Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects file activity (creation, modification, copying, or renaming) within the 'leveldb' directories of popular web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera) and Discord applications by processes other than the legitimate application executables. This behavior is highly indicative of credential theft or data staging, often associated with malware attempting to extract browser session cookies, local storage databases, or stored credentials.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms established by either modifying common Windows 'Run' registry keys or by placing executable files within user Startup folders. These techniques are commonly used by malware and adversaries to ensure their code executes automatically upon user logon.
This rule detects potential malicious process injection originating from web browsers (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) when followed by the creation or access of a hex-named text file in the C:\ProgramData directory within a 5-minute window. This behavior often suggests a staged attack where a browser process is used to inject malicious code, and subsequently reads or interacts with a dropped file used for persistence or command-and-control communication.
Detects a malicious HTA lure disguised as a military pay calculator. The attack involves a JScript routine that renames an embedded data file ('styles.dat') to an executable ('styles.dat.exe') and triggers its execution, characteristic of a spearphishing attachment delivering malware.
Detects the execution or presence of processes associated with the 'dogleash' tool, specifically identifying command lines or file paths that contain architectural references such as 'mips', 'arm', or 'x64', which is indicative of potential cross-platform malware or backdoor deployment.
Shebangs (#!) are native to Unix-like operating systems (macOS and Linux). Standard Windows consoles (Command Prompt and PowerShell) do not natively use them. However, they do work on Windows when using tools such as the Python Launcher, Git Bash, Cygwin, or Unix-like environments such as WSL. In simple terms, a Shebang tells the operating system which interpreter should execute a script. For example: #!/usr/bin/python3
For this query, I would recommend performing some threat hunting first and creating a whitelist for known false positives or trusted devices (for example, devices managed by developers). Once the detection is properly tuned, it can be a good way to monitor the download or import of Shebang files on suspicious directories, making it a strong candidate for a threat detection rule.
For this query, I would recommend performing some threat hunting first and creating a whitelist for known false positives or trusted devices (for example, devices managed by developers). Once the detection is properly tuned, it can be a good way to monitor the download or import of Shebang files on suspicious directories, making it a strong candidate for a threat detection rule.
Malicious Browser Extensions
Cortex XDR
This query identifies malicious or suspicious browser extensions by cross-referencing multiple high-fidelity threat intelligence sources, including Socket.dev, OX.Security, Koi.ai, and GitLab.io.
Detects the download of JPEG image files to suspicious system directories (e.g., C:\Windows\, C:\ProgramData\) followed by subsequent file read operations by non-image viewer processes, which is indicative of steganographic payload extraction used in campaigns such as Operation DragonReturn/DcRAT.
This rule detects activities indicative of the RoguePlanet exploit, which utilizes NTFS junction swapping to stage malicious operations. It monitors for the creation of suspicious system-like directories within temporary paths, writing of executables (like wermgr.exe) to those paths, unprivileged manipulation of the Windows Defender Quarantine directory, and virtual disk image mounting from user-writable directories.
Detects the presence of file system artifacts associated with the malicious Chromium extension 'Search for perplexity ai' (extension ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) on an endpoint. This extension is known to perform search hijacking and keystroke exfiltration.
Detects high-frequency file write activity combined with the creation of text files, which is a common behavior exhibited by ransomware during the encryption phase of an attack. The rule monitors for a large volume of file creations across a host and specific patterns indicative of ransom note generation.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the UAC-0226 threat actor by identifying a LNK shortcut file located in the user Startup folder that executes a minimized cmd.exe process. This command shell subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell command that reads and executes code from C:\ProgramData\WC3 using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This activity is linked to the GIFTEDCROOK delivery chain.
Detects browser search traffic being hijacked to the typosquatted domain 'perplexity-ai.online' by the malicious Chromium extension 'Search for perplexity ai'. The rule monitors for network connections to the malicious domain and the presence of extension-related file artifacts on the system. The extension utilizes chrome_settings_overrides to redirect browser Omnibox queries and exfiltrate user search activity to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects the use of the Windows Certutil utility to decode files or extract items from the cache, specifically looking for indicators often associated with file reassembly or extraction of payload components such as Link.dat or Link.ini files.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of object close operations (Event ID 4658) by a single user on a single computer within a one-hour window. This activity could indicate various malicious behaviors, including data collection for exfiltration, attempts to delete numerous files, or resource exhaustion attacks.
This rule detects the execution of processes named 'RoguePlanet.exe' and monitors for inter-process communication using named pipes with the same name. This pattern is indicative of a specific malware payload attempting to establish communication channels for C2 or process interaction.
Detects opportunistic lock (oplock) placement on wermgr.exe alternative data streams or volume shadow copy paths. This behavior is associated with the RoguePlanet exploit chain, which attempts to pause the Microsoft Defender service (MsMpEng.exe) by creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition during the quarantine process.
Detects the execution of 'PerfWatson2.exe' when initiated from the user-writable 'AppData\Local' directory. 'PerfWatson2.exe' is a legitimate Windows process associated with the Windows Error Reporting service; its presence or execution from a user directory is indicative of masquerading or potential malware activity.
Detects Bumblebee loader delivery via trojanized MSI installers. The rule identifies suspicious process chains originating from common web browsers, identifies DLL side-loading or loader execution from msiexec.exe child processes in temporary directories, and flags network connections to known Bumblebee delivery domains.
Detects the presence of malicious Chromium browser extension artifacts related to the 'Search for perplexity ai' extension. This extension abuses Manifest V3 declarativeNetRequest permissions (such as declarativeNetRequestFeedback and declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess) to intercept and redirect network requests to the attacker-controlled domain 'perplexity-ai.online'. The rule specifically identifies the extension's rule resource files (e.g., perplexity-rules.json) and specific file paths associated with the extension ID.
This rule detects the extraction of files from RAR5 archives using 7-Zip (7z.exe/7zG.exe), followed closely by the execution of a file from a user-writable directory (e.g., Downloads, Temp, AppData). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections, as files extracted from certain container formats may not inherit the original MotW Zone.Identifier alternate data stream, potentially allowing malicious files to execute without standard Windows security warnings.
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