Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of an executable (.exe) file from a user's temporary directory (AppData\Local\Temp). This behavior is often associated with malware or suspicious activity, as temporary directories are frequently used by adversaries for staging and executing payloads. The rule specifically excludes executables with 'setup' in their command line to reduce false positives from legitimate software installations.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious filenames (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe, powershell.exe) from common user download or pictures directories. Adversaries often place malicious executables in these locations to evade detection and execute their payloads.
Detects process execution originating from the C:\ProgramData\log\ directory. This specific path is utilized as a staging directory by UNC6692 to execute their SNOWGLAZE tunneler and SNOWBASIN bindshell malware payloads.
Detects suspicious execution paths for svchost.exe, known malicious SHA256 hashes, or suspicious registry persistence mechanisms. Specifically, it looks for svchost.exe or a file named images.png executing from the 'Users\Public\Windows' directory, known malicious hashes, or a registry run key named 'Windows Update Service' under 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'.
Detects the creation of a process named 'wt.exe' within the 'ProgramData' directory, which is an unusual location for a legitimate executable and could indicate malicious activity. Exclusions are in place for common administrative tools and specific endpoint naming conventions to reduce false positives.
This rule detects DNS queries made to a list of known malicious domains. These domains are often associated with malware command and control (C2) infrastructure or other malicious activities. Monitoring such queries can help identify compromised systems attempting to communicate with adversary-controlled resources.
This rule detects the execution or writing of a file with a specific SHA256 hash associated with the 'GateKeeper' payload. It monitors process creation events, new executable writes, PE file writes, and image loads on Windows platforms to identify the presence and activity of this known malicious file.
https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/UnDefend
This rule detects the execution of specific suspicious executables (ProShow.exe, BluetoothService.exe, Bitdefender Submission Wizard.exe) when they are launched from user-writable directories such as 'Users' or 'AppData'. This pattern can indicate malware execution or persistence, as adversaries often drop and execute malicious payloads in these locations to evade detection and leverage user permissions.
Detects network requests to known malicious domains associated with the fake RedAlert Android malware campaign used by pro-Iranian actors, acting as a payload host or C2 endpoint.
This rule detects the specific command and control check-in format used by the PhantomPull loader to retrieve the final PhantomPulse payload. It monitors for the URL pattern '/v1/updates/check?build=payloads' within process command lines on Windows systems, indicating communication with the PhantomPulse C2 infrastructure.
This rule alerts when Cato's inline Anti Malware engine identifies a file in transit as malicious. It fires on both blocked and allowed malware to catch cases where the engine detects but fails to block, indicating a potential compromise or a misconfiguration requiring immediate investigation.
Detects DNS resolution requests for known Masjesu botnet command and control (C2) domains. Masjesu relies on multiple failover domains to fetch its secondary payload and receive DDoS commands.
Detects the execution of 'syncobs.exe', which is identified as the primary loader component for the PhantomPulse RAT. This loader is responsible for decrypting and reflectively loading the final RAT payload. The detection focuses on the specific filename, which is considered highly indicative of this threat.
Detects HTTP requests containing the VS/PL/AN parameter combination used by JanelaRAT for C2 beaconing. The beacon reports malware version (VS), profile level (PL), and presence of banking security software (AN). JanelaRAT targets Latin American financial institutions (Brazil, Mexico). Note: C2 uses port 443 WITHOUT TLS encryption.
Based off of BlueHammer Local Priv Escalation, exploiting Windows Defender's signature file handling
This rule detects outbound network connections from Adobe Reader (AcroRd32.exe) or Adobe Acrobat (Acrobat.exe) processes on Windows platforms to known malicious C2 IP addresses. This activity is indicative of potential compromise, likely stemming from an exploit targeting Adobe products, as observed in a sophisticated zero-day campaign.
This rule detects the infected version of CPU-Z, a popular system information tool, which has been compromised and used as a vector for malware infection. The detection is based on specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to the malicious version of CPU-Z, like unusual command-line arguments, or known malicious behaviors associated with this tool. Specifically, it looks for `cpuz.exe` spawning `powershell.exe` with suspicious command-line arguments like `[Console]::In.ReadToEnd()` or `Invoke-Expression`, or `csc.exe` spawning `chrome.exe`.
This rule detects network traffic to the command and control (C2) domain 'sfrclak.com', which is associated with compromised versions of the Axios npm package (specifically 1.14.1 and 0.30.4). This traffic represents the first stage of activity where dropper scripts on an affected endpoint attempt to communicate with their C2 server.
This rule detects the creation, writing, or renaming of specific files associated with the compromised Axios npm package versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4. Upon installation, the postinstall script of these compromised packages deploys dropper scripts to download and install a remote access trojan on Mac, Linux, or Windows endpoints. The rule specifically looks for file paths indicative of these dropper activities across different operating systems.
This rule detects the first stage of activity once a compromised endpoint runs the affected Axios package (versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4). It specifically looks for process creation events where the command line contains a call out to the C2 domain 'sfrclak.com'. This indicates the dropper scripts attempting to establish communication with their command and control server.
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