Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DSParse DLL being loaded by an Office Product
Detects potential DLL sideloading using comctl32.dll to obtain system privileges
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "ShellDispatch.dll"
Detects loading and execution of an unsigned thor scanner binary.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "mfdetours.dll". While using "mftrace.exe" it can be abused to attach to an arbitrary process and force load any DLL named "mfdetours.dll" from the current directory of execution.
Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process
Detects DLL sideloading of unsigned "mfdetours.dll". Executing "mftrace.exe" can be abused to attach to an arbitrary process and force load any DLL named "mfdetours.dll" from the current directory of execution.
Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without PowerShell" attack
Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package
Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-PowerShell process.
Detects behavior similar to meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.
Detects behavior similar to meterpreter's "load powershell" extension.
Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables
Detects Kerberos DLL being loaded by an Office Product
Detects loading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by the "SystemResetPlatform.exe" binary which can be abused as a method of DLL side loading since the "$SysReset" directory isn't created by default.
Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicates WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers EventConsumers activity.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "SmadHook.dll", a DLL used by SmadAV antivirus
Detects Microsoft Word loading an Add-In (.wll) file which can be used by threat actors for initial access or persistence.
Detects loading of Amsi.dll by uncommon processes
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, ShadowHammer supply chain attack
Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
References:
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
Operation ShadowHammer was an attack against ASUS computer hardware, using the company's own update infrastructure to deliver malware to the company's products. The campaign ran from June to November, 2018. ASUS has since responded with updates that protect their Live Update system, and diagnostic tools to check affected systems.
The following query checks for activity associated with the ShadowHammer implant or container over the past 30 days.
References:
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan9wn/hackers-hijacked-asus-software-updates-to-install-backdoors-on-thousands-of-computers
https://www.asus.com/News/hqfgVUyZ6uyAyJe1
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
Query #1 - Find the machines on which this file was seen.
TODO - set file hash to be a SHA1 hash of your choice...
TODO - set file hash to be a SHA1 hash of your choice...
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