Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of Object Manager symbolic links that redirect the Windows Defender 'WD_SCAN' object to a loopback UNC share path. This behavior is indicative of a symlink exploitation technique (ShieldCrash/CVE-2026-69414) used to manipulate Windows Defender or associated scan operations by redirecting them to an adversary-controlled or loopback-hosted target.
Detects the creation of Object Manager symbolic links that redirect the Windows Defender 'WD_SCAN' object to a loopback UNC share path. This behavior is indicative of a symlink exploitation technique (ShieldCrash/CVE-2026-69414) used to manipulate Windows Defender or associated scan operations by redirecting them to an adversary-controlled or loopback-hosted target.
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
Detects rapid deletion and creation cycles of the WD_SCAN object manager link, a behavioral pattern associated with a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) exploit chain targeting Windows Defender (referenced as CVE-2026-69414). The rule monitors for at least three cycle events occurring within a 5-second window, specifically involving the 'WD_SCAN' object identifier.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects DragonForce ransomware note (readme.txt) referencing known DragonForce Tor negotiation/blog onion addresses
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal fake acquisition fraud, requiring corroborating secrecy-clause language and M&A-fraud-specific wire-transfer/payment phrasing alongside impersonated advisory brands
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal fake acquisition fraud, requiring corroborating secrecy-clause language and M&A-fraud-specific wire-transfer/payment phrasing alongside impersonated advisory brands
Detects forged Citibank payment confirmation/account statement PDFs used in Phantom Deal BPC fraud to falsely demonstrate wire transfer progress; requires combination of bank branding with fraud-specific SWIFT/routing/CTA artifacts
This rule monitors endpoint events (file, process, and image load) for a specific malicious MD5 hash or the presence of a specific file name pattern 'Request for Quotation' often used in malicious lures. It provides visibility into potential execution of known malicious payloads.
This rule monitors endpoint events (file, process, and image load) for a specific malicious MD5 hash or the presence of a specific file name pattern 'Request for Quotation' often used in malicious lures. It provides visibility into potential execution of known malicious payloads.
This rule detects the Microsoft Edge browser (msedge.exe) being spawned by common productivity applications like Adobe Acrobat or Microsoft Outlook using the '--single-argument' command-line flag. This pattern is frequently used to force a specific browser window to open a malicious URL, which can be an indicator of a malicious document or phishing email attempting to direct the user to a credential harvesting or malware delivery site.
Matches known HOOKEDGE malware samples attributed to BlueDelta (APT28) via SHA256 hash comparison
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
This rule detects modifications or creation of files named 'crond' in standard system paths ('/usr/bin' or '/usr/sbin') that occur within a 4-second window of an 'ssh' binary file event. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence establishment where an adversary replaces or modifies a system daemon while simultaneously interacting with SSH services.
This rule detects the presence of specific file hashes known to be associated with backdoored software builds, specifically related to recent supply chain compromises affecting South Korean software vendors (e.g., HAProxy builds). It monitors device file events, process initiation, and identity logon events to identify systems that have deployed, executed, or been accessed by these malicious binaries.
Detects a discrepancy between the SHA256 hash of a running process image (via /proc/<pid>/exe on Linux) and the hash of the corresponding binary file on disk. This behavior is indicative of process memory manipulation, such as fileless execution or binary replacement, where the code currently running in memory does not match the original file on disk.
Detects the delivery of .mobileconfig files or related configuration profile types (e.g., .plist, .xml) via email. These profiles are used on macOS and iOS devices to modify system settings, such as mail, calendar, or contact synchronization, and can be used to install malicious root certificates to enable Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. This rule accounts for direct attachments as well as those concealed within zip archives.
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