Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for the execution or presence of specific file names and SHA256 hashes known to be associated with malicious activity. It queries both process creation and file events to identify these indicators of compromise (IOCs).
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
Detects suspicious DLL loads or file drops performed by security product processes (avp.exe, MsMpEng.exe) from directories outside of standard, trusted vendor paths. It specifically flags unsigned or invalidly signed DLLs, which is indicative of DLL sideloading techniques used to abuse security software workflows for potential privilege escalation.
Detects the execution or presence of files, processes, or paths associated with the 'SnowKiller' malware or tool, as identified by keyword matching in process event logs.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
Detects periodic screen capture activity performed by Node.js or Electron-based processes, correlated with subsequent outbound network connections to public IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of the JSCeal malware's surveillance and exfiltration module, where local reconnaissance via screenshotting is followed by data transmission.
Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
This rule detects potential attempts to tamper with or bypass Windows Defender by monitoring for files or processes named 'ShieldCrash' occurring in close temporal proximity to the creation or modification of files within Windows Defender's shadow or scan directories (BaseNamedObjects\Restricted\WD_SHADOW_ or WD_SCAN). This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to evade security detection.
Detects the creation of Object Manager symbolic links that redirect the Windows Defender 'WD_SCAN' object to a loopback UNC share path. This behavior is indicative of a symlink exploitation technique (ShieldCrash/CVE-2026-69414) used to manipulate Windows Defender or associated scan operations by redirecting them to an adversary-controlled or loopback-hosted target.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for specific file hashes, specific suspicious filenames, and suspicious command-line patterns (e.g., 'antivm') initiated by known update or launcher processes. This is likely an indicator of malware behavior involving anti-sandbox or evasion techniques.
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
Matches known HOOKEDGE malware samples attributed to BlueDelta (APT28) via SHA256 hash comparison
Detects the Kimsuky trojanized .NET installer OrionQuests-Setup.exe that decrypts embedded AES resource OrionSetup.payload.enc to drop a decoy OrionLauncher installer and malicious LNK file
Detects executable file downloads initiated by common web browsers where the associated Zone.Identifier (Mark-of-the-Web) file lacks a ReferrerUrl. This pattern is often used by malware to conceal the source of a payload, potentially indicating a direct download or a hidden link redirection that bypassed standard referral tracking.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe referencing a 'Temp.txt' file located within the user's AppData Local Temp directory, which matches a known suspicious file hash. This pattern often indicates an attempt to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via the Windows Installer utility.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe referencing a 'Temp.txt' file located within the user's AppData Local Temp directory, which matches a known suspicious file hash. This pattern often indicates an attempt to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via the Windows Installer utility.
Detects execution of a specific suspicious executable file masquerading in the Windows Temp directory, coupled with the access of an associated .ini configuration file. This behavior is indicative of AsyncRAT deployment, often involving initial execution or staging of configuration files within volatile user directories.
Detects the installation or presence of the GemStone browser extension backdoor. The detection logic identifies the malicious extension by flagging specific service worker file names ('background.js') located in browser extension directories, or by detecting browser extension events associated with unique indicators found in the 'AdditionalFields' metadata, specifically looking for keys such as 'kc_state', 'portal_sync_config', or a 'background.js' file reference.
Detects access to Gitea secrets and configuration (app.ini, JWT secrets, SSH host keys, deploy keys) via file writes/renames or process command lines referencing those paths alongside Gitea, matching the secret-extraction tradecraft observed in the Red Heron campaign.
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal fake acquisition fraud, requiring corroborating secrecy-clause language and M&A-fraud-specific wire-transfer/payment phrasing alongside impersonated advisory brands
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