Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects domain fronting abuse of Cloudflare CDN where the TLS SNI (outer front domain) differs from the inner HTTP Host header actually requested, a technique used to smuggle C2 traffic behind a trusted Cloudflare-fronted domain
Detects potential web reconnaissance or scanning activity against Microsoft IIS servers. The rule identifies suspicious behavior by monitoring for high frequencies of distinct URI requests, excessive 404 Not Found status codes indicative of path brute-forcing, and the presence of known security scanning user-agents.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by an 'application/octet-stream' content type, a specific URI structure consisting of three components (20-40 characters, alpha-numeric, 20-40 characters), and an encrypted payload. This behavioral pattern is associated with SynkLoader malware command-and-control (C2) communications.
Detects HTTP traffic directed to known abused web hosting platforms and SaaS site builders frequently used by the BengalSEO campaign to host search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning lures. These lures typically mimic service activation or support pages to trick users into downloading malicious content.
Detects outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) via TLS SNI or HTTP requests, which is a common communication channel for Command and Control (C2) or management for Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms.
Detects network activity (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host) associated with the SynkLoader malware's command-and-control infrastructure using the domain 'dondermicapp.net'.
Detects attempts to perform GraphQL introspection or discover schema details by monitoring Caddy web server logs for requests containing common GraphQL-related paths or keywords.
Detects outbound HTTP traffic indicative of pyCodeVx RAT check-in behavior. The rule identifies communication with ddnsfree.com C2 domains or requests containing the 'pyCodeVx' marker in the URL or User-Agent, coupled with a base64-encoded, fixed-format victim/session ID.
Detects network traffic consistent with the ClickFix macOS loader, specifically identifying POST requests containing 'event=pasted' and a 'BuildID' header, which are indicative of a beaconing or telemetry heartbeat.
Detects Microsoft Copilot interaction URLs containing the 'autorun=1' parameter alongside a 'q=' prompt parameter. This combination indicates a potential attempt to execute a prompt in the user's Copilot session without explicit user confirmation upon link click, a technique sometimes referred to as a CoSnitch or one-click attack.
Detects network activity associated with the NovaCookies phishing campaign, specifically identifying HTTP redirects, TLS SNI connections, or HTTP host headers pointing to infrastructure utilizing .vu top-level domains.
Detects Microsoft Copilot interaction URLs containing the 'autorun=1' parameter alongside a 'q=' prompt parameter. This combination indicates a potential attempt to execute a prompt in the user's Copilot session without explicit user confirmation upon link click, a technique sometimes referred to as a CoSnitch or one-click attack.
Detects Microsoft-branded phishing pages served from non-Microsoft domains, the subsequent credential submission, and the establishment of a WebSocket relay connection characteristic of the Mirage2FA Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) toolkit. This rule correlates multiple stages of the phishing flow to identify active proxy-based credential and MFA bypass attempts.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known SynkLoader C2 domains or URI patterns, characterized by 'application/octet-stream' Content-Type headers. The rule targets specific hardcoded domains used by the malware and a suspicious nested URI path pattern commonly associated with its beaconing behavior.
Detects HTTP traffic communicating with known domains (grove-12.com and trekmesh15.com) associated with the Codex ClickFix/AMOS campaign, specifically looking for indicators of payload staging or beaconing activity through specific URI patterns.
Detects access attempts to credential files, private keys, and secrets (id_rsa, credentials.json, .pem, etc.).
Detects access attempts to exposed .git, .svn, or .hg directories.
Detects network traffic consistent with SynkLoader malware communicating with its C2 infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious TLS SNI requests to known hardcoded domains and HTTP POST requests using the application/octet-stream content type, which are characteristic of SynkLoader C2 beaconing.
Detects a sequence of events where a user interacts with a suspected fraudulent CAPTCHA or slider gate on an non-allowlisted domain, followed by interaction with a spoofed Microsoft 365 login page on the same device within 15 minutes. This behavior is characteristic of the Mirage2FA phishing kit, which intercepts credentials and MFA tokens in real-time.
Detects Cisco network devices experiencing unexpected reloads, crashes, or watchdog resets that are correlated with prior incoming WebVPN, AnyConnect, or SSL VPN HTTP requests. The rule also identifies multiple device reloads occurring within a short 15-minute window, which may indicate a distributed or repeated exploitation attempt against the SSL VPN infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with a specific URI pattern associated with C2Looper malware communication, indicating potential C2 activity or data exfiltration.
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