Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Commodity .NET keylogger and remote access trojan
Detects PowerShell invoking ScriptBlock::Create or Invoke-Expression on decrypted in-memory text, which is a technique used by malware like Banana RAT to execute obfuscated or dynamically generated code.
Detects the BQTLock ransomware loader (start.exe) spawning the primary payload (BQT.exe), which subsequently executes WMIC to perform hardware, virtualization, and sandbox environment enumeration, a technique commonly used for evasion.
This rule detects command and control (C2) communication associated with the 'easy-day-js' backdoor, which is part of the Mastra npm supply chain attack. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the IP address 23.254.164.123 with a spoofed Internet Explorer 8 User-Agent string.
This rule detects the presence of components associated with the MYRA rootkit, including specific filenames ('libcache.so', 'memfd_loader') and references to the 'apintergrationpost' npm package or the author 'kimijohn01'. It monitors process command lines, file events, and syslog messages for these indicators.
Detects the loading of 'hostfxr.dll' from suspicious user-specific AppData folders by 'CrossDeviceService.exe' or 'Teams.exe'. This behavior can indicate an attempt to load a malicious .NET runtime, potentially for DLL hijacking or code injection, often associated with persistence or execution techniques.
Detects the creation of a named object with the specific name 'MakeAmericaGreatAgain'. This string has been associated with various malware and potentially unwanted programs, often used as a mutex or other synchronization object to ensure only one instance of the malicious process is running.
This rule detects the presence of Blackbeard malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its known C2 infrastructure. It correlates file events with specific hashes and network events with specific remote IP addresses.
Detects LampoRAT malware based on known file hash execution.
Detects known malicious invoice PDFs and email samples used in Crimson Kingsnake campaigns.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of network connections to common proxy ports (3128, 8080, 80, 443) initiated by critical system processes such as 'services.exe', 'svchost.exe', or 'rundll32.exe'. This behavior can indicate the installation and use of a trojan proxy or other malicious software attempting to exfiltrate data or establish command and control through a proxy.
This rule detects suspicious file creation or modification events in the root directory (C:\) for files commonly associated with boot sectors, such as 'bootsect.bak', 'bootloader', 'MBR', and 'VBR'. Such modifications can indicate ransomware activity or other forms of boot integrity compromise.
This rule detects suspicious modifications to registry keys under 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies' where the registry value data contains '.exe' or '.dll'. Such changes, especially multiple occurrences within a short timeframe (3 or more changes within an hour), can indicate ransomware activity attempting to alter file associations or execution policies to maintain persistence or execute malicious payloads.
Detects suspicious execution patterns indicative of ransomware utilizing batch scripts. This rule triggers when 'cmd.exe' or 'powershell.exe' execute at least 5 times within a 5-minute window, with command lines containing '.bat', '.cmd', or '/c', suggesting automated script execution often seen in ransomware attacks.
Detects a specific network handshake pattern (05 01 00) associated with the SystemBC malware acting as a SOCKS5 proxy. This pattern is characteristic of the initial communication phase used by SystemBC to establish C2 connectivity, often utilized by ransomware affiliates.
Detects network beaconing activity attributed to the OceanLotus (APT32) threat group, specifically the SPECTRALVIPER C2 mechanism. The rule identifies the 'OneDrive.Sync.Services.exe' process performing HTTP GET requests to known attacker-controlled infrastructure or using specific malicious cookie headers (zd_cs_pm, euconsent-v2) for command-and-control communication.
Correlates the user interacting with a browser in kiosk mode (potentially indicating a fake tech support page) and immediately downloading an executable file into the Downloads folder. This behavior is indicative of the Havoc Demon loader being delivered via social engineering tactics.
Detects two distinct suspicious activities on Linux systems: masquerading by processes named 'uptime' making outbound network connections to non-local IP ranges, and the execution of binaries associated with AtlasRAT.
Detects execution and staging activity associated with the NUKESPED (zlrenu8.exe) backdoor. The rule monitors for direct process execution from ProgramData, malicious DLL registration using rundll32, the creation of staged payload files in ProgramData, and suspicious memory operations (VirtualProtect) by the backdoor process, which are indicative of reflective loading or shellcode execution.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections to specific Fastly CDN IP addresses associated with the Kimsuky threat group's NUKESPED backdoor. The rule identifies processes attempting to communicate with these infrastructure IPs that are not part of a predefined list of trusted or common legitimate applications, indicating potential command and control (C2) activity.
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