Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,285 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,276
250
199
141
138
Contributors
660
539
375
96
95
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
2,285
Platforms
1,502
922
374
70
51
Products / Services
740
407
225
164
140
MITRE Techniques
847
682
602
428
302
CVEs
12
10
9
9
8
IDS Classtypes
24
4
3
1
1
IDS Protocols
20
6
6
1
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to machine learning model artifacts within a model registry or deployment pipeline. The rule triggers on detected checksum mismatches, bypassed security/approval workflows, or significant, anomalous deviations in model file size compared to previous versions, which are common indicators of malicious tampering (AML.T0018).
Detects suspicious modifications or registrations of AI agent tools within the registry. The rule identifies three core indicators of compromise: usage of an unverified or external registry source, unauthorized tool definition modifications (hash mismatch against baseline), and a suspicious 'update chain' where a non-standard maintainer pushes a tool update that simultaneously increases requested operational scopes.
Detects high-volume file rename and modification operations occurring across multiple directories, combined with the creation of files indicative of ransom notes (e.g., readme, decrypt, how-to-restore). This pattern is strongly associated with the encryption phase of a ransomware attack.
Detects a sequence of activity indicative of destructive ransomware or wiper behavior on a Windows device. The rule correlates a high volume of file modification, creation, or rename events within a short timeframe with concurrent attempts to delete or modify Windows backup and recovery mechanisms (such as Volume Shadow Copies or Boot Configuration Data) using native administrative utilities.
Detects the presence of package.json or node_modules artifacts associated with a known typosquatting campaign targeting the 'sorted-btree' npm package. The rule identifies suspicious package names or dependencies by matching against a list of known malicious packages used in the campaign, or by detecting the co-occurrence of the malicious 'indexed-btree' package alongside the legitimate 'sorted-btree' package.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects anomalous file manipulation behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, characterized by rapid create, write, and delete cycles on a single file. The detection specifically targets processes identified as either explorer.exe with a reflected Kothamine DLL module or the standalone MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe loader running from an AppData staging path.
Detects an exploitation chain in RouterOS where an attacker triggers an SSH rekey before authentication completes, forcing the SSH server into a post-authentication state. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands over an unauthenticated channel, leading to unauthorized creation, modification, or reconstruction of sensitive system and configuration files.
Detects repeated file creation or modification events involving the specific file 'bot_log.txt' in directory paths containing '\Temp\' on endpoints where 'msedge_proxy.exe' is also running. This pattern is indicative of potential data staging or logging activities by an unauthorized proxy or tunnel process.
Detects scripting interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, python.exe) that perform an outbound network connection to known public Generative AI API endpoints and subsequently modify their own script file on disk. This behavior is indicative of sophisticated malware attempting to rewrite its own source code at runtime to evade signature-based detection.
Detects the presence of the 'SOUL.md' configuration file associated with the Hermes Agent AI framework. This file contains a specific 'GH0ST' persona prompt designed to bypass ethical restrictions (jailbreak) and configure the agent for automated post-exploitation tasks, such as loot collection and Telegram-based command and control.
Detects a suspected automated exploitation sequence where a web storefront file (e.g., .phtml, .js, .php) is modified to inject malicious script code (skimmer), followed by an unauthorized SQL DELETE operation on sensitive database tables containing payment, customer, or order information, originating from the same host within a 6-hour window.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the CARBONATO botnet on Linux-based Docker hosts. The rule monitors for the application of immutable file attributes using 'chattr +i' on identified watchdog binaries (specifically '.docker-network-monitor'), the creation of malicious cron jobs, the enabling of suspicious systemd timers ('docker-network-resolver'), and the execution of specific persistence-related shell scripts.
Detects the deployment and operational artifacts associated with the Hermes Agent framework using the CARBONATO GH0ST persona on Linux systems. This detection focuses on identifying specific file-system indicators, including persona configuration files (SOUL.md), loot staging directories, and deployment entry scripts (entry.sh or CARBONATO_API_KEY artifacts) that indicate malicious activity and potential AI-driven Telegram command and control (C2) staging.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain where an AI-agent's configuration file (e.g., mcp.json) is modified, followed immediately by the execution of a tool process (node/python) spawned by the agent, the subsequent spawning of a shell process, and finally an outbound network connection to a rare, non-standard domain. This sequence is indicative of AI agent tool poisoning, where malicious tool definitions are introduced to execute arbitrary commands and exfiltrate data. Coverts T1195.002, T1565.001, T1059
Detects a multi-stage, automated attack chain performed by AI-based development agents (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Cursor). The rule correlates process discovery, credential access, file collection (staging), and exfiltration over web services within a tight 15-minute window, identifying potential autonomous exploitation and data exfiltration. Covered T1046, T1552.001, T1078, T1005, T1567
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or copy sensitive browser data files (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, Local Storage) often targeted by info-stealing malware such as Vidar, LummaC2, or RedLine. The rule filters out legitimate browser-related processes and adds security context by requiring evidence of unsigned code, execution from suspicious locations (Temp/Downloads), or associated outbound network activity to reduce false positives.
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects non-browser processes (e.g., non-chrome.exe/msedge.exe) modifying critical browser configuration files such as 'Secure Preferences' followed by near-simultaneous writes to extension-related directories like 'Extension State' or 'Extensions'. This pattern is indicative of a malicious attempt to bypass browser security integrity checks to silently install or load unauthorized extensions.
Page 9 of 109