Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

2,285 detections

Detects evidence of post-exploitation activity on Cisco SD-WAN components (vManage, vSmart, vBond). The rule triggers on common forensic evasion techniques including the deletion of logs via 'rm' or 'find', modification of file permissions on sensitive logs, use of validation scripts to verify account removal (e.g., 'troot'), and cleanup of staging files or tenant lists.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects coordinated activity characteristic of Akira ransomware, involving the inhibition of system recovery mechanisms (shadow copy deletion, backup catalog deletion, recovery policy modification) followed by high-volume file renaming (indicative of file encryption) across multiple host systems within a short timeframe.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects evidence of post-exploitation anti-forensic activity on Cisco SD-WAN components (vManage, vSmart, vBond). This rule monitors for unauthorized removal of logs and exploitation artifacts, the clearing of shell command history, and suspicious modification of file and directory permissions on critical system paths.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects unauthorized or anomalous modifications to local vector database files by non-standard processes.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
104
This rule detects the presence of known Android Remote Access Trojan (RAT) APK files on Windows endpoints, or the use of Android Debug Bridge (adb.exe) to install such APKs. It monitors file creation/modification events for specific malicious filenames and process execution patterns involving 'adb install' commands, as well as suspicious script interpreters creating APK files in user-writable directories.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects artifacts and execution patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan. This includes the identification of known Embarcadero Delphi DLLs (mingwm10.dll, libwebp.dll, libffi-6.dll, libpng15.dll) being dropped into or loaded from AppData local directories, as well as wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawning suspicious executables from the same path, which is consistent with its VBS dropper chain.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects the creation or modification of shortcut (.lnk) files within the Windows Startup folder by known archive utilities (e.g., WinRAR, 7-Zip). This behavior is highly suspicious as these tools are commonly leveraged by adversaries to drop malicious payloads or persistence mechanisms into the user's startup directory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects WinRAR (winrar.exe) creating shortcut (.lnk) files within the Windows Startup directory or staging suspicious files within specific ProgramData directories. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious staging of secondary payloads by WinRAR.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects files retaining the MOTW (Zone.Identifier) executing successfully because their Fox Tempest signature bypasses SmartScreen warnings.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
005
Detects the creation or modification of APK files in user-accessible download and temporary directories initiated by web browsers or file management applications. This behavior is indicative of potential sideloading of malicious Android applications, often used in malware delivery campaigns.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects a web process modifying a .php file within WooCommerce paths, immediately followed by a DNS resolution for the 'generate.2faplugin.org' domain. This activity is indicative of the ShapedPlugin supply chain compromise where backdoored plugins are distributed, leading to file modification and subsequent communication with a malicious 2FA plugin domain.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
109
Detects the creation or modification of APK files in user-accessible download and temporary directories initiated by web browsers or file management applications. This behavior is indicative of potential sideloading of malicious Android applications, often used in malware delivery campaigns.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects the creation or modification of '.env' files within '.gemini' directories, often found in CI/CD pipelines or developer environments. This activity may indicate an attempt to inject malicious environment variables to hijack the execution flow of the Gemini CLI or related tooling.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects the creation or loading of specific DLL files identified as part of the Turla STOCKSTAY malware framework. The rule monitors both file system operations (creation, modification, renaming) and process image loads to identify indicators of this specific campaign.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
Detects the creation or modification of potentially malicious files such as autorun.inf or scripts (.lnk, .vbs, .hta, .bat, .cmd, .ps1) on removable or network drive letter paths (D-Z). This activity is indicative of attempts to facilitate malware execution via removable media, bypassing standard system binaries by excluding Microsoft-signed processes.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects files or directories created beneath the PSEMHUB environment metadata transactions staging path, which could indicate data staging or server compromise. This rule specifically looks for file creation, modification, or renaming events within paths containing 'PSEMHUB.war' and '/envmetadata/transactions/' or '\envmetadata\transactions\'.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
009
Detects the creation and subsequent deletion or modification of 'wipefile.tmp' or similarly named temporary wipe artifacts, which are used by the Gentlemen ransomware during its cleanup phase. This rule specifically looks for file events (creation, deletion, modification) related to this filename.
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Daniel Jeremiah@daniyyell
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
005
Detects high volumes of file operations (creation, rename, or modification) where files are given extensions typically associated with ransomware (e.g., .locked, .encrypted). The rule aggregates activity by process and endpoint and triggers an alert when the number of such operations exceeds a defined threshold, while excluding known legitimate backup and security software.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
000
Detects the use of the Windows certutil.exe utility for potentially suspicious file operations, including downloading files from remote URLs via 'urlcache' or 'split', or encoding/decoding files. This is a common Living-off-the-Land (LotL) technique used by attackers to stage malicious payloads or deobfuscate malicious content.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
001
Detects file creation, copy, or rename operations within known VPN application directories (CyberGhost, ExpressVPN, NordVPN) when initiated by Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) related processes (CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess). This behavior is highly irregular as standard web browser components should not be modifying the local configuration or installation directories of VPN software.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
001
Detects the creation or modification of the VbaProject.OTM file, which stores VBA macros for Microsoft Outlook, by a process other than the Outlook application (OUTLOOK.EXE). This is a common technique used to deploy malicious macros for persistence or code execution within the Outlook environment.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
000
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