Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying users who, within a short timeframe (90 seconds) of their first recorded network logon (EventID 4624, Logon Type 3), perform suspicious follow-up activities such as explicit credentials usage (4648), network share access (5140), or remote service installation (7045).
This rule detects potential credential dumping activity against the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) on a host shortly after a successful VPN logon. It correlates Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) representing known dumping techniques (Mimikatz, Procdump, or comsvcs.dll) with Windows Security Event ID 4624 (Logon) from a VPN source within a 5-minute window.
Detects high volumes of authentication failures (EventID 4625) using sub-status 0xC0000064, which indicates the attempted username does not exist. A high frequency of these events targeting multiple non-existent accounts is a strong indicator of automated username enumeration or credential stuffing.
This rule detects anomalous RDP (Logon Type 10) sessions occurring outside of typical business hours or from previously unseen geographic locations, followed closely by the execution of system discovery commands (net.exe, ipconfig.exe, whoami.exe, systeminfo.exe) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation reconnaissance following an unauthorized or suspicious remote access session.
This rule detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks by looking for multiple successful network logons (LogonType 3) using NTLM authentication for the same user from the same IP address. A count of 5 or more such events is considered suspicious.
This rule detects unusual logon activity for service accounts. It identifies service accounts by looking for a dollar sign ($) at the end of the username. The rule then counts logons, unique IP addresses, and unique computers for these service accounts within one-hour bins. An alert is triggered if a service account has 10 or more logons or logs in from 5 or more unique IP addresses within that hour, indicating potential abuse or compromise.
Detects NTLM-authenticated network logons (Logon Type 3) originating from loopback IP addresses (127.0.0.1, ::1, or 0.0.0.0). This behavior is often associated with NTLM relay attacks or credential reflection bypass techniques where an adversary forces a local service to authenticate to itself to gain unauthorized access.
Detects network logon events (Logon Type 3) using NTLM authentication where the source IP address is local (127.0.0.1 or ::1). This behavior can be indicative of attempts to interact with local services or perform lateral movement within the same host using credential-based techniques such as 'Pass-the-Hash' or unauthorized access to local resources.
Detects high-frequency failed logon attempts (Event ID 4625) from a single IP address within a short time window, indicating potential brute force or password spraying activity targeting Windows systems.
Detects successful network or explicit credential logons (4624/4648) on Windows workstations where the username or workstation name contains keywords associated with Tenable Nessus scanning activity, indicating an authenticated vulnerability scan.
Detects high-frequency SMB (Logon Type 3) authentication events targeting Domain Controllers, specifically involving suspicious or generic accounts such as 'ANONYMOUS LOGON', 'Guest', empty usernames, or machine accounts. This behavior is indicative of network reconnaissance, session enumeration, or brute-force attempts targeting the domain.
Detects successful logon events (4624) or special logon attempts (4648) associated with accounts or workstations identified as Qualys scanner agents. This is typically used to identify or baseline vulnerability scanning activity across the environment.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of logon events (both successful and failed) or a large number of unique users attempting to log on within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential brute-force attacks or credential stuffing attempts against Windows systems.
This rule detects potential MFA bypass via stolen session cookies by identifying successful single-factor authentications from new or unmanaged/non-compliant devices, especially when originating from a new geographical location for the user or exhibiting medium/high sign-in risk. It correlates impossible travel, new device, and lack of MDM/EDR compliance signals.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns where a single source IP address exhibits multiple failed login attempts followed by at least one successful login within a 10-minute time window, indicative of credential stuffing or password spraying.
Detects successful authentication events from accounts identified as service, managed, or robot accounts (e.g., svc_, sa_, msol, robot) originating from external IP addresses or exhibiting an unusually high number of distinct source IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential credential theft, token replay attacks, or unauthorized usage of service account identities.
This rule detects a remote interactive logon (Logon Type 10) via RDP, followed by a PowerShell process executing 'net.exe' with sensitive administrative arguments such as 'administrator', '/active:yes', or '/dom'. This pattern is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to elevate privileges or modify domain/local account properties after establishing initial access via Remote Desktop.
Detects non-interactive OAuth2 token refresh attempts targeting Microsoft 365 services where the authentication is satisfied by a pre-existing session without MFA challenge. The rule flags instances where the sign-in originates from an IP address with a different ASN or country than the user's previous interactive session and uses specific browser user-agents identified in known Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) campaigns like the Payroll Pirate.
Detects exploitation attempts of the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) by monitoring for specific process executions related to Impacket tools (secretsdump, zerologon_tester), suspicious domain controller machine account password resets via Windows Event ID 4742, and high-frequency Netlogon authentication failures (Event ID 4776) typical of the zero-length client challenge brute force attack.
Detects real-time Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) OTP relay, commonly associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing frameworks like Bluekit. The rule flags successful sign-ins where MFA methods (SMS, TOTP, or Authenticator app) are completed with an abnormally low latency (under 10 seconds), suggesting automated relay, or where discrepancies exist in session context indicative of proxy-based interception.
Detects suspicious access to browser credential stores (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, Brave) by non-browser processes within a short time frame (2 hours) after a FortiClient VPN logon event. This activity is consistent with information stealer malware, such as LummaC2, Phantom Stealer, Aurora Stealer, Luca Stealer, and Formbook, often observed in post-compromise phases of campaigns like FortiBleed.
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