Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the ZEROLOT wiper, a component reportedly used by the Sandworm group. This rule identifies specific artifacts related to its disk wiping functionality.
Detects the Tsundere botnet infection chain where msiexec.exe launches a hidden, encoded PowerShell process, which in turn executes a Node.js spawner script.
Detects the execution of a Python interpreter with suspicious characteristics, such as running from a temporary location or using command-line arguments associated with obfuscation and in-memory execution. This behavior is consistent with Python-based stealers like Xillen Stealer.
Detects a PowerShell process launched by a JavaScript script host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) that contains command-line arguments indicative of downloading, decoding, and reflectively loading a payload, a technique used by Phantom Stealer.
Detects network traffic to Solana RPC endpoints containing the wallet address associated with the GlassWorm malware. GlassWorm uses the Solana blockchain as a resilient C2 mechanism by querying for transactions from an attacker-controlled wallet.
This rule detects command and control (C2) communication associated with the Lazarus Group's ScoringMathTea Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header matches a known string used by this malware: 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/107.0.1418.42'. This User-Agent string attempts to masquerade as a legitimate Microsoft Edge browser.
Detects potential execution of BQTLock ransomware by identifying characteristic command-line strings, credential staging files, and associated UAC bypass techniques.
Detects behaviors associated with the LCRYX VBScript ransomware, including modification of the hosts file to block security sites and the download of additional malicious payloads from known malicious URLs.
Detects ScoringMathTea malware by identifying its custom in-line CRC32 table generation routine. This routine, used for integrity checks and anti-debugging, utilizes a unique polynomial constant (0x04C10DB7).
Detects process masquerading and resource abuse techniques used in the ShadowRay 2.0 campaign. This includes processes renamed to mimic legitimate system components (e.g., kworker, dns-filter) and the execution of known cryptominers from unusual locations.
This rule detects Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the UNC1549 threat group and the LIGHTRAIL malware. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic with a URI containing '/news', an 'Upgrade: websocket' header, and a distinct User-Agent string 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 Edge/12.10136'. This combination of indicators suggests an attempt to tunnel C2 communications over HTTP, potentially masquerading as legitimate WebSocket traffic.
Detects the Visual Basic Compiler (vbc.exe) initiating DNS queries. This is highly anomalous behavior, as vbc.exe is a compiler and should not be making network connections. This technique is used by malware like Lokibot for defense evasion after process injection.
Detects the creation of malicious disk images (.dmg) or a dropper file (.msi) associated with the DigitStealer macOS infostealer campaign.
Detects the RedTail cryptominer targeting exposed Docker APIs by looking for specific HTTP request patterns, including the 'libredtail-http' user agent and 'docker.selfrep' parameter in the request body.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests consistent with Lumma Stealer's browser fingerprinting activity. This activity involves contacting a C2 endpoint at '/api/set_agent' with specific URL parameters ('id', 'token', 'description') to register the victim and gather system information.
This rule detects Command and Control (C2) communication associated with the Amatera Stealer malware. It specifically looks for TLS traffic where the Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains the string "aether100pronotification.table.core.windows.net". This SNI is considered bogus and indicative of Amatera Stealer's C2 activity.
Detects network connections to Pastebin.com from a Python process. This behavior is associated with the InvisibleFerret malware, as part of the 'Contagious Interview' campaign, which retrieves additional payloads from Pastebin.
Detects network connections from Node.js to specific JSON storage services known to be abused by the 'Contagious Interview' campaign. Threat actors host malicious code on these services, which is then fetched and executed by trojanized applications as part of a social engineering scheme.
Detects the execution of a JavaScript file via wscript.exe or cscript.exe where the file path in the command line contains a tilde (~). This is indicative of the Gootloader malware, which leverages Windows 8.3 short filenames (e.g., "ADAPTI~1.JS" for "Adaptive Algorithms.js") as part of its persistence mechanism to evade simple string-based detections. The persistence scripts are typically dropped in subfolders under the user's AppData\Roaming directory.
Detects a process loading a commonly hijacked system DLL from a non-standard file path that is unsigned. This is indicative of DLL Search Order Hijacking, a technique used by malware like Rhadamanthys to achieve persistence and stealthy execution.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of Kraken Ransomware activity, specifically looking for connections to Cloudflared tunnels. It identifies TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) containing '.trycloudflare.com', which is a domain used by Cloudflare for its tunnel services. This behavior is often leveraged by adversaries for command and control or data exfiltration, as it can help bypass traditional firewall rules and obscure the true destination of the traffic.
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