Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,918 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,568
780
216
110
94
Contributors
703
507
419
236
211
Categories
20,460
11,847
5,879
5,158
4,866
2,918
Platforms
2,584
507
385
83
17
Products / Services
1,265
605
83
82
72
MITRE Techniques
841
797
582
344
307
CVEs
24
8
8
5
5
Detects DLL side-loading where the signed Tencent UxEnhanceHost binary loads a malicious UxEnhance64.dll from randomized staging directories under C:\Users\Public\, a primary execution vehicle in the SilverFox campaign.
This rule detects potentially malicious use of the ClickOnce process (dfsvc.exe) by monitoring for suspicious parent processes (such as rundll32.exe or mshta.exe) spawning dfsvc.exe, or dfsvc.exe spawning unexpected child processes. ClickOnce is often abused by attackers to proxy the execution of malicious code, and these patterns are indicative of such activity.
This rule monitors for file and process events associated with known malicious Chrome extensions. It filters for specific extension IDs embedded within file paths or command-line strings, which typically indicate the installation or activity of malicious browser plugins.
Detects GhostBackdoor malware execution via known file hash.
This rule detects when an account copies five or more files, each larger than 50MB, within a one-hour period. This activity could indicate data exfiltration or staging for exfiltration.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry keys related to COM object handlers (InprocServer32/LocalServer32) within User registry hives. It specifically identifies when a COM object is registered to point to a file path residing in suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) or arbitrary user directories, which is a common indicator of COM hijacking for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects instances where browser processes (msedge.exe, chrome.exe) copy sensitive credential and session SQLite databases (e.g., Login Data, Cookies) to locations outside of the canonical User Data directories. This behavior is indicative of the StegoAd campaign, where malicious browser extensions stage these files for subsequent exfiltration.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry keys related to COM object handlers (InprocServer32/LocalServer32) within User registry hives. It specifically identifies when a COM object is registered to point to a file path residing in suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads) or arbitrary user directories, which is a common indicator of COM hijacking for persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects file creation and process execution events associated with specific SHA256 hashes linked to the APT28 threat actor exploiting CVE-2026-21509.
This rule detects when a legitimate signed executable loads a DLL from a non-standard or user-writable directory (e.g., AppData, Temp, ProgramData). This behavior is characteristic of DLL search order hijacking, a technique used by various backdoors, including MiniJunk, to gain persistence or execution within a trusted process.
Detects the installation of Visual Studio Code extensions from sources other than the official Marketplace. This activity is monitored by checking process command line arguments for the --install-extension flag combined with external URLs or local file paths, which may indicate an attempt to install malicious extensions.
Detects bulk file access or modifications in sensitive directories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads) targeting credential and document files (ovpn, kdbx, jks, eml, docx, xlsx, pdf), or direct PowerShell access to OpenVPN configuration or KeePass database files. This behavior is indicative of data staging or exfiltration activities associated with the GIFTEDCROOK stealer.
Detects WinRAR creating .lnk files within Windows Startup directories under suspicious conditions. The rule looks for indicators of NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) path traversal, where WinRAR might be instructed to write a file into a sensitive directory using a path like 'archive.rar:stream\malicious.lnk'. This behavior is indicative of exploitation attempts related to vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-6218 or CVE-2025-8088.
Detects the execution of RDP files (mstsc.exe) initiated by common application vectors (email clients, browsers, archive utilities) from suspicious user-writable paths like Temp, Downloads, or AppData directories. This behavior is consistent with Turla group's phishing delivery chain where malicious RDP files are used for persistence or lateral movement.
Detects mshta.exe spawning from archive utilities (winrar.exe, 7z.exe) or Windows Explorer, or executing HTA files directly from common user-writable temporary or download directories. This pattern is commonly associated with the execution of malicious payloads delivered via compressed archives, a technique observed in campaigns attributed to the Turla threat group.
Detects creation of the Process Explorer drivers by processes other than Process Explorer (procexp) itself.
Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.
Hack tools or malware may use the Process Explorer driver to elevate privileges, drops it to disk for a few moments, runs a service using that driver and removes it afterwards.
Detects when common Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) load a DLL file from suspicious or user-writable locations such as AppData, Downloads, Documents, or Temp folders. The rule specifically alerts on DLLs that are unsigned or where the loading process itself is unsigned, which is a common indicator of side-loading or malicious library injection.
This rule detects the use of 7za.exe to extract specific files (data2.bin) from an archive using a hardcoded password while located within an Avast Software directory. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity involving the tampering or extraction of security software components or data.
Detects process execution patterns associated with the LegionLoader malware staging area ('Traiolx Custom Utils'). It monitors for unsigned processes launched from this directory or processes spawned by common loaders like msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, or dllhost.exe that exhibit artifacts linked to the malware's anti-debugging and infection routines.
Detects the presence of the malicious Chrome extension with ID 'flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd' on an endpoint. This extension is known to hijack the browser's default search provider, redirecting queries to an attacker-controlled domain, and includes manifest configurations that may facilitate future WebAssembly-based malicious execution.
This rule detects activity associated with the SHARDLOADER malware loader. It monitors for the presence of specific DLL files ('SolidPDFCreator.dll' or 'MediumInstStart.exe') in process image paths or process names, and explicitly checks for the creation of a unique mutex artifact named 'uydgcfteionxcfd' as a high-confidence indicator of execution.
Page 74 of 139