Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,866 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,757
1,593
604
243
199
Contributors
944
801
787
614
315
Categories
20,460
11,847
5,879
5,158
4,866
Platforms
3,711
737
612
405
100
Products / Services
1,458
648
498
272
235
MITRE Techniques
1,330
1,214
888
785
772
CVEs
7
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
546
20
16
5
4
IDS Protocols
417
66
60
39
13
Detects instances where a user account performs non-interactive or legacy authentication (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP, ActiveSync) shortly after an endpoint associated with that same user is flagged for malware or infostealer activity. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using exfiltrated credentials to maintain access to cloud services while bypassing MFA policies.
Detects architecture-specific Mach-O 64-bit AMOS Stealer binaries dropped by the Macfinger ClickFix first-stage shell script, requiring multiple distinctive C2 endpoint strings alongside Mach-O magic and size constraints to reduce false positives
This rule detects artifacts and behaviors associated with the WaterPlum/Contagious Interview (also known as DeceptiveDevelopment) malware suite, including BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, and related payloads. The rule specifically targets the presence of embedded family-name strings, as well as the execution of suspicious npm package installations triggered by VS Code task automation (tasks.json) or trust prompts, common in fake technical interview attack scenarios.
Detects the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe) to extract a file named drata.dat using command line arguments that indicate silent extraction from an encrypted or password-protected archive. This behavior is associated with the LegionLoader malware, which uses this technique to stage its payload.
Detects the presence of specific Go build path metadata associated with the sckit Go implant, including modules and internal package structures, within an executable or file.
This rule detects outbound network beaconing from the SCKit malware to known command-and-control (C2) domains hosted on skyleen.fr or to a specific malicious IP address (139.84.223.178). The rule monitors both TLS SNI indicators in HTTPS traffic and direct IP connections to identify compromised hosts communicating with the attacker's infrastructure.
Detects a fake ClaudeDesktop.exe installer / tampered libcef.dll sideload chain deploying the SectopRAT .NET RAT, requiring multiple corroborating indicators and a PE anomaly consistent with DLL sideloading rather than a single generic string
Detects SectopRAT (Arechclient2) .NET RAT binaries deployed via tampered libcef.dll / JetBrains helper DLL sideloading that harvest browser credentials, cookies, credit card data, and files. Tightened to require combined sideload+family+target indicators plus .NET CLR import evidence, avoiding standalone generic strings.
Detects the presence or execution of known malicious Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool binaries associated with phishing campaigns, such as those impersonating MSP360 or ScreenConnect.
Detects the presence or execution of known malicious Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool binaries associated with phishing campaigns, such as those impersonating MSP360 or ScreenConnect.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and process events to identify the execution or presence of files matching a curated list of 161 SHA256 hashes associated with twelve known malicious threat actors and families (Lynx, ANUBIS, Rhysida, LockBit, ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, Medusa, The Gentlemen, NetRunner, Genesis, Pay2Key, and Handala). The rule filters out events occurring in known EDR/AV quarantine or sandbox directory structures and dedupes hits on a per-device and per-hash basis within 24-hour windows to reduce alert noise.
Detects the UAT-11587 TestAssembly.dll downloader by its shared AssemblyAttribute GUID b2b3adb0-1669-4b94-86cb-6dd682ddbea3 embedded in .NET metadata across all campaign builds
Detects Antino backdoor binaries (slc.dll and standalone) via embedded AntinoApp application manifest string and Rust PDB path patterns matching GitHub Actions Windows runner structure.
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
This rule identifies potential activity related to the Kothamine malware by monitoring for specific file hashes associated with the malware in process and file execution events, as well as network connections to a specific malicious GitHub repository path used for payload delivery.
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
Detects Kothamine Agent via hardcoded base64 AES-GCM key combined with C2 loop markers and plugin command strings, gated on PE structure to reduce false positives
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Page 16 of 232