Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects HTTP POST requests targeting Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) that contain strings associated with internal service account processes or configuration files, indicative of an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-20316.
Detects unauthorized HTTP Basic authentication attempts targeting Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) using hardcoded service account credentials associated with CVE-2026-20316.
Detects OAuth2 JWT bearer-grant token requests to Google's OAuth endpoint using the attacker-controlled service-account identity and Sheets API scope observed in the fake GlobalProtect campaign
Detects outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API characteristic of malware command and control (C2). This rule specifically identifies Python-based requests using the 'python-requests' user agent performing common Telegram API operations (getUpdates, sendDocument, sendPhoto, getFile) typical of C2 frameworks like HEAVYGRAM or CHOSEN BRICK.
Detects network activity associated with the KREMLIN browser extension communicating with a known command and control domain (luizestrelhashapr.online). The rule monitors DNS queries, TLS SNI connections, and HTTP WebSocket upgrade requests to identify potential C2 communication.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP requests to 'apimantax.otax.fun' attempting to initiate a WebSocket upgrade connection. This is characteristic of the Mantax Otax v2 malware family establishing a Command and Control (C2) channel.
Detects high-frequency access to 'about' pages from a single IP address, indicative of potential reconnaissance or information gathering on an organization's public-facing infrastructure. The rule filters out common search engine crawlers and triggers only when a significant number of distinct pages are requested within a short timeframe.
Detects high-frequency access to 'about' pages from a single IP address, indicative of potential reconnaissance or information gathering on an organization's public-facing infrastructure. The rule filters out common search engine crawlers and triggers only when a significant number of distinct pages are requested within a short timeframe.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to LinkedIn 'about' pages, which may indicate reconnaissance activity or attempts to gather sensitive organizational information by an adversary. The rule uses threshold-based aggregation to filter out standard search engine crawlers and identify potentially malicious scanning behavior.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to LinkedIn 'about' pages, which may indicate reconnaissance activity or attempts to gather sensitive organizational information by an adversary. The rule uses threshold-based aggregation to filter out standard search engine crawlers and identify potentially malicious scanning behavior.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to LinkedIn 'about' pages, which may indicate reconnaissance activity or attempts to gather sensitive organizational information by an adversary. The rule uses threshold-based aggregation to filter out standard search engine crawlers and identify potentially malicious scanning behavior.
This rule monitors HTTP POST requests for patterns indicative of armored malware (specifically StealC) beaconing to a Command and Control (C2) server. The rule looks for established connections that use POST requests while avoiding common patterns found in standard web traffic (like JSON, XML, or standard form data) and having a specific request body size threshold. The thresholding mechanism helps reduce noise by only alerting when multiple occurrences are observed within a short time frame, suggesting automated beaconing behavior.
Detects network indicators associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns. The rules identify connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses involved in serving fake CAPTCHA prompts or error-resolution instructions, as well as the delivery and subsequent transmission of specific overlay cookies ('cookie-captcha-complete') used in these attacks.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to a known StealC malware command-and-control (C2) endpoint. This rule monitors for established TCP connections and HTTP traffic directed towards a specific IP address associated with malicious exfiltration activity.
Detects outbound HTTP POST beaconing behavior to a known C2 IP address associated with the StealC malware and ClickFix campaign. This rule monitors for established connections to the hardcoded infrastructure used for exfiltrating data or receiving commands.
Detects network indicators associated with the StealC information stealer, including DNS lookups for identified C2 domains, HTTPS traffic to known C2 endpoints, and suspicious POST requests using multipart/form-data indicative of credential or session data exfiltration.
Detects anomalous HTTP CONNECT proxy handshake requests and responses associated with Tengu malware. The rule monitors for 'HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established' and 'HTTP/1.1 407 Proxy Auth Required' responses initiated from internal hosts, as well as outgoing HTTP CONNECT requests containing a 'Proxy-Authorization' header that match established Tengu bot proxy patterns.
Detects the Iron Man System phishing kit via its HTTP fingerprint: a request-header rule (ETag/Server/Via combo) checked on the external server's response, and three request-side rules checking for the kit's hashed asset paths and favicon when an internal host requests them from an external site. Fixed a direction bug on the three request-side rules that had source/destination reversed (they previously required an external host to request the path from an internal server, which would rarely if ever fire).
Detects the Iron Man System phishing kit via its HTTP fingerprint: a request-header rule (ETag/Server/Via combo) checked on the external server's response, and three request-side rules checking for the kit's hashed asset paths and favicon when an internal host requests them from an external site. Fixed a direction bug on the three request-side rules that had source/destination reversed (they previously required an external host to request the path from an internal server, which would rarely if ever fire).
Detects unauthorized or suspicious POST requests to the Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) web interface that lack standard authentication headers (Cookie, Authorization, or X-Api-Token). This pattern is consistent with exploit attempts targeting CVE-2026-20079.
Detects network traffic initiated by the WeaselBiscuit loader targeting api.npoint.io, a known free JSON storage service often abused by adversaries as a dead drop resolver for Command and Control (C2) configurations or secondary payloads.
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