Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious command-line executions involving common Windows system binaries (rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, certutil.exe, wmic.exe) combined with keywords often associated with network communication or data transfer (http, https, base64, /transfer). This pattern can indicate attempts at downloading malicious payloads, exfiltrating data, or executing encoded commands.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
This rule detects the creation of common ransomware ransom note filenames on a device. It triggers when two or more distinct ransom note files are created within a 5-minute window, indicating potential ransomware activity.
This rule detects a high volume of network share connections (SMB/CIFS) from a single device to multiple remote IPs within a short timeframe. This behavior can be indicative of ransomware attempting to encrypt files across network shares, or other forms of rapid lateral movement and data access. The rule specifically looks for connections on ports 445 or 139 initiated by common user or system processes like explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe.
This rule detects suspicious file creation or modification events in the root directory (C:\) for files commonly associated with boot sectors, such as 'bootsect.bak', 'bootloader', 'MBR', and 'VBR'. Such modifications can indicate ransomware activity or other forms of boot integrity compromise.
This rule detects suspicious file renaming activities indicative of ransomware. It specifically looks for files that previously had common document extensions (.doc, .xls, .ppt) being renamed to extensions commonly associated with encryption by ransomware (.encrypted, .locked, .crypted, .ecc). The rule triggers if 20 or more such renames occur within a 5-minute window on a single device.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by monitoring network events for specific URL patterns and user agent strings associated with known C2 frameworks like AzureVeil and Adaptix. It identifies beaconing if multiple devices communicate with the same remote IP address using these indicators within a 15-minute window, with more than 5 beacon counts and more than 1 distinct device.
Detects indicators associated with the MiniUpdate RAT deployed by the threat group Screening Serpens. This rule identifies network connections to known C2 domains, the creation of a persistence scheduled task named 'WindowsSecurityUpdate', and the dropping of specific RAT module DLLs ('UpdateChecker.dll', 'InitInstall.dll', 'Updater.dll') in common user-writable directories. The file event detection is tuned to require multiple generic DLLs or the presence of 'InitInstall.dll' to reduce false positives.
Detects outbound network traffic to a hardcoded Command and Control (C2) IP address and port associated with a specific build of Lucid Stealer malware. This rule identifies potential C2 communication by monitoring network connections for a known malicious IP and port combination.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with command-line arguments indicating an attempt to download a .7z file over HTTP or HTTPS. This behavior is often associated with malware delivery and execution.
This rule detects a drive-by download attempt initiated via a malicious advertisement. It specifically looks for HTTP responses to clients where the HTTP referer header contains common advertisement-related keywords (ad., ads., advert) and the response body contains the 'MZ' magic bytes, indicating an executable file download. This combination suggests a user was redirected from an advertisement to a site that then attempted to download an executable.
This rule detects Fast Flux DNS activity, characterized by rapid changes in IP addresses associated with the same domain within a short period. Specifically, it triggers an alert if 30 or more distinct IP addresses are observed for a single domain within a 10-second window, based on DNS queries. This behavior is often indicative of malware using fast flux techniques to evade detection and make takedowns more difficult.
This rule detects HTTP PUT requests to known remote file hosting services (transfer.sh, file.io, gofile.io, anonfiles). This activity is indicative of payload staging, where an attacker uploads malicious files or tools to a remote server for later use in an attack, often as part of the resource development phase of the attack lifecycle.
This rule detects potential watering hole attacks by identifying HTTP responses (flow to client) that contain a combination of HTML script tags, 'document.write', and 'eval(' within the file data. This pattern is indicative of malicious JavaScript injection designed to execute code on the client side.
his query hunts for Beagle malware indicators by correlating suspicious file artifacts (NOVupdate.exe, avk.dll, Claude.msi), process command-line executions, and potential network callbacks. It unifies multiple telemetry sources to surface persistence, DLL sideloading, and C2 activity aligned with MITRE ATT&CK techniques.
This rule detects the download of a COM scriptlet (.sct file) over HTTP that contains XML and the keyword 'scriptlet'. This behavior is characteristic of the 'Squiblydoo' technique, which abuses legitimate Windows binaries like Regsvr32 to execute arbitrary code, often for defense evasion.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header contains the string 'CertUtil' (case-insensitive). This pattern is often associated with adversaries using the Windows built-in utility CertUtil to download malicious payloads, a common technique for defense evasion.
This rule detects HTTP downloads where the file is disguised as an image (e.g., .jpg, .png) but its content starts with 'MZ', indicating it's a Windows executable. This is a common technique used by adversaries to bypass security measures that might block executable downloads but allow image files.
This rule detects when a file is written to a remote Windows Startup folder via Server Message Block (SMB). The rule specifically looks for SMB traffic containing the string "Startup" and "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\" (case-insensitive) in the flow to the server. This activity is often associated with persistence mechanisms where malware or an attacker attempts to execute code automatically upon system startup.
This rule detects attempts to download a payload that contains an MSBuild inline task. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic (flow:to_client,established) containing the case-insensitive strings "<UsingTask" and "TaskFactory" within the file data. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to leverage MSBuild's inline task functionality to execute arbitrary code, often as part of a larger attack chain for code execution or persistence.
This rule detects attempts to drop a DLL file to a network share, specifically targeting the 'ADMIN$' share, which could indicate a DLL hijacking attempt. It monitors SMB traffic on port 445 for established connections and looks for content containing '.dll' and 'ADMIN$' (case-insensitive).
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