Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control beaconing. The rule identifies communication to an external network using a specific URI pattern (4-16 alphanumeric characters), a 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' header, and a legacy Internet Explorer 7.0 User-Agent, while explicitly excluding common non-binary or HTML response formats in the request body.
Detects common SQL injection patterns (such as UNION SELECT, tautologies, sleep functions, and information_schema queries) within HTTP URI parameters and HTTP POST request bodies, which are indicative of an attempt to manipulate backend database queries.
Detects high-volume SSH authentication attempts originating from a single source IP targeting a server on port 22, indicating a potential brute force attack.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Qakbot (QBot) malware command-and-control (C2) communication. This rule monitors for POST requests to .php files featuring a specific hardcoded User-Agent (IE 7.0 on Windows NT 5.1), a 'Cookie' header, 'application/octet-stream' content type, and a request body length of at least 201 characters.
Detects outbound network traffic matching Stratum protocol JSON-RPC methods (mining.subscribe, mining.authorize, mining.submit) typically used by XMRig and other cryptomining software to communicate with a mining pool. The rule monitors for established TCP connections on non-standard ports, excluding common web ports 80 and 443.
Detects sequential suspicious SMB activity characteristic of PsExec lateral movement: connection to ADMIN$ or C$ administrative shares, followed by the upload of an executable or batch file to the share, and subsequently the usage of SVCCTL (CreateServiceW/StartServiceW) to execute the uploaded binary.
Detects specific JSON-RPC calls indicating C2 communication associated with the Graphalgo RAT. The rule identifies calls to the 'eth_call' method referencing specific function names like 'setCPubKey', 'serviceData', or a hardcoded Arbitrum Sepolia contract address used as a blockchain dead-drop mechanism.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 communication patterns such as heartbeat beacons and agent tasking requests occurring over non-standard port 8133.
Detects unauthorized attempts to interact with the Docker API to create containers or pull images, specifically looking for patterns associated with the CARBONATO worm which utilizes the /containers/create endpoint with 'net-setup' parameters.
Detects outbound connections to a known malicious C2 infrastructure associated with the CARBONATO threat actor. The rule identifies both established SSH sessions using the OpenSSH implementation and the initiation of outbound TCP connections on ports dynamically determined by an MD5 hash, which is a known behavior of this actor's C2 communication strategy.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to create privileged containers via the Docker API, specifically identifying the use of the 'net-setup' string often associated with the CARBONATO worm. Such activity indicates potential propagation or lateral movement within a containerized environment by attempting to deploy containers with elevated permissions.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware agent, including C2 tasking, Go agent 'frpc' tunnel configuration retrieval, tunnel deployment status reporting, and internal loopback C2 server communication.
Detects network activity associated with the RatHat Android malware, specifically identifying C2 data exfiltration API calls over FRP (FRP/Go Agent) tunnels and WebSocket handshake traffic for command-and-control communication.
Detects specific HTTP traffic patterns associated with the RatHat malware's FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) reverse-tunneling deployment and C2 status reporting. The rule identifies the sequence of fetching configuration, initiating WebSocket tunnel links, and reporting deployment status to a remote command-and-control server.
Detects HTTP traffic from the Psychedelic Stealer malware as it exfiltrates stolen browser passwords and session tokens to a specific command-and-control endpoint, and identifies the staging of Chromium Web Data files ('wd_tmp.db') within HTTP POST requests.
Detects outbound network traffic to known public BNB Smart Chain (BSC) data seed nodes using JSON-RPC 'eth_call' methods or TLS connections. This pattern is indicative of malware using blockchain infrastructure as a dead drop resolver for C2 command retrieval or configuration updates.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to connect to known infrastructure associated with the VPN-for-X extension, which has been observed acting as a fallback proxy. The rule alerts on specific TLS SNI strings (de8.staticvaultcdn.org, de4.servefaststatic.work, de34.rapidstaticserve.cc) commonly leveraged by this infrastructure.
This rule detects malicious HTTP POST requests attempting a path traversal attack against Grav CMS, specifically targeting the __unique_form_id__ parameter. The rule looks for directory traversal sequences ('..') following the parameter, which is characteristic of attempts to read sensitive files outside the intended web directory.
Detects established, bidirectional TCP connections between internal hosts and known infrastructure associated with the SIDEEYE backdoor on specific control and data ports (3333 and 3334).
Detects network communication associated with VelvetCake C2 infrastructure, including plaintext authentication, specific inventory request commands, and session termination commands over port 12345.
This rule detects potentially malicious Command and Control (C2) traffic utilizing DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to interact with public resolvers like Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. It identifies both high-frequency, repeated direct-to-resolver TLS sessions and specific HTTP requests to these resolvers that resolve domains associated with known C2 infrastructure, such as the ClickFix campaign.
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