Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,230 detections
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Detects network, HTTP, and DNS activity associated with the known three-tier delivery infrastructure (phishing sites, relay/dispatcher servers, and payload hosts) used by the threat actor UNC6671/SilverFox/Aurora. The rule distinguishes between high-confidence confirmed connections and low-confidence DNS-only events.
Detects network, HTTP, and DNS activity associated with the known three-tier delivery infrastructure (phishing sites, relay/dispatcher servers, and payload hosts) used by the threat actor UNC6671/SilverFox/Aurora. The rule distinguishes between high-confidence confirmed connections and low-confidence DNS-only events.
Detects network traffic associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, specifically identifying API requests to a harvester service and subsequent responses indicating the activation of FlashProxy residential proxy services. These indicators suggest an attacker is leveraging proxy infrastructure to manage command-and-control communications and mask the source of malicious activity.
Detects incoming HTTP GET requests targeting known API endpoints associated with the GhostCode phishing kit. These endpoints (/api/harvester) are used by the phishing kit to poll for session details, device codes, or flow identifiers, characteristic of credential harvesting operations.
This rule detects network activity (HTTP requests or DNS queries) interacting with specific suspicious domains that mimic Microsoft 365, Purview, or DocuSign authentication pages. These domains are identified by specific naming patterns and content markers indicative of credential harvesting or device code phishing attacks.
Detects network activity and HTTP traffic associated with the Iron Man System kit, specifically targeting hardcoded C2 infrastructure (IP-based) and lure domain patterns involving specific brand tokens combined with disposable TLDs.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (/sendPhoto) containing structured string patterns typical of exfiltrated Dahua camera credentials, including login, password, port, location, and channel information. This indicates an automated exfiltration attempt where stolen device credentials are sent to an adversary-controlled Telegram bot.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal devices interacting with Dahua Easy4IP cloud relay services, specifically identifying device resolution requests, probe actions, and the submission of WSSE authentication headers (UsernameToken and PasswordDigest) to the cloud relay host.
This rule detects HTTP traffic patterns consistent with a Golang-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) beaconing to a command and control (C2) server. It monitors for specific fitness-themed URI paths used for C2 communication and identifies the use of a hardcoded domain ('monitorondomainwintgt') within both the HTTP Host header and the TLS SNI field.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with Transparent Tribe (APT36) Golang-based remote access trojans (RAT). The rule identifies specific HTTP POST requests to suspicious domains and URI paths ('/api/gym-facility', '/api/gym-membership') that mimic legitimate fitness-related traffic to blend in with environment noise.
Detects DNS queries and HTTP GET requests directed at known typosquatted domains associated with the APT36 (Transparent Tribe) threat group, which are utilized for payload staging and delivery.
Detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity to GitHub repository API endpoints. The rule monitors for a high frequency of requests to specific file names commonly associated with C2 payloads (e.g., command.txt, results.txt, heartbeat.txt) and employs statistical analysis to identify consistent, non-random connection patterns that deviate from expected business usage.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with the PSNATCH malware exfiltrating data to GitHub. It specifically identifies HTTP requests to 'api.github.com' using the custom 'SmartUploader' User-Agent string, which is characteristic of this malware's exfiltration behavior.
Detects network activity associated with the RUSTYSHADE malware, specifically identifying the 'HCENC1:' prefix used in HTTP requests to encapsulate AES-256-GCM encrypted command and control traffic directed towards GitHub API channels.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of the Transparent Tribe threat group using the GitHub API for command-and-control (C2) operations. It specifically identifies HTTP requests to GitHub's content API that attempt to access or exchange files named 'command.txt', 'results.txt', 'heartbeat.txt', or 'screenshot.png', which are known indicators of this actor's C2 communication strategy.
Detects network communication patterns associated with the RUSTYSHADE malware family, which leverages the GitHub REST API for command-and-control (C2) operations. The rule monitors for specific SNI indicators, GitHub API URL patterns for command retrieval, task/result file interactions, exfiltration of files (screenshots/webcam photos), and custom encrypted request body markers.
Detects DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS connections associated with known APT36 (Transparent Tribe) malicious infrastructure, specifically targeting typosquatted news domains used for staging payloads.
This rule monitors network traffic to GitHub API endpoints and categorizes the activity based on APT36's known operational window (weekdays, 04:00-11:00 UTC). Traffic patterns deviating from this schedule are flagged as anomalous, helping to identify potential C2 communication outside of established threat actor activity windows.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to known Kimsuky command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the Stella_Gary campaign. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns ('/unicorn/mort.php' or '/unicorn/uni.txt') commonly used by this threat actor for beaconing.
This rule monitors network traffic logs for HTTP requests directed toward domains identified as potentially malicious (gstatcs.com, webfaset.com, bulder.online). It further filters for events involving common web activity patterns, such as Google Tag Manager references or general HTTP/web traffic, which may indicate command and control communication or beaconing behavior.
Detects potential JWT algorithm-confusion or authentication-bypass attempts
targeting WSO2 API Manager components through JWTs specifying unsupported,
downgraded, or unexpected signing algorithms such as "none" or HS256 where
asymmetric signing is expected. Matching events should be investigated to
determine whether the request represents exploitation of CVE-2026-5430.
targeting WSO2 API Manager components through JWTs specifying unsupported,
downgraded, or unexpected signing algorithms such as "none" or HS256 where
asymmetric signing is expected. Matching events should be investigated to
determine whether the request represents exploitation of CVE-2026-5430.
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