Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of the 'com.finder.helper.plist' file in the '/Library/LaunchDaemons/' directory, which is a specific persistence mechanism used by the AMOS stealer malware. This rule specifically targets the root-level persistence method.
Detects the creation or modification of a local VSCode workspace extension (package.json) that maps a keybinding to the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command while explicitly setting 'skipPublisherTrust' to true. This technique is used to bypass VSCode's publisher trust mechanisms and silently install malicious extensions.
This rule detects process execution events on Linux systems where the command line contains references to 'dirtyfrag.conf'. This file is associated with a mitigation for the 'Dirty Frag' Linux vulnerability. Detection indicates that a process is interacting with this specific mitigation configuration, which could be part of a system hardening effort or an attempt to modify/disable the mitigation.
This rule detects the presence of specific files and API calls associated with the SprySocks malware, which functions as a keylogger. It looks for 'lgf.dat' and 'lg.dat' files within a 'Microsoft\Vault' directory, combined with the presence of keylogging-related API functions like 'GetClipboardData', 'GetForegroundWindow', and 'GetAsyncKeyState'. This combination indicates potential keylogger activity on a Windows system.
Detects the creation of specific systemd service files, macOS LaunchAgents, or payload files ('update.py') used by the Miasma toolkit for its GitHub polling backdoor. This rule identifies file creation or modification events indicative of the Miasma toolkit establishing persistence on Linux and macOS systems.
Detects modification of macOS plist files to hide processes or enable autostart
Detects the use of 'chattr +i' to make files immutable. This technique is used by malware, such as Miasma payloads, to prevent security tools and administrators from deleting malicious artifacts, hindering incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects when scripting language interpreters (Node, Python, Bun, NPM) create or modify files within the '/etc/cron.d/' directory. This activity is suspicious as it may indicate a compromised package or malicious actor attempting to establish system-wide persistence via scheduled tasks.
Detects non-standard scripts altering the authorized_keys file to inject attacker SSH public keys, providing persistent backdoor access to the compromised machine. Specifically looks for modifications or creations of 'authorized_keys' files by 'node', 'python', or 'bun' processes.
Detects an attacker disabling Code Access Security (CAS) publisher validation by modifying a .NET .config file, specifically looking for modifications to files ending with '.config' in conjunction with a process command line containing 'generatePublisherEvidence'.
Detects the creation, renaming, or modification of 'vcpktsvr.exe' and 'libcef.dll' within a directory path containing '\vcpacket'. The rule specifically looks for the co-occurrence of both files within a 10-minute window on the same device, indicating the presence of the Windows ZiChatBot malware stage, which is known to use DLL side-loading.
This rule detects modifications to the 'AppInit_DLLs' or 'LoadAppInit_DLLs' registry keys, which can be used by adversaries to establish persistence. When these registry keys are modified, a DLL specified in their values will be loaded into nearly every process that loads user32.dll, providing a mechanism for arbitrary code execution.
This rule detects modifications to critical boot sector files (bootsect, bootmgr, BOOTCODE, MBR) on the C: or X: drives. It specifically looks for these modifications when initiated by processes other than common system processes like 'system', 'csrss.exe', or 'explorer.exe'. The rule counts modifications within one-hour bins and triggers if one or more modifications are observed.
This rule detects the creation or modification of files on a device that match a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes. It identifies potential malware presence based on file integrity.
This rule detects the creation or modification of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with adware. It monitors device file events for these hashes and logs instances where they are created or modified.
Detects malicious .config modifications suppressing ETW telemetry and bypassing strong name verification, indicative of the Screening Serpens activity. The rule specifically looks for file modifications to .config files that include specific strings related to disabling ETW and bypassing strong name verification, combined with process command line arguments containing these same strings.
This rule looks for adding a passwordless sudo rule for a CI runner account on Linux. Attackers who gain runner access can then become root freely. Remove the rule and audit runner images. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
Detects if 'install-persistent.php' or 'class-wc-subscription-diagnostics.php' files are modified by tools like powershell.exe, certutil.exe, or cmd.exe, indicating potential alternative persistence methods or backdoor installation.
Detects the creation or modification of directories named 'logs', 'persistantstorage', or 'scratchpad' within paths related to PeopleSoft PSEMHUB. This activity could indicate an attacker staging data or setting up persistence, as observed in campaigns like ShinyHunters targeting the education sector with Oracle exploits.
Detects the command line sequence used by Miasma to restore passwordless sudo for the 'runner' user in GitHub Actions by overwriting sudoers via a Docker container. This specific sequence involves echoing 'runner ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' into a file within the /mnt/runner directory and then changing its permissions to 0440, indicative of a privileged modification to the sudoers file within a containerized GitHub Actions runner environment.
Detects attempts to overwrite web server content files for defacement
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