Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network activity initiated by Node.js processes towards specific Infura and Alchemy RPC endpoints for the Sepolia testnet, including specific JSON-RPC queries containing potential malicious contract addresses. This pattern is indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Web3 infrastructure.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts to Slack's domain that contains hardcoded Slack bot tokens and specific Slack channel IDs associated with a malicious npm supply chain campaign (indexed-btree). This indicates successful exfiltration of sensitive configuration credentials or data to an attacker-controlled Slack environment.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting the cdnsuicaches[.]com domain. The rules identify the initial DNS query, the subsequent TLS SNI connection, and the retrieval of malicious JavaScript containing the 'cookie-captcha-complete' overlay signature. This behavior is indicative of a browser-based social engineering attack.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package. The rule specifically monitors for hardcoded Telegram bot tokens and chat IDs used for data exfiltration.
Detects outbound network traffic attempting to exfiltrate data to Slack or Telegram APIs using hardcoded bot tokens or channel identifiers associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to known public Ethereum RPC gateways (Alchemy and Infura) containing embedded, hardcoded API keys or references to specific contract addresses associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign. This pattern indicates a compromised host leveraging legitimate Web3 infrastructure for Command and Control (C2) communication.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
Detects Sauron Loader C2 registration/polling: an HTTPS POST whose URI path matches the malware's exact <prefix>/v<1-9>/<action><Resource> structure (action = set|get; resource = one of the 10 known config/task resource names) combined with the malware's hardcoded Windows-10 Edge/Chrome 143 user agent. Narrowing the URI regex from a generic '/api/v1/anything' wildcard to the exact action+resource vocabulary eliminates matches against ordinary versioned REST API traffic, which was the dominant false-positive source.
This rule detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-33044, a vulnerability in Dahua hardware that allows an attacker to bypass authentication by sending a specially crafted request to the global.login endpoint.
Detects network traffic associated with the SloppyRAT backdoor, which utilizes a reverse SOCKS proxy mechanism. The rule identifies specific HTTP GET/POST heartbeats and command responses to the '/api/poll' and '/api/proxy/ack' endpoints commonly used for C2 operations.
This rule set detects web traffic associated with 'GhostCode' phishing campaigns. These campaigns utilize Cloudflare Turnstile verification gates on non-Cloudflare domains, specific phishing page titles, and session cookies ('turnstile_verified', 'cf_clearance') to facilitate device code phishing or credential harvesting activities.
Detects outbound HTTP requests from endpoints to a known C2 infrastructure associated with mobile device spyware. The rule identifies two specific stages: polling for new commands using a GET request and posting command execution results using a POST request, both targeting an MDM-mimicking API structure.
Detects outbound HTTP requests from endpoints to a known C2 infrastructure associated with mobile device spyware. The rule identifies two specific stages: polling for new commands using a GET request and posting command execution results using a POST request, both targeting an MDM-mimicking API structure.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
Detects cleartext HTTP POST requests to specific URI endpoints (/api/v1/devices/register or /api/v1/devices/heartbeat) known to be used by the Corp_MDM Android spyware for C2 communication, registration, or heartbeat signals.
This rule monitors for outbound TCP and HTTP traffic to a known malicious infrastructure hosting a fake or compromised 'Corp MDM' (Mobile Device Management) admin panel, which serves as a Command and Control (C2) channel for spyware.
Detects network traffic patterns indicative of unauthorized or malicious APK sideloading attempts, specifically targeting fake Google Play delivery mechanisms, lure domains, and known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
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