Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modification of domain controller authentication packages
Detects malicious code written to PowerShell profile scripts
Detects modification of Group Policy Objects for privilege escalation
This rule detects when a single process account initiates a high volume (10 or more) of file move operations to folders associated with cloud storage services (e.g., 'cloud', 'dropbox', 'drive') within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate data exfiltration or staging for exfiltration.
Detects instances where the Windows COM surrogate (DllHost.exe) writes executable files or scripts to user-writable/temp directories. This proxy file-write behavior indicates potential WSL2 payload staging that bypasses network telemetry.
This rule detects attempts to modify the end-of-file marker on a network share, specifically looking for the 'SetEndOfFile' operation over SMB. This activity can be indicative of an attacker manipulating file sizes or content on shared resources, potentially as part of data staging or to evade detection. The rule is configured with a threshold to alert on 20 such events from the same source within 30 seconds, aiming to reduce noise from legitimate, infrequent operations.
Detects Master Boot Record overwrite for disk wiping attacks
This rule detects when a single process rapidly creates or modifies three or more YAML files (files ending with '.yaml' or '.yml') within an hour. It specifically looks for these activities in paths containing 'config' or 'pipeline', which could indicate configuration changes, deployment activities, or potential malicious manipulation of system or application settings.
This rule detects when a single process account initiates a high volume (10 or more) of file move operations to folders associated with cloud storage services (e.g., 'cloud', 'dropbox', 'drive') within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate data exfiltration or staging for exfiltration.
Detects tampering with 'binding.gyp' files by processes other than 'npm', 'node', or 'yarn'. Modifying these build scripts can allow attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution during the 'npm install' phase, indicating a potential supply chain compromise.
Identifies the creation or execution of the specific JavaScript file named 'Remittance Advice.js' used in the initial access phase of the Evil MSI Background steganography campaign.
Detects the creation or modification of suspicious web-related script files (PHP, ASPX, JSP, SHTML) in common web server directories, excluding activities from legitimate web server processes. This rule aims to identify potential webshell deployment or other post-exploitation activities, specifically linked to APT28's targeting of Roundcube webmail servers.
This rule detects attempts to modify macOS Plist files over an SSH connection. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) where the payload contains both '/Library/Preferences/' and '.plist' (case-insensitive). This activity is flagged as potential defense evasion, as modifying Plist files can be used to alter system behavior or application settings to evade security mechanisms.
Detects the creation of the '.bun_ran' run-once marker in a temporary directory or suspicious Python '.pth' startup hooks (e.g., 'langchain_core-setup.pth') indicative of the Hades loader variant. The '.bun_ran' file acts as a marker for the loader, while '.pth' files can be used to inject malicious code into Python's import mechanism, achieving persistence or execution.
This rule finds an npm package whose main index.js file was swapped for a much larger obfuscated version. Maintainers may not notice a silent replace during a compromise. Compare package hashes to known good releases. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
Detects the creation or modification of files with specific names known to be associated with Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. This rule identifies potential APT activity by monitoring for the presence of these highly suspicious file names on endpoints.
Detects replacement of accessibility binaries for backdoor access
Detects modification of macOS plist files to hide processes or enable autostart
Detects exploitation of weak installer file permissions
Detects command and control communications via files on removable media
Detects malicious code written to PowerShell profile scripts
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