Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a node/npm/npx process writing to a Unix shell startup file (.zshrc, .zprofile, .bashrc, .bash_profile) immediately after package install activity. STARDUST CHOLLIMA (DPRK-nexus) used stolen maintainer credentials to compromise the Axios npm package and deliver platform-specific "ZshBucket" malware, and separately injected a malicious dependency into 131 Mastra AI framework packages. Malicious postinstall scripts modifying shell profiles is a persistence mechanism consistent with this campaign's naming and delivery pattern.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
Hunting query, not intended as a scheduled alert.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
The following analytic detects the use of the 'dd' command to overwrite files on a Linux system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the 'dd' command to destroy or irreversibly overwrite files, disrupting system availability and services. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data destruction, making recovery difficult and potentially causing significant operational disruptions.
The following analytic identifies the creation of a .crmlog file within the %windows%\Registration directory, typically with a format of <RANDOM_GUID>.<RANDOM_GUID>.crmlog. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to monitor file creation events in the specified directory. This activity is significant as it is associated with the Snake malware, which uses this file for its operations. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate the presence of Snake malware, leading to potential data exfiltration, system compromise, and further malicious activities. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate the threat.
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
This rule monitors NetScaler ADC logs for indicators associated with the PitScaler campaign, specifically targeting exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772. It detects exploitation artifacts (DTLS handshake errors, NSPPE crashes), deployment of WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT malware, web shell installation, httpd.conf configuration tampering, persistence mechanisms involving privilege escalation (chmod), and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
This rule monitors NetScaler Syslog events for file creation or modification actions targeting web-accessible directories (/netscaler/, /var/vpn/, /var/netscaler/logon/) involving common web shell scripting extensions (.php, .pl, .sh, .py). It is designed to detect post-exploitation activity such as the manual deployment of backdoors following a vulnerability compromise.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
The following analytic detects the creation of files typically associated with SharpHound, a reconnaissance tool used for gathering domain and trust data. It leverages file modification events from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model, focusing on default file naming patterns like `*_BloodHound.zip` and various JSON files. This activity is significant as it indicates potential domain enumeration, which is a precursor to more targeted attacks. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain detailed insights into the domain structure, facilitating lateral movement and privilege escalation.
The following analytic detects the use of the 'dd' command to overwrite files on a Linux system. It leverages data from Linux Auditd telemetry, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the 'dd' command to destroy or irreversibly overwrite files, disrupting system availability and services. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data destruction, making recovery difficult and potentially causing significant operational disruptions.
Detects potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to manipulate or destabilize a system.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
The following analytic detects modifications to Windows accessibility binaries such as sethc.exe, utilman.exe, osk.exe, Magnify.exe, Narrator.exe, DisplaySwitch.exe, and AtBroker.exe. It leverages filesystem activity data from the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify changes to these specific files. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit these binaries to gain unauthorized access or execute commands without logging in. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and further compromise of the environment.
This rule monitors NetScaler ADC logs for indicators associated with the PitScaler campaign, specifically targeting exploitation of CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772. It detects exploitation artifacts (DTLS handshake errors, NSPPE crashes), deployment of WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT malware, web shell installation, httpd.conf configuration tampering, persistence mechanisms involving privilege escalation (chmod), and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
Hunting query, not intended as a scheduled alert.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
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