Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,285 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,276
250
199
141
138
Contributors
660
539
375
96
95
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
2,285
Platforms
1,502
922
374
70
51
Products / Services
740
407
225
164
140
MITRE Techniques
847
682
602
428
302
CVEs
12
10
9
9
8
IDS Classtypes
24
4
3
1
1
IDS Protocols
20
6
6
1
Detects suspicious unsigned processes that load user32.dll (often for API hooking) while concurrently writing data to files in temporary or application data directories (consistent with keylogging dump patterns). This rule targets non-system binaries originating from user-writable paths that exhibit combined module loading and file output behaviors typical of keylogger malware like TrymeLocker.
Detects behavior indicative of Pay2Key ransomware, specifically the renaming of files with a '.3396bw_p2k' extension, the creation of 'HowToRestoreFiles.txt' ransom notes by Everything.exe, or file rename activity initiated by Everything.exe from a 7Zip SFX temporary directory.
Detects attempts to perform a container escape via the docker cp command by abusing path traversal vulnerabilities or suspicious file write operations performed by the Docker daemon to the host filesystem outside of standard container paths, often associated with symbolic link extraction exploits.
Detects when a non-Discord process creates or modifies both 'index.js' and 'package.json' within a Discord desktop core module directory. This file pair is critical for Electron module loading and is often targeted by malware like VVS Stealer to establish persistent session interception.
Detects LCRYX ransomware activity where PowerShell is used to write data from a specified file (gcrybground.png) directly to the physical disk (PhysicalDrive), intending to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) and render the system unbootable. It also monitors for subsequent attempts to disable Windows system recovery via bcdedit.
Detects LCRYX ransomware behavior characterized by the disabling of Windows Defender real-time monitoring followed by an attempt to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) on PhysicalDrive0 using PowerShell. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes spawned by wscript.exe or cscript.exe that reference disk drive objects or specific LCRYX image files, and correlates them with Defender tampering activities.
Detects modifications to the `/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist` file on macOS. This file can be abused by adversaries to establish persistence by configuring login hooks or other autostart mechanisms.
Detects the creation or modification of a web shell named 'help.php' within REDCap application directories, a known persistence mechanism used by UNC6508. This rule specifically looks for file creation, modification, or renaming events for 'help.php' in paths containing 'redcap'.
Detects GitHub Actions workflow files that include 'id-token: write' permissions in conjunction with 'npm publish' or 'yarn publish' commands. This pattern is indicative of the Miasma worm (also known as the wshu.net campaign) which abuses OIDC trusted publishing to facilitate unauthorized npm package propagation. The rule also identifies workflows that attempt to fallback on legacy NPM_TOKEN secrets.
Detects command-line activity indicative of timestomping, specifically when 'cmd.exe' is used with file copy/move commands ('copy', 'xcopy', 'robocopy', 'move') and the target path is not within 'Program Files' or 'Windows' directories. This behavior is often associated with ransomware like Prinz Eugen attempting to hide its activities.
Detects file encryption activity associated with Prinz Eugen ransomware by monitoring for newly created files with the '.prinzeugen' extension and a significant total file size increase within a short period.
This rule detects the creation or modification of at least 10 files within an hour that have the '.prinzeugen' extension, which is indicative of the Prinz Eugen ransomware encrypting files using ChaCha20.
Detects unauthorized file writes to specific Google Chrome extension directories associated with the VILE ransomware. The rule monitors for file creation or modification events targeting known extension paths or files with the .vile extension suffix, indicating potential persistence or malicious extension installation.
This rule detects indicators of the Grixba v2/v3 ransomware group, specifically identifying the presence and execution of sideloaded XOR-encrypted payloads (inf_g.dll) and the utilization of specific reconnaissance file staging paths within C:\Users\Public\Music\, including the identification of malicious binaries masquerading as gt_net.exe.
This rule detects potential web shell activity on Windows IIS servers by monitoring for two suspicious behaviors: the w3wp.exe process spawning shell processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) and the creation or modification of .aspx files within common web root directories (\wwwroot\, \inetpub\). These are common indicators of web shell installation and subsequent remote command execution.
Detects potential DLL sideloading attempts where a malicious 'Mixed Reality.exe' loads a 'nvdaHelperRemote.dll' from the Windows Media Player directory, or the creation of these suspicious files by unrecognized processes, potentially linked to a dropper file 'COU_ITR-1_to_4_AY2026-27.exe'.
Detects indicators of the DcRAT malware associated with Operation DragonReturn. The rule monitors for the creation of the specific DcRAT mutex 'Global\ShitSetupOn26126k', the execution of a malicious process disguised as the Windows Media Player 'Mixed Reality' utility, and the sideloading of the 'nvdaHelperRemote.dll' file within the Windows Media Player directory, which are techniques used for sandbox evasion and persistence.
Detects activities associated with the exploitation of the Netfilter vulnerability CVE-2023-32233. The rule monitors for the compilation or execution of known exploit binaries (e.g., packet_edit_meme), the use of 'unshare' for namespace-based privilege escalation (gaining CAP_NET_ADMIN), the loading of the 'act_pedit' kernel module, and potential AppArmor bypass attempts via 'aa-exec'.
Detects a non-browser process creating copies of at least three Chromium credential or browsing databases in a temporary, roaming, public, or program-data directory. The logic requires the reported SessionGate, Remus, or AnimateClipper structure rather than a standalone executable name.
Detects the unique XOR decryption routine logic utilizing the actor's embedded Session messenger identifier as the key string. This rule specifically looks for file creation or modification events of '.pth' files, correlated with process command lines containing 'contact [alphanumeric] on session'.
This rule detects a specific command-line pattern executed via `cmd.exe` that is associated with the ClickFix attack. The pattern involves moving an `update.zip` file from the user's downloads directory, extracting a `u.zip` file in the temporary directory using `tar`, and then executing an `update.bat` script. This sequence of actions is indicative of a multi-stage malicious payload deployment.
Page 86 of 109