Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule monitors endpoint network events, file events, and process executions for indicators associated with the Kamasers malware. It specifically looks for connections to known malicious C2 IP addresses and domains, as well as the presence or execution of files matching known malicious SHA256 hashes.
Detects malicious Android application installation or launch behavior consistent with the 'Corp MDM' implant. This rule specifically identifies instances where a package named 'com.corp.mdm' is installed or launched and rapidly requests a combination of high-risk permissions including SMS and telephony access (RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS, CALL_PHONE) alongside notification permissions, which is characteristic of the implant's initial setup phase.
Detects a specific execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule identifies a process named 'ReportDump.exe' reading a payload file 'Activation.Desktop.db' and subsequently loading 'stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll', which is known to trigger malicious shellcode via an exported function.
Detects a specific execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule identifies a process named 'ReportDump.exe' reading a payload file 'Activation.Desktop.db' and subsequently loading 'stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll', which is known to trigger malicious shellcode via an exported function.
This rule identifies the execution or presence of files matching a known list of MD5 hashes associated with malicious activity. By monitoring file metadata, this rule flags instances where specific identified threat files are present on the system.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
This rule monitors for the presence or execution of files matching a known set of SHA256 hashes associated with the 'DXSCAN' malware, utilizing both device file and process events.
Detects the suspicious registration of a Cloud Filter provider callback using staging paths and naming conventions associated with the ShieldCrash (CVE-2026-69414) exploit. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for cloud provider activity that originates from unsigned or untrusted binaries, excluding known-legitimate cloud synchronization clients.
Detects BeaverTail JavaScript-based loader malware hidden inside NPM packages, distributed via GitHub or Bitbucket during fake technical interviews
This rule monitors for the loading or interaction with specific device drivers named 'truesight.sys' or 'rentdrv2.sys'. These drivers are often associated with malicious activity, including potentially vulnerable kernel drivers used in BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks or rootkit-like persistence mechanisms. The rule tracks driver loading, registry updates, process activity, and device I/O control calls related to these files.
Detects PNG image files containing an 'iTXt' metadata chunk and a specific byte marker (FF 89 AD 4A). This signature is characteristic of LausivLoader, which hides an encrypted payload within the image using steganographic techniques, intended for subsequent extraction via XOR decryption and DEFLATE decompression.
Detects removable-media/storage interaction events initiated by the PlugX side-loaded process chain (GRrte.exe / Jarte.exe), consistent with the PlugX core's drive-type query and removable-media ejection behavior (GetDriveTypeW / DeviceIoControl)
Detects the malicious OIC_Invitation_General_Official.lnk sample used as the entrypoint for PlugX infection chain
Detects the malicious OIC_Invitation_General_Official.lnk sample used as the entrypoint for PlugX infection chain
Detects the execution or file activity associated with the 'OrionQuests-Setup.exe' installer. This rule monitors both process creation and file system activity to track the presence and usage of this specific installer executable, which may indicate the installation of potentially unauthorized or untrusted software.
Detects execution of the PlugX side-loaded host process (Jarte.exe / GRrte.exe) from the JartePortable directory. This process performs in-memory host/system profiling (GetComputerNameW, GetVersionEx, system directory queries) via the decoded PlugX core (T1082), which is not directly visible as command-line telemetry.
Detects execution of the PlugX side-loaded host process (Jarte.exe / GRrte.exe) from the JartePortable directory. This process performs in-memory host/system profiling (GetComputerNameW, GetVersionEx, system directory queries) via the decoded PlugX core (T1082), which is not directly visible as command-line telemetry.
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