Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

2,918 detections

Detects access to Gitea secrets and configuration (app.ini, JWT secrets, SSH host keys, deploy keys) via file writes/renames or process command lines referencing those paths alongside Gitea, matching the secret-extraction tradecraft observed in the Red Heron campaign.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
003
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe referencing a 'Temp.txt' file located within the user's AppData Local Temp directory, which matches a known suspicious file hash. This pattern often indicates an attempt to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via the Windows Installer utility.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
1011
Detects processes attempting to read the ntdll.dll file directly from the disk, a technique commonly associated with EDR bypass attempts where adversaries map a fresh copy of the library to overwrite hooked syscall functions (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory/NtWriteVirtualMemory) to evade detection. The rule excludes common, legitimate system processes that may legitimately access this file during startup or normal operation.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
006
Detects usage of the 'gem' command (install, build, push, publish) that includes naming patterns or specific command strings associated with the GemStuffer supply chain compromise campaign. This targets attempts to introduce malicious dependencies into the environment using RubyGems.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
2 months ago
002
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
5014
Detects bulk filesystem operations (create, copy, rename, move, delete) performed by the masqueraded process 'msedge.exe' located in 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\', indicative of the MovieReaper 'file manager' module performing mass file manipulation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects bulk filesystem operations (create, copy, rename, move, delete) performed by the masqueraded process 'msedge.exe' located in 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\', indicative of the MovieReaper 'file manager' module performing mass file manipulation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects bulk filesystem operations (create, copy, rename, move, delete) performed by the masqueraded process 'msedge.exe' located in 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\', indicative of the MovieReaper 'file manager' module performing mass file manipulation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects bulk filesystem operations (create, copy, rename, move, delete) performed by the masqueraded process 'msedge.exe' located in 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\', indicative of the MovieReaper 'file manager' module performing mass file manipulation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
Detects bulk filesystem operations (create, copy, rename, move, delete) performed by the masqueraded process 'msedge.exe' located in 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\', indicative of the MovieReaper 'file manager' module performing mass file manipulation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule monitors for processes named 'msedge.exe' executing from the 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\' directory. The rule filters out legitimate Edge update processes and common browser command-line arguments to isolate potentially malicious masquerading attempts by identifying binaries that share the name of a legitimate application but reside in unexpected, often non-standard locations.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
This rule detects the execution of a process named 'WhatssApp.exe' from a non-standard location ('C:\ProgramData\Drivers\Whatsapp\'), which is indicative of masquerading. It further correlates this activity with the prior termination of the legitimate 'whatsapp.exe' process within a 30-minute window, a pattern often associated with 'WhatsappCheker' or similar malicious tools designed to hijack legitimate application sessions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
102
This rule detects the execution of a process named 'WhatssApp.exe' from a non-standard location ('C:\ProgramData\Drivers\Whatsapp\'), which is indicative of masquerading. It further correlates this activity with the prior termination of the legitimate 'whatsapp.exe' process within a 30-minute window, a pattern often associated with 'WhatsappCheker' or similar malicious tools designed to hijack legitimate application sessions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
This rule detects the execution of a process named 'WhatssApp.exe' from a non-standard location ('C:\ProgramData\Drivers\Whatsapp\'), which is indicative of masquerading. It further correlates this activity with the prior termination of the legitimate 'whatsapp.exe' process within a 30-minute window, a pattern often associated with 'WhatsappCheker' or similar malicious tools designed to hijack legitimate application sessions.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects unauthorized processes modifying the 'Secure Preferences' configuration file in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser data directories. This activity often indicates an attempt by malicious software to hijack browser settings, such as forcing extensions or modifying security policies, which is a common precursor to credential theft or persistent malicious access.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
This rule detects unauthorized processes modifying the 'Secure Preferences' configuration file in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser data directories. This activity often indicates an attempt by malicious software to hijack browser settings, such as forcing extensions or modifying security policies, which is a common precursor to credential theft or persistent malicious access.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects unauthorized processes modifying the 'Secure Preferences' configuration file in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser data directories. This activity often indicates an attempt by malicious software to hijack browser settings, such as forcing extensions or modifying security policies, which is a common precursor to credential theft or persistent malicious access.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
002
Detects the presence of known file hashes associated with Vectra Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The rule monitors both file creation/existence events and process execution events where the SHA256 hash matches the identified indicators of compromise.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
103
Matches known HOOKEDGE malware samples attributed to BlueDelta (APT28) via SHA256 hash comparison
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
004
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