Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects rapid sequence of unsuccessful (401) followed by successful (201) POST requests to the WordPress user API endpoint from the same source IP, indicating potential brute force or account enumeration attempts.
Detects network-based enumeration of Active Directory components, including user accounts, computer objects, group memberships, session information, and domain trust relationships. This pattern is characteristic of automated discovery tools used during the reconnaissance phase of an attack.
Detects ChonkyChicken's monitor_list enumeration chained with a screen_start command in the same C2 session.
Detection of network communications associated with the TAG-195 campaign, specifically targeting the 'ClickFix' social engineering lure. The rules identify TLS SNI, DNS queries, and HTTP requests involving known C2/staging domains 'screenly.cam' and 'xtrafftrck.net', as well as specific payload retrieval patterns for OCX files and 'curl' usage involving the infrastructure IP 70.34.205.43.
Detects network indicators related to the BlueNoroff ClickFix Kit, specifically targeting malicious TURN relay domains (edensun.xyz) used for WebRTC-based webcam exfiltration and Command and Control (C2) traffic involving Socket.IO signals that trigger malicious UI modals.
Detects network requests to the Google OAuth device authorization flow endpoint, which is commonly abused in phishing campaigns to trick users into authorizing a malicious application on their behalf, allowing an attacker to steal session tokens.
Detects multiple repeated web requests targeting WordPress 'author_exclude' or '/wp/v2/batch' endpoints that contain suspicious time-based SQL injection payloads. The rule specifically looks for patterns attempting to leverage SLEEP() functions to infer database information.
Detects attempts to perform error-based SQL injection against WordPress instances associated with the wp2shell exploit chain. The rule monitors for the use of MySQL functions EXTRACTVALUE or UPDATEXML within query parameters that are typically targeted by the exploit (author_exclude, author__not_in) or when interacting with the batch REST endpoint.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects network traffic indicating msaRAT behavior where a host initiates a STUN/TURN token request to a Cloudflare Workers (.workers.dev) domain. The rule identifies suspicious characteristics including spoofed Microsoft-related Origin or Referer headers and a HeadlessChrome User-Agent, commonly used by automated C2 communication.
Detects suspicious batch requests to the WordPress REST API (/wp-json/batch/v1) containing both a DELETE operation on category ID 0 and a POST operation to the core block-renderer, which is characteristic of attempts to exploit vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-27956 to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.
Detects a POST to the WordPress REST API batch endpoint whose request body embeds a nested /wp/v2/users call granting the administrator role, consistent with the wp2shell exploit chain where a forged customize_changeset/parse_request replay temporarily assumes an existing admin's identity to pass current_user_can('create_users') and create a new administrator account without any preceding authenticated login. To reduce false positives from legitimate onboarding of administrator accounts, this rule now requires either the absence of an authenticated WordPress session cookie on the request, or a newly created username matching the randomized/generated wp2shell naming pattern (wp2_*, w2s_*).
Detects suspicious batch requests to the WordPress REST API (/wp-json/batch/v1) containing both a DELETE operation on category ID 0 and a POST operation to the core block-renderer, which is characteristic of attempts to exploit vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-27956 to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution.
Detects potential SQL injection attempts against Azure App Service endpoints (specifically /wp-json/batch/v1 and /batch/v1) by identifying SQL-specific characters in URI query parameters that correlate with SQL syntax error logs within a 5-minute window.
Detects the HTTP POST exfiltration pattern used by the mrmustard stealer to send harvested credentials/host data to its C2 endpoint at metrics.femboy.energy/v1/collect.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to a Polygon blockchain JSON-RPC endpoint containing the eth_call method and a specific hardcoded smart contract address and function selector associated with the TELEPUZ malware command-and-control communication.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to a specific Telegram channel (chanadarkpart) commonly associated with the TELEPUZ malware (used by SCMBANKER), indicating a potential command-and-control (C2) dead-drop resolver communication attempt.
This rule detects a specific HTTP request pattern targeting the WordPress REST API batch endpoint. It identifies a malformed sub-request path containing a path string formatted as 'http://:', which is indicative of a 'route confusion' attempt, potentially leading to unauthorized operations or SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) within the WordPress environment.
Detects unauthorized modifications to the 'wp_users' table in a WordPress database. The rule correlates specific WordPress REST API calls (oEmbed or batch processing endpoints) originating from the same source IP address that performs database inserts or updates, while explicitly excluding activity originating from verified Admin UI sessions.
Detects the wp2shell unauthenticated SQL injection chain (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137) abusing the REST API batch-route confusion via author_exclude/author__not_in parameters against wp-json/wp/v2/posts or wp-json/batch/v1, where the extraction result reflects the WordPress 6.9 $wp$2y$ bcrypt-over-HMAC-SHA384 hash marker in the request query or response body. Requires both the specific unauthenticated REST SQLi vector AND the hash-format marker to fire, excluding legitimate authenticated admin export/reporting tools that reference wp_users through normal means.
Detects attempts to perform error-based SQL injection against WordPress instances associated with the wp2shell exploit chain. The rule monitors for the use of MySQL functions EXTRACTVALUE or UPDATEXML within query parameters that are typically targeted by the exploit (author_exclude, author__not_in) or when interacting with the batch REST endpoint.
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