Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential DLL side-loading attempts involving GlobalProtect VPN components. The rule identifies the execution of GlobalProtect.exe with specific command-line arguments combined with the presence of suspicious versions of bcrypt.dll or WININET.dll within the same directory, which are characteristic of recent malicious activity involving modified DLL files targeting GlobalProtect environments.
Detects the 'Comet.exe' process, associated with the Perplexity Comet AI agent, accessing sensitive system files or configuration directories outside its expected scope. This pattern of file interaction is characteristic of unauthorized data collection or exfiltration attempts, specifically linked to the BragJack threat activity.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects the creation or modification of a property list (.plist) file within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory on macOS. The rule filters for configurations set to execute at system load, and identifies instances where the program path executed by the launch agent does not reside in standard, trusted system directories. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms utilized by malware or unauthorized background processes.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating three distinct events: the execution of a suspicious, potentially obfuscated binary (matching a specific naming pattern of _win64.exe) from an untrusted location (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), followed by a high volume of file modifications or renames with specific ransomware-related extensions (.locked), and the dropping of a known ransom note file (RESTORE_FILES.txt) within a short 15-minute time window.
Detects modifications or creations of files within the /var/spool/cron directory specifically involving the postgres user, as well as process execution of the 'crontab' utility by or for the postgres user. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or execute code with postgres privileges.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
Detects high-frequency file creation, opening, or modification events within the Windows AppData Local Temp directory. This behavior, often involving specific obfuscated file names or known malicious process names, is a common indicator of malware payload staging or execution patterns, such as those observed in AsyncRAT infections.
Detects a 'force-push' operation in a Git repository where the pushed commit is not cryptographically signed. This behavior is often indicative of repository tampering, such as overwriting commit history to remove audit trails, hide malicious code injection, or facilitate unauthorized repository modifications.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects suspicious activities in GitHub audit logs that could indicate RepoJacking or SkillJacking attempts, specifically focusing on repository ownership transfers, default branch modifications, repository deletion, and changes to organizational membership or roles.
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
Detects modifications or creation of the VS Code 'settings.json' file within a '.vscode' folder where the configuration includes 'workbench.startupEditor' and 'readme'. This pattern is frequently used in malicious extensions or malicious repository configurations to trick users into opening a malicious README file upon starting the editor, potentially leading to further compromise.
Detects the creation, modification, or execution of a hidden file named '.rc' located in '/usr/local/bin/'. This behavior is suspicious as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or run malicious scripts via hidden configuration files, especially when performed by non-standard installers.
Detects SSH persistence planted during the Red Heron campaign: authorized_keys file writes under a .ssh folder, correlated with process command lines referencing authorized_keys and the operator's observed key comment naming pattern (backdoor / root-shell).
Detects access to Gitea secrets and configuration (app.ini, JWT secrets, SSH host keys, deploy keys) via file writes/renames or process command lines referencing those paths alongside Gitea, matching the secret-extraction tradecraft observed in the Red Heron campaign.
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