Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of PowerShell to enumerate storage devices (USB, disk, partition information) and perform file operations such as copying or logging, potentially indicating malicious data collection from removable media or external drives.
This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain involving communication with known malicious infrastructure ('mnoskemp.beer'), staging and extraction of password-protected archives using '7za.exe' in temporary directories, installation of a spoofed OBS Studio MSI package, and subsequent DLL side-loading of malicious libraries (e.g., 'obs.dll', 'WSql-2.dll') by the 'obs64.exe' process when initiated from outside legitimate installation paths.
Detects the presence of known adversarial LLM jailbreak or prompt injection patterns embedded within source code comments. These patterns are designed to bypass safety filters or security controls of AI models when the source code is processed or analyzed by such systems.
Detects the execution or presence of AnyDesk.exe within directories containing 'UBP-Asset' that are outside of known, legitimate installation paths. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to use remote access software for persistent access or command and control, commonly disguised within unconventional directories.
Detects the execution or presence of AnyDesk.exe within directories containing 'UBP-Asset' that are outside of known, legitimate installation paths. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to use remote access software for persistent access or command and control, commonly disguised within unconventional directories.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by correlating device events against a known set of malicious file hashes, domains, and URLs. It identifies files with known malicious hashes, network connections to known malicious domains, and command-line processes attempting to download files from known malicious URLs using common living-off-the-land tools like PowerShell, curl, or wget.
Detects BeaverTail JavaScript-based loader malware hidden inside NPM packages, distributed via GitHub or Bitbucket during fake technical interviews
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
Detects execution or file presence associated with the TraderTraitor malware, specifically targeting known malicious file paths or SHA1 hashes used by the actor to masquerade as legitimate macOS system utilities (iTunesCloud, iSync, AppleAccountd).
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
Detects the malicious OIC_Invitation_General_Official.lnk sample used as the entrypoint for PlugX infection chain
Detects removable-media/storage interaction events initiated by the PlugX side-loaded process chain (GRrte.exe / Jarte.exe), consistent with the PlugX core's drive-type query and removable-media ejection behavior (GetDriveTypeW / DeviceIoControl)
Detects high-volume file/directory enumeration behavior by the PlugX side-loaded process GRrte.exe, consistent with PlugX's use of FindFirstFileW/FindNextFileW/FindFirstFileExW for file and directory discovery (T1083).
This rule detects the opening of a specific PDF file named 'OIC_Invitation_General_Official.pdf' by Adobe Acrobat. The detection logic triggers either when Acrobat processes this file or when the file itself is identified on the system. This pattern has been associated with the delivery of the PlugX remote access tool, often used in targeted spearphishing campaigns.
Detects Adobe Acrobat (Acrobat.exe) launched by a suspicious parent process (GRrte.exe) while opening a specific PDF document from the user's temporary directory. This pattern is indicative of a potential malicious document lure often associated with malware delivery.
Detects the execution of suspicious binaries from the user's AppData Local Temp directory, often associated with AutoIt scripting or similar automation tools that utilize configuration (.ini) files to drive malicious activity.
This rule detects the use of 'winget' or 'ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe' to execute Windows Configuration DSC (Desired State Configuration) files, specifically targeting the invocation of 'PSDscResources/Script' resources, 'SetScript', 'TestScript', or 'GetScript' operations. This technique may be leveraged by attackers to execute arbitrary code or maintain persistence through the configuration management framework.
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