Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a network request to download a file named 'msgbox.exe' using the curl command-line utility, consistent with the activity observed from threat actor UTA0560 (GRIMWEDGE). This rule monitors for HTTP GET requests targeting the specific file path while the User-Agent string begins with 'curl/'.
Detects network indicators associated with the BambooToken C2 infrastructure, including DNS lookups for specific domains, TLS SNI mismatches, non-standard MQTT port usage, and specific command-and-control tasking keywords within MQTT payloads.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests containing suspicious URL query parameters (nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure or chave_tecl_cresol) that are associated with phishing kits targeting Brazilian taxpayers, often used to deliver or facilitate HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) remote access tools.
Detects periodic outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) indicative of potential command and control (C2) beaconing, specifically monitoring for repeating connections over extended time intervals.
Detects network traffic associated with the WallStealer malware, including the download of malicious payloads from a known C2 server, communication with a cryptominer C2, and the use of Steam Community profiles as dead-drop resolvers for C2 instructions.
Detects network communication associated with the Cyclops Blink modular malware, specifically targeting known Sandworm C2 IP addresses and non-standard ports used for firewall rule manipulation and C2 beaconing. The rule identifies both inbound and outbound traffic, including potential TLS handshakes on specific non-standard ports.
Detects network traffic associated with the RatHat Android RAT, specifically monitoring for HTTP and TLS connections to the command and control (C2) delivery domain 'kingbss.com', as well as detecting characteristic FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) client login handshake patterns used for tunnel establishment.
Detects network communication associated with the Rapuncel MaaS (Malware-as-a-Service) campaign, specifically identifying the Command and Control (C2) connection, GitHub Pages-based redirect chains, and subsequent delivery of large, suspicious ZIP archives containing renamed executable/system files.
This rule detects potential NTLM relay or authentication downgrade attempts by monitoring HTTP POST requests to the Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) endpoint. It specifically flags when an 'Authorization' header contains an NTLM-wrapped 'Negotiate' token, which is often indicative of an attacker attempting to coerce or relay authentication material to the service.
Detects malicious network activity associated with TokenGrabber stealer malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP requests to public IP lookup services (api.ipify.org) followed by chained geolocation lookups (ip-api.com). This behavior is characteristic of an initial reconnaissance phase where the malware determines the victim's external network footprint.
Detects malicious network activity associated with TokenGrabber stealer malware, specifically identifying outbound HTTP requests to public IP lookup services (api.ipify.org) followed by chained geolocation lookups (ip-api.com). This behavior is characteristic of an initial reconnaissance phase where the malware determines the victim's external network footprint.
This rule detects network traffic containing the specific 'Xwormmm' string in the payload, which serves as a handshake or banner characteristic of XWorm command-and-control (C2) communications.
Detects HTTP responses containing SocGholish (FakeUpdates) malware delivery signatures. The rule monitors for a 200 HTTP status code, a content type of 'javascript', and the presence of the specific string 'NDSW' in the response body, which is a known indicator of the SocGholish JavaScript-based loader.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known blockchain RPC endpoints (bsc-dataseed and rpc.ankr.com) that utilize the 'eth_call' method. This behavior is associated with the ClearFake malware strain using the EtherHiding technique, where malicious scripts or payloads are hidden or retrieved via blockchain smart contracts.
This rule monitors HTTP traffic for requests containing 'bp.dat', which is associated with the registration phase of the Latrodectus malware downloader. It detects both URI-based and request body-based attempts by an infected host to register with a command and control server.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with the SocGholish Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The rule identifies an HTTP 302 redirect response where the 'Location' header points to a URL containing 'update' and a .js extension, a characteristic behavioral signature used by SocGholish for its drive-by-download campaigns.
Detects outbound network traffic containing the hardcoded user-agent string 'Remcos', which is indicative of a Remcos RAT beacon communicating with a command-and-control (C2) server. The rule inspects HTTP requests to identify this specific malware signature within the established communication flow.
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Rclone to exfiltrate data to MEGA cloud storage, a technique associated with Akira ransomware campaigns.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with ARToken-style OAuth device code phishing attacks, specifically monitoring for initial backend requests to Cloudflare Workers infrastructure, response payloads containing known phishing template indicators, and subsequent polling activity against device code endpoints that indicate an active phishing session.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal network hosts to a known hardcoded AsyncRAT C2 IP address (158.51.122.136). This indicates a successful infection where a host has established communication with the C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with a known malicious campaign using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages as a lure. This includes requests to retrieve tracker scripts from 'fsputnik.com', loading of fake verification pages from 'uasputnik.com', and communication with a known command retrieval endpoint ('admin777111777.php') potentially used for clipboard hijacking.
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