detects non-browser processes performing file operations (create, modify, rename) on known web browser credential storage, configuration files, and cryptocurrency wallet artifacts in a short duration. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting or information stealing activity often associated with malware like Vidar, which stages these sensitive files for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of suspected Hidden VNC (HVNC) backdoor components that demonstrate behaviors consistent with banking credential theft, specifically targeting keystroke logging APIs. The rule monitors for specific process names executing from suspicious directories often used for persistence.
Detects instances where the ScreenConnect ClientService process initiates a child process that is not a recognized ScreenConnect binary. It further filters for child processes created shortly after a file has been created or modified by the ScreenConnect service, which is often indicative of an adversary using the remote access tool to drop and execute malicious payloads.
Detects file operations (open, read, write, rename) involving common sensitive credential files (e.g., .kdbx password databases, .ovpn and .pcf configuration files, .pem, and .ssh directory contents) by processes not authorized to interact with these files.
Detects the presence of Sauron Loader by matching known SHA-256 hashes of the MSI installer and associated side-loaded DLLs, or by identifying malicious PE files containing the 'Sauron' string.
Detects specific file hashes associated with Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) Mach-O payloads, which are often delivered via staging scripts on macOS systems.
Detects instances where a process named msedge.exe is running from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. This is a common location used by attackers to hide malicious executables by masquerading them as legitimate browser processes, particularly when the process command line includes arguments like 'preview' or 'thumbnail' which are often used to blend in with background system activity.
Detects workflow or repository content referencing the compromised actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment GitHub Actions, the known malicious commit, or the Bun-based execution of an obfuscated index.js payload
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, C2 domains, and specific URL markers associated with identified threat activity. It consolidates multiple detection vectors including file activity, process execution, network connections, and DNS queries to identify compromised devices communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects the use of PowerShell to enumerate storage devices (USB, disk, partition information) and perform file operations such as copying or logging, potentially indicating malicious data collection from removable media or external drives.
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