Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network communication to known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses used by the Medusa ransomware group.
Detects when a legitimate application, specifically 'pdf24.exe', loads 'cryptbase.dll' from a non-standard directory. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, a technique known to be used by the PDFSIDER malware to evade detection and potentially escalate privileges.
Detects PowerShell executing a reflective .NET assembly load, potentially indicative of a backdoor, initiated by a Node.js process. The detection specifically looks for keywords related to .NET Reflection, assembly loading, byte arrays, and a specific C2 domain (hellolargeworld.com:443) or invocation method (Extension.SubRoutine.Run2) within the PowerShell command line. The initiating process is expected to be 'node.exe'.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with Emotet malware by monitoring for successful network connections to suspicious remote ports frequently used by the malware. The rule flags endpoints that establish connections to at least three of these high-risk ports within a one-hour window, which is indicative of automated C2 beaconing behavior.
This rule detects the use of JSON-RPC 'eth_call' by a non-browser process during network connection events. It specifically looks for network activity where the process is not a known web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) and the network traffic or command line contains the string '"method":"eth_call"'. This behavior is indicative of malware or other malicious software attempting to interact with blockchain services, potentially for dynamic command and control or address resolution, as described in the Check Point research.
Detects ScreenConnect or another remote support process directly spawning a mining executable or script. This rule identifies suspicious process creation where a known remote management tool (ScreenConnect, ConnectWiseControl, ClientService) initiates a process with command-line arguments or filenames indicative of cryptocurrency mining (e.g., xmrig, lolminer, nbminer, stratum, wallet, gpu).
Detects the creation of executable or script files by common web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Internet Explorer) or email clients (Outlook). This activity can indicate a drive-by download, a malicious attachment being saved, or other forms of initial access where an attacker leverages a user's interaction with these applications to drop malicious payloads.
Detects LegionLoader malware performing environmental fingerprinting by querying specific Windows registry keys (Internet Settings Zones and CentralProcessor) in rapid succession. This behavior is indicative of a multi-stage check to identify sandbox or virtual machine environments before executing the final payload.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity associated with LegionLoader by monitoring for outbound network connections to 'birdeemusic.com' domains initiated by Python or AppData/Roaming-based processes, following a precursor process launch (msiexec.exe or from AppData/Roaming) on the same host within 10 minutes.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for the creation, modification, or renaming of files with the '.prinzeugen' extension. This extension is commonly associated with specific ransomware families. The rule triggers if 10 or more such files are observed within a one-hour window on a single device, indicating a bulk encryption event.
This rule detects execution patterns associated with the BeepRAT malware family. It identifies the presence of known loaders (HFY.exe or tcc.exe) or processes exhibiting specific command-line arguments and configuration loading behavior often used by this malware. The rule also aims to identify child process activity consistent with keyboard hooking.
Detects the presence and execution of 'HFY.exe', a trojanized telecom utility associated with BeepRAT malware. The rule flags file creation or process execution events involving this specific filename, which often indicates the reconnaissance phase where the malware generates a hardware identifier (HWID) for C2 registration.
Detects the execution of HFY.exe, a known component of the BeepRAT malware family, along with the presence of its associated sideloaded or dependency DLL files (e.g., data.dll, SQLite.Interop.dll). The rule monitors both process creation events and file system artifacts indicative of the malware's deployment.
This rule detects activities associated with the BeepRAT malware, including the execution of LuaJit.exe with specific command-line arguments (config.ini, temp.bin), the creation of staging files in the TCC local AppData directory, and parent-child process relationships involving a known dropper (HFY.exe). It also utilizes specific SHA256 hashes to identify known malicious BeepRAT binaries.
Detects BeepRAT malware activity, including network communication to its command-and-control (C2) server on port 18848 and the creation of screenshot or video artifacts by known loader processes (HFY.exe, LuaJit.exe, tcc.exe). It also monitors for unauthorized network connections to the known BeepRAT C2 IP address.
This rule targets suspicious process launches where an executable, specifically a `.exe` file, is executed from a temporary directory (e.g., `temp` or `appdata\local\temp`). The detection is further refined by looking for a command line pattern where the executable is followed by a numeric argument (1 to 10 digits) and then a long Base64-like string (at least 40 characters long, optionally padded with '=='). This pattern is often observed in malware that uses temporary files and obfuscated command-line parameters for execution.
This rule targets suspicious process launches where an executable, specifically a `.exe` file, is executed from a temporary directory (e.g., `temp` or `appdata\local\temp`). The detection is further refined by looking for a command line pattern where the executable is followed by a numeric argument (1 to 10 digits) and then a long Base64-like string (at least 40 characters long, optionally padded with '=='). This pattern is often observed in malware that uses temporary files and obfuscated command-line parameters for execution.
Detects activity associated with the BeepRAT keylogger plugin by monitoring for specific command-line strings and file artifacts identified in the DcRAT-derived BeepRAT framework.
Detects persistent outbound network connections to known SystemBC (Coroxy) C2 infrastructure and Tor gateway IP addresses. The rule identifies suspicious beaconing behavior characterized by repeated connections over ports 4001 or 4002, originating from processes in user-writable directories, and correlates these with process lineage from common office applications or browsers.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the SHARDLOADER malware family, including the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks and modification of registry run keys. The rule monitors processes, scheduled task events, and registry value changes for specific indicators such as paths in C:\ProgramData\IDM\logs\, files named 'pcl2bmp' or 'mediuminststart', and DLL sideloading patterns involving SolidPDFCreator.
This rule detects WebSocket communication attempts from a device to known command and control (C2) IP addresses associated with the Remcos Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It specifically looks for network events where the remote URL contains 'ws://', 'wss://', or 'websocket' and the remote IP address matches one of the listed indicators of compromise (IOCs).
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