Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of PHP files within the 'wp-content/uploads' directory of a WordPress installation. This pattern is commonly indicative of an attacker uploading a web shell to maintain persistence or execute arbitrary code on a compromised web server.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to the /etc/sudoers.d/ directory, specifically identifying files with a 'prl-rce-' naming pattern that contain 'NOPASSWD:ALL'. This configuration allows users to execute commands with elevated privileges (root) without requiring a password, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence and facilitate privilege escalation on Linux systems.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to the /etc/sudoers.d/ directory, specifically identifying files with a 'prl-rce-' naming pattern that contain 'NOPASSWD:ALL'. This configuration allows users to execute commands with elevated privileges (root) without requiring a password, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence and facilitate privilege escalation on Linux systems.
Detects suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-81963, an Elevation of Privilege vulnerability in the Windows Update stack. The rule monitors for the creation of reparse points, junctions, or symbolic links within update staging paths by Windows Update processes, followed by either the spawning of suspicious child processes or unauthorized file writes/renames outside of expected directories, which are indicative of a privileged link-following exploit.
The following analytic detects the creation or modification of adsource.dll or other staging files with the name adsource_*.dll within the SCCM SMS Provider bin directory, consistent with exploitation of CVE-2026-47301.
This abuses a DLL side-loading vulnerability in the Microsoft Configuration Manager SMS Provider component.
An attacker can plant a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 path, causing the SMS Provider service to load the attacker-controlled library in a privileged context.
The presence of renamed dlls alongside adsource.dll is a strong indicator of the classic DLL hijacking pattern where the legitimate library has been renamed so the malicious replacement can proxy calls to it.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents a privilege escalation vector that can result in SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the SCCM SMS Provider role.
This abuses a DLL side-loading vulnerability in the Microsoft Configuration Manager SMS Provider component.
An attacker can plant a malicious adsource.dll in the SCCMProvider bin\X64 path, causing the SMS Provider service to load the attacker-controlled library in a privileged context.
The presence of renamed dlls alongside adsource.dll is a strong indicator of the classic DLL hijacking pattern where the legitimate library has been renamed so the malicious replacement can proxy calls to it.
If confirmed malicious, this activity represents a privilege escalation vector that can result in SYSTEM-level code execution on any host running the SCCM SMS Provider role.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
Detects suspicious file activity within directories named 'ShieldCrash' followed by a cloud provider registration or placeholder creation event within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized software or an adversary attempting to stage data for exfiltration or create persistent storage aliases outside of legitimate cloud client applications.
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
This rule detects suspicious file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) initiated by MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender Antivirus) involving specific indicators related to ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) or 'ShieldCrash' components. These indicators often suggest tampering attempts or the presence of tools designed to interfere with Defender's security operations by targeting its configuration, staging, or protected storage locations.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects DragonForce ransomware note (readme.txt) referencing known DragonForce Tor negotiation/blog onion addresses
This rule detects file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving Acronis plugins integrated with web hosting control panels such as cPanel, WHM, or Plesk, where the plugin version is identified as vulnerable. It specifically monitors for versions earlier than 1.9.3 (excluding specifically patched 1.9.3 HF3 versions) that are prone to exploitation.
Detects the creation of an administrator-level user account in a WordPress environment within a one-hour window after the 'Admin Menu Editor Pro' plugin is updated to known trojanized versions (2.35 or 2.36), which is indicative of a backdoor installation.
Detects a sequence of suspicious behaviors on a single host within a 1-hour window, indicative of an adversary establishing a foothold and preparing for malicious activity. The pattern involves: 1) System architecture discovery, 2) Downloading files from an external IP address, 3) Changing permissions of files in temporary directories (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), and 4) Executing files directly from those same temporary directories.
Detects a DLL file being created directly under C:\Windows\System32 by a process running at less than System integrity (not SYSTEM/TrustedInstaller). Legitimate System32 DLL writes are performed by installers or the OS itself running with SYSTEM privileges; a standard-user or low/medium-integrity process writing a new DLL into this protected path is consistent with the HardBreacher/SolidSnake local privilege-escalation exploit chain. Scoped on protected-directory + non-privileged-writer, not on filename, to generalize to renamed variants.
Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating risky user identity events (such as impossible travel or malicious IP access) with subsequent endpoint behavior typical of ransomware, specifically the deletion of shadow copies or system backups, or mass file modification activity occurring within a short window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating risky user identity events (such as impossible travel or malicious IP access) with subsequent endpoint behavior typical of ransomware, specifically the deletion of shadow copies or system backups, or mass file modification activity occurring within a short window.
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