Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of executable files in the AppData\Roaming folder, excluding common legitimate applications, when the file's version information (internal file name, product name, or file description) matches known indicators for the TuglaInsaatci malware. This rule specifically looks for files named 'oacY.exe' or containing 'TuglaInsaatci' in their version info, indicating potential self-copying or masquerading behavior of the malware.
Detects the in-memory loading of 'Optimax.dll' and 'System Optimizer Ultimate.dll', which are identified as first and second-stage loaders respectively, associated with a steganographic Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) delivery chain. This chain is known to drop Remcos RAT and other malware families. The rule also identifies related dropper processes based on internal file names 'TuglaInsaatci' and 'oacY.exe', and suspicious API calls indicative of process injection techniques like CreateRemoteThread and ProcessHollowing.
Detects the execution of inline C# code compilation, often used by malware like Remcos RAT, when initiated by PowerShell or a process with 'Remcos' in its parent's filename. This rule specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of C# compilation (csc.exe, csc.compiler, CodeCompile, CompileAssemblyFromSource) in conjunction with suspicious initiating processes.
This rule detects Vidar Stealer activity through two primary methods: a hash-based detection for a known Vidar 2.1 sample and a behavioral detection for non-standard parent processes spawning Chrome with specific command-line arguments. The behavioral detection targets Vidar's technique of using hash-resolved API calls (CreateNamedPipeA and WaitForSingleObject) to orchestrate APC injection into a suspended Chrome process for credential theft.
Detects Vidar Stealer attempting to access virtual memory of Chrome, Edge, or Brave processes to locate the v20_master_key, which is used to bypass Application-Bound Encryption. This rule also identifies suspicious browser process creations with specific command-line arguments that might indicate stealer activity.
Detects potential fileless execution of Meow RAT by monitoring process command lines for 'curl' fetching an AppleScript payload and piping it to 'osascript'. It also looks for specific Meow RAT indicators like C2 domains, payload names, and build hashes.
Detects the installation of the Kazuar backdoor, indicated by the creation of a scheduled task or service, following initial access via stolen credentials. This detection correlates suspicious persistence mechanisms with a remote session login on a host previously identified with StealC activity, suggesting a multi-stage attack where initial compromise (StealC) leads to credential theft, followed by remote access and persistence (Kazuar).
Detects evidence of anti-debugging techniques commonly associated with VILE Ransomware. The rule monitors process information including command lines, descriptions, and file paths for strings such as 'RtlGetCurrentPeb', 'taggedPointerPack', 'gcstoptheworld', and specific ransomware-related markers, indicating that a process is attempting to detect or evade analysis environments.
This rule monitors for specific registry modifications to the Windows LegalNoticeText key, which is a known behavior of Pay2Key ransomware to display ransom notes to the user upon logon.
Detects specific registry queries related to 'en-US' custom locale checks, often used by Grixba (Play Ransomware) to identify and evade sandbox environments. The rule also filters for process names matching known Grixba execution patterns or suspicious locations such as Public Music directories.
This rule detects suspicious activities indicative of Phantom Stealer malware injecting into 'explorer.exe'. It looks for screen capture API calls originating from 'explorer.exe', the loading of GDI DLLs into 'explorer.exe', and 'explorer.exe' being spawned from unexpected parent processes, all of which are behaviors associated with Phantom Stealer.
This rule detects outbound network connections from the internal network to external hosts on specific ports (2404, 37393) that are known to be used by the Remcos Remote Access Trojan (RAT) for command and control (C2) communications. The rule is designed to identify established TCP connections to the server.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned in a suspended state, indicative of process hollowing. The rule specifically targets legitimate Windows system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, rundll32.exe, dllhost.exe, taskhost.exe, taskhostw.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvr32.exe) when they are spawned by non-system parent processes originating from user-writable paths like AppData, Temp, Roaming, ProgramData, or Desktop. This behavior is commonly associated with malware like Remcos RAT.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to known infrastructure associated with the 'Borrowed Trust' gambling kit. It identifies connections to specific IP addresses, IP ranges, compromised subdomains, URLs containing affiliate referrer codes, known redirect destinations, and a unique favicon path. The rule specifically excludes connections originating from common browser processes to focus on non-browser initiated activity, which could indicate malware or other malicious software attempting to establish C2 or exfiltrate data.
Detects network communication with the Rokarolla trojan's command and control (C2) server ('beralisvc.info') and subsequent injection of base64-encoded HTML phishing overlays into legitimate banking application UIs. The rule identifies C2 contact via network events and the presence of specific HTML content indicators ('html_base64', 'PCFEt0NUWVBFIGh0bWw+', 'com.imaginbank.app') in HTTP responses, suggesting an overlay attack.
This rule detects the loading of a machine learning model (e.g., Pickle, PyTorch, or Hugging Face model files) via Python, immediately followed by the creation of a Windows Executable (PE) or Shared Object (.so) file on disk by the same initiating process. This behavior is indicative of an embedded stage-2 loader within a malicious model file, often seen in backdoored Large Language Models (LLMs). The time correlation between the model loading and the file drop is set to 45 seconds to identify immediate post-load execution.
This rule detects potential Remote Access Trojan (RAT) activity by identifying specific indicators associated with Nuitka-compiled binaries, specifically the 'chost.exe' filename or paths containing 'win-driver-xd7d'. Additionally, it monitors for suspicious Python-based loader executions ('loader.py') initiated from temporary directories, which is a common persistence or execution technique for such malware.
Detects the creation of specific scheduled tasks associated with LoaderClient or WeedHack malware. These tasks, named 'JMonitoringTask' or 'JavaSecurityUpdater', are used for persistence and recurring execution of malicious code.
Detects MYRA RAT's proc_hide and agent_launcher components masquerading as systemd-userdbd by copying Node.js binary to /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-userdbd and using prctl PR_SET_NAME to overwrite process name and argv[0]. This rule identifies suspicious process activity where a process attempts to impersonate 'systemd-userdbd' by having a matching folder path or command line, but originating from an unexpected location or being associated with known MYRA RAT components like 'agent_launcher' or 'proc_hide', or Node.js.
Detects anomalous behaviors associated with the Remcos RAT watchdog, specifically the execution of host processes (svchost.exe, rmclient.exe, fsutil.exe) by non-standard parent processes, the creation of specific 'WD' or 'exepath' registry keys in HKCU\SOFTWARE used for persistence configuration, and rapid respawn patterns indicating a watchdog process restart loop.
Detects execution of PowerShell or PowerShell ISE containing indicators associated with 'Ptero' malware families or known file-hosting services and infrastructure used for payload delivery or command-and-control. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious command-line strings and flags executions triggered by common persistence or infection vectors like Word documents, WMI, or scripting engines.
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