Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network communication with known malicious infrastructure (C2 IPs and URLs), presence of malicious files identified by SHA256 hashes on disk, and execution of known malicious files. It also correlates these activities with specific operator email addresses involved in the malicious campaign.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
Detects the reflectively-loaded SectopRAT .NET payload by its combination of heavy calli (indirect call) opcode usage for control-flow flattening and its characteristic runtime string-decryption helper method used to resolve the C2 IP/port and other obfuscated strings
Detects HTTP GET requests to external services 'trycloudflare.com' or 'workers.dev' that return a file content starting with the 'MZ' and 'PE' header signatures within the first 256 bytes, indicating a Windows executable payload download often associated with AvisLoader activity.
Matches known SHA-256 hashes of AvisLoader toolkit components recovered from an exposed staging server: the Windows loader client, UAC-bypass helper, and process-hiding DLL
Detects AvisLoader Windows loader requiring both decoy non-executable packer-named sections and an embedded c-toxcore developer build path to co-occur in a valid PE
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the presence of PAYLOAD ransomware ELF binaries specifically configured to target VMware ESXi environments. The detection logic looks for a combination of ELF magic bytes, the 'PAYLOAD' string, references to common virtual machine file extensions (e.g., .vmdk, .vmx), and usage of ESXi-specific administration tools such as esxcli or vim-cmd.
Detects HTTP GET requests to '/api.php?t=' containing a 13-digit timestamp identifier, followed by a response body containing 'download_link'. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relaying instructions or stage-two payload delivery.
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
Detects Neo-reGeorg tunnel.jsp/tunnel.jspx servlets used by UNC6240 to establish SOCKS5-over-HTTP(S) tunneling from compromised PeopleSoft PSEMHUB.war hosts
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
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