Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the installation or service creation of 'gdrv.sys', a known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver often abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to escalate privileges.
This rule detects the creation of Git branches or tags using names that match the 40-character or 64-character hexadecimal format of Git commit hashes. This technique, identified in the context of Plugin4Shell, is used to spoof pinned-commit references, potentially misleading automated systems or developers into using malicious code versions.
Detects potential model weight poisoning or unauthorized integrity compromise by identifying training jobs launched by non-authorized users, model file modifications in production paths that bypass CI/CD approval gates, or integrity mismatches between deployed model artifacts and their corresponding approved training outputs.
Detects potential model weight poisoning or unauthorized integrity compromise by identifying training jobs launched by non-authorized users, model file modifications in production paths that bypass CI/CD approval gates, or integrity mismatches between deployed model artifacts and their corresponding approved training outputs.
Detects a rapid, multi-stage intrusion sequence on a single host involving discovery, lateral movement, and high-volume file modifications. The rule identifies anomalous behavior where diverse reconnaissance and lateral movement commands are executed within a compressed timeframe, characteristic of automated or LLM-driven orchestration of ransomware operations.
Detects instances where an AI agent invokes sensitive administrative or system tools (shell execution, file writing, network communication, or email sending) shortly after ingesting untrusted external content, in the absence of explicit, logged user instructions for those specific actions. This behavior is a primary indicator of indirect prompt injection attacks aimed at achieving command execution or C2-like behavior.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects activity associated with the CARBONATO botnet, specifically the weaponization of the Hermes Agent framework. The detection monitors for the overwrite of the SOUL.md configuration file to inject a malicious GH0ST persona, execution of the hermes-agent binary from known malicious paths, and the presence of the CARBONATO_API_KEY environment variable or command-line parameter.
Detects various persistence mechanisms used by the CARBONATO botnet on Linux systems, including registration of cron jobs, systemd services/timers, and the usage of 'chattr +i' to make persistence files immutable.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving macOS LaunchAgents and files within the 'Application Support/System' directory, often associated with persistence or malicious background execution. The detection looks for the creation or modification of specific plist files (e.g., com.apple.finder.agent.plist) or git-related files in Application Support, correlated with process execution of commands like 'sysnotif-repair', 'launchctl' manipulating agents, or git operations involving custom hooks paths.
This rule detects modifications to the Windows hosts file by unauthorized processes. The hosts file is often targeted by adversaries to redirect network traffic, intercept communications, or prevent access to security-related websites.
Detects unauthorized write, create, or rename operations on the Windows HOSTS file (\drivers\etc\hosts). The rule excludes common system processes and paths associated with legitimate administrative or update activities, targeting potentially malicious attempts to redirect network traffic by modifying DNS resolution locally.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files that contain sensitive keywords (e.g., 'password', 'seed', 'wallet', 'recovery') by processes other than standard system or productivity applications. This activity is indicative of credential or sensitive data harvesting.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
This rule detects a specific persistence technique used by AvisLoader malware. It monitors for the creation of a .lnk.backup file alongside a corresponding .lnk shortcut modification in common shell locations (Desktop, Taskbar, etc.), coupled with the execution of wscript.exe or cscript.exe referencing the 'VLCAssistant' VBScript within a short time window. This sequence indicates an attempt to persist malicious activity by backing up existing shortcuts and replacing them with a launcher for the AvisLoader payload.
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