Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous ICMP traffic patterns, specifically ICMP Echo Request packets with unusually large payload sizes (dsize > 64) and specific byte signatures consistent with known ICMP tunneling tools such as icmpsh or ptunnel, which are used to establish covert C2 channels.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity using DNS tunneling. It monitors for a high frequency of DNS TXT record queries to long subdomains (exceeding 50 characters), which is a common characteristic of tools like DNScat and iodine that encode data within DNS requests.
This rule detects HTTP requests attempting to perform Local File Inclusion (LFI) or path traversal attacks by searching for patterns such as '/../' sequences and common sensitive file paths like /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or /proc/self/environ in the URI.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious URIs and subsequent inbound responses containing executable binary (PE) signatures, characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects remote execution of WMI commands over DCOM by identifying the specific IWbemServices UUID (8BC3F05E-D86B-11D0-A075-00C04FB68820) in RPC traffic. The rule triggers on inbound TCP traffic on port 135 where the payload size exceeds 500 bytes, which is consistent with the initiation of WMI remote process creation.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns characteristic of Emotet malware command and control (C2) beaconing, specifically looking for POST requests with random alphanumeric URIs (4-16 characters) and a specific Accept-Encoding header (gzip, deflate).
Detects remote execution of WMI commands over DCOM by identifying the specific IWbemServices UUID (8BC3F05E-D86B-11D0-A075-00C04FB68820) in RPC traffic. The rule triggers on inbound TCP traffic on port 135 where the payload size exceeds 500 bytes, which is consistent with the initiation of WMI remote process creation.
Detects repeated use of the FTP 'STOR' command to transmit data to an external host within a short timeframe. The STOR command is used in the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to upload a file to the server. An unusual frequency of this command toward external destinations may indicate data exfiltration.
Detects network traffic attempting to exploit the SMBv1 vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144), commonly known as EternalBlue. The rule monitors for specific SMB Trans2 SESSION_SETUP packet structures associated with this remote code execution exploit.
This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts using DCOM-based WMI calls to the remote OXID Resolver on port 135. Attackers often abuse DCOM to remotely trigger WMI methods, enabling remote code execution, discovery, or other malicious activities. The rule triggers on the characteristic DCOM OXID Resolve packet structure associated with this activity.
This rule detects ICMP Echo Request (type 8) packets with an unusually large payload (greater than 64 bytes). Such anomalies often indicate that an adversary is using ICMP as a covert channel for command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, by embedding arbitrary data within the ICMP payload fields.
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike Beacon check-in activity over HTTP. It identifies incoming GET requests where the URI is abnormally short and the HTTP Referer header is missing, which are common indicators of default Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles.
Detects high-frequency ICMP Echo Requests (Type 8) directed from internal networks to external destinations with oversized payloads (greater than 200 bytes). This pattern is indicative of ICMP tunneling, which is often used by adversaries for covert command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, bypassing standard filtering or monitoring.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests containing patterns commonly associated with Emotet command-and-control (C2) communication, specifically identifying the use of an application/octet-stream content type combined with a specific, randomized URI path structure consisting of alphanumeric segments.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts exhibiting characteristics of PowerShell-based download cradles, such as specific User-Agent strings or URL patterns associated with IEX DownloadString or Invoke-WebRequest.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns consistent with data exfiltration to major cloud storage providers (AWS S3, Azure Blob Storage, Google Cloud Storage) using common command-line interface tools like rclone, aws-cli, and AzCopy.
This rule detects DNS queries originating from the internal network towards the domain 'direct-download.giize.com', which has been associated with the unauthorized distribution of the ScreenConnect remote access tool. This activity is indicative of an attempt to download potentially malicious or unauthorized remote administration software.
This rule monitors network traffic for specific command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the Ousaban banking trojan. It detects response packets from an external server to a client machine containing JSON-like structural indicators such as 'inicio{', 'host', and 'porta' followed by '}fim'.
Detects frequent, persistent outbound TLS connections to api.telegram.org. This behavior is indicative of a malware sample or backdoor polling the Telegram Bot API for command and control (C2) instructions, effectively using the legitimate Telegram infrastructure to tunnel malicious communication.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network to external hosts on TCP port 45588, which is associated with Interlock ransomware beaconing behavior. This rule monitors for initial TCP SYN packets, characteristic of an outbound connection attempt potentially related to command-and-control activity following the exploitation of CVE-2026-20131.
Detects network activity initiated by the TukTuk malware to communicate with Arweave public gateways (arweave.net and g8way.io), which are utilized as dead-drop resolvers for C2 infrastructure resolution.
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