Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where Adobe Acrobat (Acrobat.exe) is launched by an unusual or potentially obfuscated process (GRrte.exe), specifically when loading a PDF file from a temporary user directory. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious document execution where a PDF is used as a delivery mechanism for malware.
Detects the presence of PNG image files containing a specific steganographic marker embedded within the iTXt metadata chunk, often used by the LausivLoader malware for C2 communication or payload delivery. The rule looks for the specific marker 0xFF89AD4A or known C2 indicators (yapw.life, stego_zrgaixkku8.png) within PNG files.
Detects the presence of PNG image files containing a specific steganographic marker embedded within the iTXt metadata chunk, often used by the LausivLoader malware for C2 communication or payload delivery. The rule looks for the specific marker 0xFF89AD4A or known C2 indicators (yapw.life, stego_zrgaixkku8.png) within PNG files.
This rule detects the opening of a specific PDF file named 'OIC_Invitation_General_Official.pdf' by Adobe Acrobat. The detection logic triggers either when Acrobat processes this file or when the file itself is identified on the system. This pattern has been associated with the delivery of the PlugX remote access tool, often used in targeted spearphishing campaigns.
This rule monitors network HTTP traffic containing specific strings related to gym-membership APIs and client IDs, alongside process or file activity referencing 'getFitnessProfile'. This combination is a behavioral fingerprint associated with a specific Golang-based remote access trojan (RAT) attempting to exfiltrate or interact with fitness profile data.
Detects the creation of a suspicious file named 'FitnessMonitor.exe' within the Windows Startup folder. This technique is commonly used by remote access trojans (RATs) to ensure persistent execution upon user logon.
This rule detects malicious activity related to the exploitation of MpDlpService.exe. It looks for the execution or presence of known malicious file hashes associated with this threat, including a P-stage script, payload files, and a malicious mpclient.dll. Additionally, it identifies instances where the legitimate MpDlpService.exe binary is executed from a non-standard, suspicious directory, which is a common indicator of side-loading or persistence techniques.
This rule detects malicious activity related to the exploitation of MpDlpService.exe. It looks for the execution or presence of known malicious file hashes associated with this threat, including a P-stage script, payload files, and a malicious mpclient.dll. Additionally, it identifies instances where the legitimate MpDlpService.exe binary is executed from a non-standard, suspicious directory, which is a common indicator of side-loading or persistence techniques.
Detects Python compiled bytecode (.pyc) files that have been renamed to .cat, a common Windows Security Catalog extension. This is a masquerading technique often used by backdoors to evade detection and facilitate malicious loader execution.
Detects the creation of common audio file formats (wav, mp3, m4a, etc.) by processes associated with the CHOSEN BRICK persistence mechanism (SMQDService and winappx). This pattern is consistent with unauthorized microphone-based surveillance behaviors.
Detects malicious file system activity where the legitimate Python interpreter (python.exe) is deleted and replaced or renamed to a deceptive filename (codeflush.exe) within the 'C:\Users\Public\Music\MusicLibrariesPackage' directory. This technique is used by threat actors, including APT37, to mask the execution of Python-based backdoors and evade detection.
This rule detects the execution of a suspicious, specifically named executable (ogftogcyiblzjccmcbnw.exe) originating from a temporary folder, or the creation/access of a related configuration file (kojuyn.ini) within the same temp directory. This pattern is consistent with the delivery and execution of malicious tools like AsyncRAT or similar threats that often use obfuscated filenames and localized configuration files within temporary user paths.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting VLC media player, specifically focusing on the CVE-2026-56711 integer overflow vulnerability. The rule identifies instances where VLC processes a PNG file originating from untrusted locations (such as Downloads, Temp, or removable media) shortly after that file was created or modified on the host.
Detects emails from specific suspicious domains or senders masquerading as executive roles (CEO, CFO) that contain attachments with 'invoice' in the filename and subject lines indicative of urgent financial transactions (e.g., payment, wire transfer). This pattern is commonly associated with Business Email Compromise (BEC) and malicious document delivery.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Rapuncel/Cruciferra 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign. It detects malicious file hashes (associated with dropped binaries or drivers), connections to known malicious command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and network requests to domains used by the infrastructure.
This rule detects the creation of .lnk files within the Windows Startup directory. Attackers frequently use this persistence technique to ensure that a malicious script or executable runs automatically upon user login.
Detects the presence of known artifacts associated with the GhostContainer backdoor, including indicators of Neo-reGeorg web shell usage, ysoserial payloads, and exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability via VIEWSTATE manipulation.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
This rule detects the presence, installation, or execution attempts of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys). Monitoring for this specific driver is a common practice to identify attempts to perform 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks, which can be used for kernel-mode code execution and privilege escalation.
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