Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with HijackLoader delivered via ErrTraffic ClickFix lures. The rule identifies a sequence where a web browser spawns a PowerShell process that subsequently creates a large archive file (binary bloating), followed by the execution of suspicious processes (often associated with process injection/hollowing) from the extracted context.
Detects the ClickFix infection chain where a web browser process spawns PowerShell to execute obfuscated ScriptBlock content. This activity is correlated with network connections to identified ErrTraffic C2 infrastructure (/api/index.php?a=ctx) used for distributing various malware payloads including Vidar, Stealc, and others.
Detects the behavioral pattern of Vidar Stealer where it launches Chrome, Edge, or Brave browsers with specific command-line arguments ('--no-first-run', '--disable-gpu', 'about:blank') from a non-browser parent process. This technique is often used by Vidar to facilitate browser data theft while evading static analysis by using process hollowing or similar injection techniques against the spawned browser process.
Detects the presence of Remcos RAT by correlating a specific mutex (Remcos_Mutex_Inj) indicative of active malicious processes with an outbound network connection to a known command-and-control (C2) IP address (62.102.148.212) on port 37393. This combination is characteristic of Remcos RAT operations used for unauthorized audio and webcam surveillance.
This rule detects the creation of a '_vault.zip' archive, which is characteristic of the VVS Stealer malware, followed by network activity to Discord from the same process within a 15-minute window. VVS Stealer uses these archives to store stolen browser data (passwords, cookies, history, autofill) before exfiltrating it, often via Discord webhooks.
Detects the execution of a Nuitka-compiled Python RAT (chost.exe) associated with the PostCSS typosquatting campaign. The rule identifies this malicious binary when spawned by wscript.exe, powershell.exe, or node.exe from a location outside of C:\Windows\, followed by network communication to known campaign-associated C2 infrastructure.
Detects the execution of OXLOADER (aBsvwbdas.exe) which drops a maliciously crafted .ocx file (a copy of dui70.dll) into the %TEMP% directory. This behavior is indicative of module stomping to facilitate the in-memory execution of CASTLESTEALER via techniques like DonutLoader and RunPE.
Detects the creation or download of 'injection-obf.js', an obfuscated JavaScript payload associated with VVS Stealer for Discord injection. The rule captures details like source URL, referrer, and responsible process to aid in containment and scoping.
Correlates JS payload execution with immediate network requests to high-reputation but compromised shadowed domains used for traffic proxying. Specifically, this rule detects network connections initiated by 'wscript.exe' to known SocGholish domain shadowing infrastructure.
Detects HTTP GET requests for specific malicious archives (calculator.rar, EditorToolsPdf.zip) originating from suspected compromised Ukrainian domains (basecon.com.ua, online.zp.ua). This behavior is associated with the STOCKSTAY malware used by the threat actor Turla.
This rule monitors for HTTP POST requests to external networks containing 'gtag=' in the URI, which is a known technique used by the TrickBot malware to exfiltrate its group identifier during C2 communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests with specific URI patterns (/rob/ or /ins/) that are indicative of TrickBot malware command and control (C2) check-in activity.
Detects the initial handshake communication pattern associated with AsyncRAT, characterized by a specific base64-encoded configuration blob sent to external non-standard ports (6606, 7707, 8808) as identified by the Snort rule logic.
Detects BQTLock ransomware anti-analysis checks, specifically looking for processes named 'start.exe' or 'BQT.exe' that exhibit characteristics of PyInstaller environments (via environment variables) or log anti-debugging failure messages. This rule helps identify the initial stages of BQTLock execution where it attempts to evade analysis.
Detects behaviors associated with ransomware attempting to evade sandbox or virtual machine environments. This rule specifically looks for checks against the 'OOBEInProgress' and 'SystemSetupInProgress' registry values under '\Registry\Machine\System\Setup', and the presence of '_CLUSTER_NETWORK_NAME_' in process command lines. These checks are often performed by malware, such as Reynolds ransomware, to determine if it is running in an analysis environment before proceeding with malicious activities like encryption.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by a specific URL pattern consisting of two segments of 4-16 alphanumeric characters, typically observed in Emotet C2 traffic. The rule specifically matches requests with a Content-Type header set to application/octet-stream, which is indicative of malicious binary payload transfer or communication.
Detects the creation of a file named '__RestoreYourFiles__.txt' within the Microsoft Word STARTUP folder. This file name and location are commonly associated with ransomware activity, specifically the BlackByte ransomware, which drops this file as a ransom note.
Detects the loading of .NET assemblies (mscorlib.dll, System.dll, System.Net.dll, System.IO.dll) by processes whose filenames start with 'GST' or contain 'Debit' or 'Invoice'. This pattern is indicative of the Remcos RAT loader attempting to execute without writing the assembly to disk, a technique often used to evade detection.
Detects network communication patterns indicative of RedLine Stealer activity by looking for specific keywords in the RemoteUrl field during inbound or outbound connections.
This rule detects the execution of processes with command lines containing indicators associated with 'Phantom Stealer' malware, such as 'phantom stealer', 'stealer.dll', 'phantom.exe', or 'phtantom'. This could indicate an attempt to load or execute the stealer.
Detects process activity indicative of keylogging by the Remcos RAT loader. The rule specifically looks for processes with 'Remcos' or 'GST*.com' in their file name that also contain command-line arguments related to capturing window text or foreground window information, which are common keylogger behaviors.
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