Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

4,230 detections

Detects network traffic associated with SloppyRAT C2 beacons by identifying specific user-agent strings ('CommandExecutor/1.0', 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DLLMemLoader/1.0)') or anomalous API path requests containing 'X-API-Key' or 'Authorization: Bearer' headers.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects network traffic associated with SloppyRAT C2 beacons by identifying specific user-agent strings ('CommandExecutor/1.0', 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; DLLMemLoader/1.0)') or anomalous API path requests containing 'X-API-Key' or 'Authorization: Bearer' headers.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
000
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
This rule detects network communication associated with the REVSTEALER 'EtherHiding' technique. It monitors for POST requests to Polygon network RPC endpoints containing specific contract interaction signatures ('eth_call' with '0x4965e13f' and a specific contract address), as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and fallback RPC providers used to resolve C2 instructions from blockchain data.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects network requests originating from the Netch gateway tool or similar environments, attempting to fetch auto-configuration profiles for Shadowsocks from the external domain 'www.sheng886.top' using the '/api/v1/internal/shadowsocks/auto-config' endpoint. The rule specifically matches the Go-http-client user agent, which is common in automated scripts and Go-based proxy tools.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects network communication (via DNS queries, web logs, or device network events) with a list of known malicious domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
103
This rule detects network communication (via DNS queries, web logs, or device network events) with a list of known malicious domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
203
This rule detects network communication (via DNS queries, web logs, or device network events) with a list of known malicious domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
103
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for static image assets (jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, svg) where the Referer header originates from a .shop top-level domain. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized use of brand image assets, often associated with fraudulent e-commerce sites or phishing campaigns using lookalike or disposable infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
000
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
Detects high-frequency, automated requests to product and catalog pages within a short time window, characteristic of web scraping or catalog harvesting often used to feed fake-shop networks or build clone sites.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
Detects high-frequency, repeated access to a specific fraud-tracking or canary token link by sources utilizing rotating VPNs or proxies over an extended period. This behavior is indicative of automated probing or credential validation attempts associated with the Phantom Deal campaign.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
000
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the PEEP Browser RAT, specifically HTTP beacons targeting the URI path '/api/commands'. It monitors for unique HTTP headers ('X-PEEP-Agent-Id', 'X-PEEP-Agent-Key') and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against Grafana instances using the 'X-Grafana-URL' header. The rule identifies requests attempting to access internal network ranges, link-local addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254, localhost) via the Grafana MCP interface, particularly when non-GET HTTP methods are used to potentially mutate internal resources.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects unauthenticated attempts to invoke Grafana API tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) by utilizing spoofed Mcp-Session-Id headers while bypassing bearer token authentication requirements. This primarily targets unauthorized access to API functionality on Grafana instances configured with bearer-token authentication (v1.1.0+).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects instances of an mcp-grafana server responding with an HTTP 200 status code to a 'tools/call' request without an Authorization header, indicating potential unauthenticated remote tool execution on a vulnerable or misconfigured server.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
Detects anomalous use of the 'X-Grafana-URL' header in conjunction with an 'Authorization: Bearer' token, indicative of an attempt to exfiltrate a service account token to an unauthorized or external domain, exploiting CVE-2026-15583.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects anomalous use of the 'X-Grafana-URL' header in conjunction with an 'Authorization: Bearer' token, indicative of an attempt to exfiltrate a service account token to an unauthorized or external domain, exploiting CVE-2026-15583.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
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