Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,303 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,251
22
21
7
2
Contributors
910
584
506
125
48
Categories
20,443
11,831
5,872
5,155
4,866
2,303
Platforms
2,190
209
168
62
61
Products / Services
2,250
2,159
163
32
31
MITRE Techniques
713
422
384
187
184
CVEs
17
12
12
12
10
IDS Classtypes
995
426
281
190
98
IDS Protocols
1,291
401
281
117
45
Detects the use of the HTTP CONNECT method on non-standard ports (8888, 9999, 4444). The CONNECT method is frequently used by HTTP proxies to establish TCP tunnels; unauthorized use of this method on uncommon ports is a common indicator of protocol tunneling used to bypass network egress filtering or for command and control (C2) communication.
This rule detects ICMP Echo Request (type 8) packets with an unusually large payload (greater than 64 bytes). Such anomalies often indicate that an adversary is using ICMP as a covert channel for command-and-control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, by embedding arbitrary data within the ICMP payload fields.
Detects network traffic associated with PsExec lateral movement activity, specifically looking for the creation of the PSEXESVC named pipe over SMB/ADMIN$ shares, which is commonly used by PsExec to remotely execute services and commands on target systems.
Detects ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets with a payload size exceeding 1000 bytes. This is a common indicator of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within ICMP packets to bypass network security controls for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic on high ports where the TLS SNI header consists of a 8-20 character random alphanumeric string. This pattern is indicative of default configurations for Metasploit Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS payloads attempting to establish a Command and Control connection.
Detects HTTP requests containing directory traversal patterns (e.g., ../, %2e%2e/) combined with attempts to access sensitive system files like /etc/passwd, shadow files, or Windows system configuration files (boot.ini, win.ini).
This rule detects attempts to inject malicious JavaScript code via HTTP URI requests. It uses PCRE pattern matching to identify common XSS indicators such as <script> tags, JavaScript event handlers (onerror, onload), and attempts to access document.cookie, which are indicative of stored or reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attack patterns.
This rule detects large HTTP POST requests (greater than 10MB) originating from the internal network to external destinations, which may indicate bulk data exfiltration.
Detects network traffic associated with PsExec lateral movement activity, specifically looking for the creation of the PSEXESVC named pipe over SMB/ADMIN$ shares, which is commonly used by PsExec to remotely execute services and commands on target systems.
Detects ICMP Type 8 (Echo Request) packets with a payload size exceeding 1000 bytes. This is a common indicator of ICMP tunneling, where attackers encapsulate data within ICMP packets to bypass network security controls for command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects multiple failed SSH authentication attempts originating from a single source IP within a short timeframe, which is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against SSH services.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to external networks that match a known Emotet C2 traffic pattern. The rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests using an 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' Content-Type and a URI structure consisting of randomized alphanumeric segments (4-20 characters long). This structure is characteristic of Emotet's communication with its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of QakBot malware command and control (C2) activity. The rule identifies a specific combination of a hardcoded User-Agent string ('Trident/7.0') and a URI pattern consisting of 4 to 32 alphanumeric characters ending in .php.
Detects the use of the FTP STOR command to transfer files with sensitive extensions (.docx, .pdf, .xlsx, .zip, .7z) to external networks. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via an unencrypted alternative protocol.
Detects HTTP GET requests originating from internal network hosts to external destinations that match known Emotet C2 communication patterns, specifically those using hardcoded URI paths such as '/wp-content/', '/wp-admin/', or '/tmp/' combined with the 'Accept-Encoding: identity' header.
Detects a high frequency of incoming TCP SYN packets targeting port 3389 (RDP) from a single source within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a brute-force or credential-stuffing attack against Remote Desktop services.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic on non-standard ports that matches a specific JA3 fingerprint associated with the Sliver command and control framework. This indicates potential beaconing or C2 communication from a compromised host.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length is at least 10MB and the Content-Type header indicates the transfer of archived data (zip or x-tar). This pattern is often associated with the staging and exfiltration of compressed sensitive data from an internal host to an external network destination.
Detects HTTP requests attempting to access sensitive internal IP addresses (RFC-1918) or cloud metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254) which are common indicators of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) exploitation attempts.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity using DNS by identifying high-frequency, long, and random subdomain queries. It monitors for DNS requests that exceed 40 bytes in size, feature complex alphanumeric subdomains, and exceed a defined threshold of 10 requests within a 60-second window, which is indicative of DNS tunneling or command-and-control exfiltration.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of PsExec lateral movement, specifically identifying the authentication or access to the hidden 'ADMIN$' network share followed by the transfer or execution of the 'PSEXESVC' service binary, a hallmark of the PsExec tool.
Page 97 of 110