Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

4,230 detections

Detects web requests to Cloudflare workers.dev subdomains containing specific keywords commonly used in the EvilTokens device code phishing campaign. The rule specifically looks for a pattern like '[lure-type]-[3char-id].[username]-[domain]...workers.dev' to identify malicious URLs.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
7 months ago
390644
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-21962 (Critical - CVSS 10.0) in Oracle WebLogic Server Proxy Plug-in. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass access controls via path traversal (patterns like /_proxy/ or /wl_proxy/ + weblogic/..; + ProxyServlet) and header spoofing (WL-Proxy-Client-IP pointing to localhost/127.0.0.1). Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access, data modification or full compromise of the backend WebLogic Server.
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Aitor Fernández@aitorsbio
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
20123
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests containing the specific custom header 'X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz'. This custom header is used by the TeamPCP credential harvester to exfiltrate collected sensitive credentials (cloud, database, SSH, Kubernetes) to an attacker-controlled server following the compromise of the litellm PyPI package.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
90164
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests containing the specific custom header 'X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz' used by the TeamPCP credential harvester for data exfiltration. This rule targets a highly specific Indicator of Compromise (IOC) associated with the TeamPCP threat.
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Brandon Rodriguez@BMRodriguez
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Federal Signal Detections
7 months ago
120139
This rule detects attempts to exploit CVE-2026-21962, a vulnerability in Oracle WebLogic Server. It specifically looks for requests to Application Gateway or Frontdoor logs that contain 'weblogic' in the URI, along with path traversal indicators ('..;', '%2e%2e') or specific proxy paths ('/_proxy/', '/wl_proxy/'), and keywords like 'proxyservlet' or 'bea_wls_internal'. These patterns are indicative of attempts to bypass security controls and access internal resources within a WebLogic environment.
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Aitor Fernández@aitorsbio
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
5093
This rule detects network communication (DNS queries, HTTP requests, or network connections) to the command and control (C2) domain 'checkmarx.zone', which is associated with the TeamPCP threat group. This activity indicates potential compromise or communication with adversary infrastructure.
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
30120
Identifies suspicious URI request patterns potentially indicative of CVE-2026-4681 exploitation attempts against PTC PLM solutions. This rule looks for these specific patterns within web traffic logs from various sources (access logs, IIS, Apache).
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Danny Y@zendannyy
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
3089
This rule detects an inbound HTTP POST request targeting the Langflow AI pipeline application, specifically looking for attempts to exploit CVE-2026-33017. The detection logic focuses on specific URI paths and keywords within the HTTP request body that indicate an attempt to inject code, such as 'import '.
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David Wharton@whartond
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
40115
Detects User-Agent rotation behavior from a single Source IP (c-ip) associated with more than 3 distinct
User-Agent (c-useragent) values within a 5-minute window. This behavior is characteristic of the Nuclei
'-random-agent' flag, which allows the scanner to bypass WAF (Web Application Firewall) detections by
using a different, valid browser User-Agent string for each request.
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Bryant Smith@flowstate
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
40104
This rule detects an inbound HTTP POST request targeting the Langflow AI pipeline application, specifically looking for attempts to exploit CVE-2026-33017. The detection logic focuses on specific URI paths and keywords within the HTTP request body that indicate an attempt to inject code, such as 'import '.
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David Wharton@whartond
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Suricata Shoebox
7 months ago
3086
Detects HTTP POST requests targeting the Langflow public flow build endpoint, which is vulnerable to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-33017).
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
3043
Detects the presence of HTML tags within the URL query parameters of Claude chat application pre-fill URLs. Attackers can use this to embed invisible instructions (prompt injection) that the AI processes but the user does not see in the chat interface.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
2077
Detects network traffic matching the specific URI structure used by LeakNet for command-and-control beaconing. This behavior has been consistently observed across multiple LeakNet incidents following initial access.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
3061
This rule detects when a user clicks on a URL that contains a domain identified as malicious. The rule specifically looks for `UrlClickEvents` where the extracted domain from the URL matches any of the domains listed in the `malicious_domains` array. This can indicate a successful phishing attempt or an accidental click on a known malicious link.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
241176
Detects Zimbra SOAP API requests attempting to enable IMAP access by setting zimbraPrefImapEnabled. This is a known persistence technique used by threat actors (such as in Operation GhostMail) to silently enable mail protocols, bypassing the web UI to maintain access using stolen app-specific passwords.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
0040
Detects the creation of an app-specific password named 'ZimbraWeb' via Zimbra SOAP API. This specific persistent credential name is a known mechanism utilized in the Operation GhostMail campaign by a Russian APT.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
0032
Detects HTTP/HTTPS traffic where the User-Agent string is explicitly set to 'MicroStealer/1.0', which is used by the malware when communicating with Discord webhooks or its C2.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
110148
Detects access to the Zimbra mailbox export endpoint (/home/~/?fmt=tgz). This native Zimbra feature is actively abused by APT actors (such as in Operation GhostMail) to silently export emails without deploying custom collection tools.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
7 months ago
1026
Detects potential data exfiltration by the BlackBeard backdoor, associated with Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater). The malware abuses the HTTP 'Expires' header in client requests to exfiltrate encrypted system data to its command and control server. The 'Expires' header is a standard response header, so its presence in a request is highly anomalous.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
1070
Detects web requests for specific JavaScript file names that are part of the DarkSword iOS exploit chain. The presence of these requests strongly suggests a device is being targeted with the exploit kit.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
1034
Detects the C2 communication of the Slopoly PowerShell backdoor, used by the Hive0163 group. It looks for specific HTTP POST requests containing a JSON body with characteristic keys.
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Elgonad .@elgonad
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Detections.ai Community
8 months ago
2076
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