Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects Neo-reGeorg tunnel.jsp/tunnel.jspx servlets used by UNC6240 to establish SOCKS5-over-HTTP(S) tunneling from compromised PeopleSoft PSEMHUB.war hosts
Detects network activity associated with the NeedyMantis malware, specifically identifying C2 beaconing behavior. The rule looks for HTTPS GET requests to specific URI paths ('/library/zip/') with a WebSocket upgrade header and suspicious cookie patterns, as well as TLS SNI traffic targeting the hardcoded domain 'corp.tripswithengine.com'.
Detects anomalous network traffic associated with Vidar Stealer 2.0, where an HTTP GET request for a .jpg file is directed to a bare IP address, and the server's response header fails to indicate an image content type despite the requested file extension.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) domains, and specific download URLs associated with identified threats. It correlates these indicators across process execution, file activity, and network connection logs to identify potential compromises or malicious activity related to the aware-cr1 infrastructure.
Detects 2CLoader samples containing the embedded config magic bytes alongside rolling-XOR, AES-GCM, and sha256-seed-derived key material used in its payload decryption chain
Detects 2CLoader samples containing the embedded config magic bytes alongside rolling-XOR, AES-GCM, and sha256-seed-derived key material used in its payload decryption chain
Detects 2CLoader samples containing the embedded config magic bytes alongside rolling-XOR, AES-GCM, and sha256-seed-derived key material used in its payload decryption chain
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects SectopRAT (Arechclient2) .NET RAT binaries deployed via tampered libcef.dll / JetBrains helper DLL sideloading that harvest browser credentials, cookies, credit card data, and files. Tightened to require combined sideload+family+target indicators plus .NET CLR import evidence, avoiding standalone generic strings.
This rule performs a retrospective hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ClosedQuorum malware. It identifies suspicious activity by matching against known file hashes, specific filenames, and network traffic directed towards services (such as DeepSeek, OpenRouter, Mistral, and Discord) which the malware uses for C2 or data exfiltration. The detection logic aggregates results from file system, process, and network telemetry.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
Detects specific malicious Mach-O binary payloads associated with the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) discovered in the Macfinger ClickFix campaign. The rule uses static file hashes to identify these specific samples.
Detects specific malicious Mach-O binary payloads identified as Atomic Stealer (AMOS) that are associated with Macfinger ClickFix first-stage infection campaigns. The rule uses static file signatures (Mach-O headers), specific file size ranges, and known SHA-256 hashes of the payloads.
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