Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to the Tor configuration file (torrc) that permit SSH traffic (port 22) in the exit policy, followed by a Tor service reload or restart on the same device within a 4-hour window. This behavior may indicate an adversary setting up an onion routing proxy or covert tunnel.
Detects anomalous activities associated with potential PHP2Shell exploitation or webshell deployment where a web server worker (such as Apache, HTTPD, or PHP) spawns a Unix shell containing suspicious utility tokens, drops a PHP file outside excluded directories, or creates a PHP session-derived file.
Correlates the modification of the Explorer Policies Run registry key (specifically the 'Loader' value) with the creation or modification of a .url shortcut file in the user Startup folder on the same device within a 1-hour window, using the same initiating process.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
Detects unauthorized access to virtual hard disk (VMDK) files by non-standard processes followed by the creation or modification of sensitive offline credential artifacts such as ntds.dit or SYSTEM hives on the same host within a 2-hour window, indicating potential offline credential theft.
Detects Gryxa staging behavior where files are written across 2 or more distinct toolkit directories (such as WinRTCS, WER .wucache, and Diagnosis .etlcache) within a 1-hour window on a single device.
Detects Tailscale serve commands setting up a TCP forward to a Unix socket (such as tailscaled.sock), correlated with recent file creation, modification, or renaming events involving the socket file by a non-standard process within a 1-hour window.
Detects the writing and subsequent loading of driver files signed by a specific certificate holder (Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology), utilizing DeviceFileCertificateInfo, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents.
Detects instances where inst.exe running from C:\ProgramData\Intel with specific command-line arguments (extensionless and key-like) subsequently writes files to the EFI system partition or boot paths on the same device.
Detects a sequence where a FortiSIEM-related process writes or modifies a shell script in a cron or phoenix directory, followed closely within 2 minutes by a child process spawned by cron executing that same written script file.
Detects when a USB mass storage device is connected to a host and is followed shortly thereafter by a large volume of file creations or modifications on a removable drive, which may indicate data exfiltration or staging.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects potential bootkit activity or unauthorized modifications to the EFI system partition by correlating non-standard .efi file writes with subsequent execution of boot configuration utilities like bcdedit or mountvol within a 30-minute window.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects the creation or modification of web script files (.aspx, .jsp) within common web application directories by unusual processes (such as command shells or download utilities) or by non-standard user accounts, indicating potential web shell deployment.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects the creation of cook.pth or cook.py in Python site-packages or dist-packages directories by package managers or interpreters, followed by a Python interpreter execution on the same device within one hour. This pattern matches the malicious supply chain behavior observed in compromised LiteLLM versions (e.g., 1.107.0) utilizing .pth auto-import chains for persistence and execution.
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