Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of specific sensitive file names (AGENTS.md, MEMORY.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, SOUL.md) within 30 minutes of a process execution containing email-related keywords (email, mail, inbox). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary staging sensitive information for exfiltration after gaining access to or interacting with an email client or communication tool.
Heuristic detection of high-entropy, obfuscated script content consistent with AI-generated (WormGPT-derived) malware formatted specifically to evade AV/EDR detection tooling
This rule retrieves a collection of raw telemetry events including process, file, registry, and network information for a specific host (ex. HostName123). It acts as a diagnostic or hunting query to list the most recent 5,000 activities performed on the specified machine.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a non-standard process writes to the Windows Installer TempPackages registry key, followed by the msiexec.exe process running as SYSTEM deleting the C:\Config.Msi folder. This behavior is indicative of potential privilege escalation or exploitation, such as CVE-2025-27727, where an attacker leverages msiexec's high-privilege context to perform unauthorized file operations.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for high-frequency file rename events (more than 50 in a single dataset aggregation) or file renames resulting in the specific extension '.God8Damn'. Such patterns are highly characteristic of ransomware encrypting local or network files.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe, likely used by the TELEPUZ threat actor, performs a direct file read of ntdll.dll from standard Windows system directories. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to obtain an unhooked copy of ntdll.dll to overwrite the in-memory, hooked version, thereby evading security monitoring.
Detects the execution of MokManager UEFI binaries or administrative activity via the mokutil utility targeting the MokListX denylist. This activity is indicative of Secure Boot configuration changes, such as enrolling unauthorized certificates or bypassing MOK (Machine Owner Key) denylist enforcement, which can facilitate the persistence or execution of malicious boot-level code.
This rule monitors DeviceFileEvents to detect the installation of a known malicious browser extension, 'VPN Go: Free VPN'. By matching file activity against the extension's unique ID, this detection helps identify potential browser-based threats, such as information stealer functionality or persistent backdoors installed via malicious extensions.
Detects known WinUpdateHelper.dll malicious variants by SHA256 hash, side-loaded to initiate infection across 17 kill chains
Detects the presence of known ransomware extortion note file names on endpoints or communication attempts with associated extortion contact email addresses in email logs.
Detects the creation of SQLite database files associated with the LabubaRAT malware implant. The rule monitors for the nvidia-sysruntime.exe process creating specific database files (nvctr_sys.db and its associated journal/shared memory files) which are used for staging collected data.
Detects the creation of SQLite database files associated with the LabubaRAT malware implant. The rule monitors for the nvidia-sysruntime.exe process creating specific database files (nvctr_sys.db and its associated journal/shared memory files) which are used for staging collected data.
Detects the LabubaRAT implant (masquerading as nvidia-sysruntime.exe) performing file system checks against Chrome, Firefox, Microsoft Edge, and Brave installation paths as part of its enumerate_browsers() host profiling routine.
Detects file write operations performed by 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe', a known masquerading binary used by LabubaRAT. This activity signifies the RAT's operator-directed tasking where attacker-controlled data is written to the file system.
Detects file write operations performed by 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe', a known masquerading binary used by LabubaRAT. This activity signifies the RAT's operator-directed tasking where attacker-controlled data is written to the file system.
Detects execution or file activity associated with 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe', a known masquerading file name used by LabubaRAT, which often performs unauthorized archiving or staging of data.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for high-frequency file renaming operations combined with the presence of specific file extensions often associated with encryption and the concurrent creation of ransom note files (e.g., 'README.TXT').
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts on disk associated with Stealth Falcon's WebDAV-based delivery and staging infrastructure. The rule looks for filenames characteristic of their simulated 'clickfix' and application update social engineering themes.
Detects the presence or loading of files named 'profiler16.dll' or 'loader-pool.db', which are associated with in-memory payload staging and execution techniques typically used by IDAT (a modular, multi-stage loader).
Detects the access or execution of Windows Library files (.library-ms) which can be leveraged as a vector for forced NTLM authentication (CVE-2025-24054). By placing a maliciously crafted library file on a system or network share, an attacker can cause the victim's machine to automatically authenticate to an external resource, potentially exposing user credentials for NTLM relay or cracking.
Detects the presence or loading of files named 'profiler16.dll' or 'loader-pool.db', which are associated with in-memory payload staging and execution techniques typically used by IDAT (a modular, multi-stage loader).
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